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BARRIERS TO THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
HAGUE CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND COOPERATION IN RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
CaeliElizabeth Kimball*
INTRODUCTION

The recent tsunami disaster that devastated many regions in Southeast Asia on
December 27, 2004, has brought an unprecedented outpouring of humanitarian aid
from around the world.' Some of the most heart-rending images beamed into
American homes have been pictures of frightened children temporarily or
permanently separated from their parents, many of whom were killed. In response
to the disaster, Americans have flooded the U.S. Department of State with phone
calls and letters voicing interest in adopting Tsunami orphans.2
American families' strong interest in international adoption is by no means a
new phenomenon. For the last fifty years, economic, social, and political changes
in foreign countries have led hundreds of thousands of American families to adopt
foreign children for altruistic and personal reasons. After World War II, families
from the United States rushed to adopt orphans from Germany, Italy, and Greece.
Similarly, both the Korean and Vietnam wars prompted huge movements by
American families to adopt Korean and Vietnamese children.4 Only thirty
Romanian children were internationally adopted in 1989, but the economic and
social policy shifts of the Cold War allowed for over 10,000 intercountry adoptions
to take place following Nicolae Ceausescu's fall in 1991. 5 China, Russia, and
Korea are examples of sending countries reluctant to allow their orphans to be
internationally adopted, but Russia is currently "the world's largest supplier of
orphans" to U.S. families, with China as a close second.6
Despite the overwhelming number of American families yearning to adopt
tsunami orphans, the Department of State must look to the principles behind the

* Juris Doctor, 2005, University of Denver College of Law; Bachelors Degree, 2002, Smith College.
The author would like to extend a special thanks to her parents for their immense love and support.
1. See eg., Jonathan Padget, Danish Dancing: Morten Misson and Camera Take a Turn Around
the Ballroom, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at C05; CharityBreakfast Aids Asian Tsunami Children, INS.
DAY, Jan. 14, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library, Ins. Day File.
2. Chris Echegaray, Tsunami Orphans' Adoption Restricted, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 7, 2005,
availableat LEXIS. News Library, Tampa Trib. File.
3. Ethan B. Kapstein, The Baby Trade, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Foreign Aff. File.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Linda J. Olsen, Live or Let Die: Could Intercountry Adoption Make the
Difference? 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 483,499-500 (2004).
6. Kapstein, supra note 3.
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U.S. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (JAA) 7 and to international adoption laws
that promote legal adoptions and protect interests of children worldwide.8 In doing
so, the Department of State announced its decision to disallow the adoption of
tsunami children by American families for three reasons: (1) the United States
received reports of child trafficking for illegal adoption of Tsunami children; (2)
the current inability of the countries of origin to determine whether children are
legally orphaned; 9 and (3) the strong likelihood that children are experiencing
substantial trauma from the natural disaster, which would potentially increase the
emotional impact of moving to a foreign country for adoption into a new family. 10
These considerations make a strong cause for caution; intercountry adoption may
not be within the best interests of tsunami children at this time."
These recent events triggered a discussion over international adoption that
should bring renewed attention to the status of the Hague Convention on Protection
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague
Convention). 12 For over a decade, the Hague Convention has been the driving
force for nations to establish governing regulations over a process that leads to a
definitive event in the lives of adopted children and their adoptive families.
Although these efforts have achieved a measure of success to date, 13 significant
political and cultural obstacles must be overcome before an international consensus
regulating intercountry adoptions can truly be put in place. Those barriers, as
shown in this paper, may be insurmountable.
Since its popularization in the 1950s, intercountry adoption has been subject
to a mesh of conflicting adoption laws and red tape in both sending and receiving
countries. 14 It was not until horrific stories of child trafficking and child abduction
were unearthed and reported in international media that international organizations
saw the drastic need to establish uniformity in intercountry adoption regulations
and procedures. 15 In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention on the
7. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit. 1(2d.
Sess. 2000).
8. See Echegaray, supra note 2 [hereinafter IAA]
9. To be deemed an orphan, the country of origin must conclude that the parents of the child are
deceased, or that the child has been legally abandoned in order to legally terminate parental rights.
10. Echegaray, supra note 2; Jean Hopfensperger, Disaster in Asia: Foreign Adoptions: Children
of Tsunami Victims Aren 't Adoption Candidates, STAR TRIB., Jan. 7, 2005, available at LEXIS, News

Library, Star Trib. File. "Country of origin" means the country from which the orphaned child being
adopted is domiciled.
11. Hopfensperger, supra note 10.
12. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, [herein
the "Hague Convention"], 32 I.L.M. 1134, 1135, 1139, (1993).
13. See eg., AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK [herein
"IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK"], Ch. 14, Intro. (2004).

14. Susann M. Bisignaro, Comment: Intercountry Adoption Today and the Implications of the
1993 Hague Convention of Tomorrow, 13 DICK. .. INT'L L. 124, 126-31 (1994). Sending countries are
countries that put their children up for international adoption. Sending countries is synonymous for
"country of origin." Receiving countries are countries where the prospective adoptive parents reside,
which will be the child's country of citizenship once the adoption has been finalized.
15. Kapstein, supra note 3.
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Rights of the Child (CRC), to recognize children's human rights. 16 The CRC laid
the foundation for the Hague Convention, enacted in 1993, which established
regulations and procedures to protect the interests of the children being adopted
and sought to potentially unify international adoption laws. 17 The goals and values
underlying the Hague Convention have been received with great support, with
sixty-four countries ratifying or acceding to the Hague Convention as of August
2004.18 However, the United States, one of the largest receiving countries, and
China and Korea, historically two of the largest sending countries, have yet to
become parties.' 9
Although Congress adopted the IAA in 2000, it had not been put into effect as
of January 2005. Until that occurs, the United States cannot become a party to the
Hague Convention. The concerns delaying the United States' implementation of
the Hague Convention are primarily rooted in financial and business concerns,
rather than cultural and moral perspectives. Not only do sending countries
potentially face these same issues, but many of the primary sending countries also
face the more serious problem of societal and cultural objections to international
adoption of their children. Even if sending countries permit adoptions to take
place, it is unlikely that these sending countries will endorse an international
agreement that imposes procedures that must be followed in order to participate in
international adoptions with member countries.
The Hague Convention fails to address several conceptual and practical issues
that are critical to achieving its goals. Despite good intentions to protect the
interests of children being adopted, and to establish systems for ensuring legal
adoptions, the Hague Convention favors compliance of receiving countries, which
tend to be wealthier and more able to bear the economic burdens posed by
compliance than comparatively poor sending countries. The treaty depends on the
cooperation between the receiving and sending countries, and three of the largest
sending countries-Russia, China, and Korea-have yet to ratify the Hague
Convention over a decade after signing the treaty. 20 Although the Hague
Convention sets forth specific requirements for its members regarding intercountry
adoption procedures, nowhere does the treaty prohibit members from engaging in
intercountry adoptions with non-members. Signatories of the Hague Convention

16. Convention on the Rights of the Child (herein the "CRC"), G.A.Res. 44, U.N. GAOR, 61st
Plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25/20 (1989).
17. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 1.L.M. at 1139.
18. IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13.
19. In this paper, "member states" and "parties" are used interchangeably to label those countries
that have ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention. Countries who ratify the Hague Convention are
referred to as members, parties, or Hague countries. The Hague Convention is referred to by name, or
by "the treaty," as all compacts between nations are described as 'conventions' or as 'treaties,' since
there is no substantial distinction in the terms. See generally 74 AM.JUR.2D TREATIES §2 (2005).
20. This paper recognizes that Russia is the largest sending country at this moment in time;
however, this paper will only focus on China and Korea to examine the impact of the cultural issues in
combination with the economic burdens of implementation that influence these sending countries'
decision to ratify the Hague Convention. Russia does not possess the same long history of participation
in intercountry adoption, nor the history of cultural opposition to the practice like China and Korea.
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agree to the purpose and goals behind the treaty but the treaty dos not require every
signer to ratify or accede to it.
The undue economic burden of compliance, in conjunction with underlying
social and cultural opposition to intercountry adoption, provides little incentive for
ratification by major sending countries, such as China and Korea, who have
actively participated in intercountry adoption for over half a century. In all
likelihood, intercountry adoptions between parties and non-parties to the Hague
Convention will continue even if major sending countries choose not to ratify the
treaty, undermining the goals and purpose of the Hague Convention.
Part I of this paper looks at some of the reasons that sending countries such as
China and Korea depend on intercountry adoption to care for their orphans. From
the sudden trend of allowing international adoptions came corrupt adoption
practices and child trafficking stories that cried for international adoption
regulations. Part II explores the regulations set forth by the Hague Convention and
the influences of early international legislation, attempting to establish regulations
for intercountry adoptions. In addition, this paper addresses issues that were not,
but should have been addressed by the Hague Convention. Part III examines the
steps the United States has taken to ratify the Hague Convention, and the
controversies that have slowed down the process. Part IV looks at the social and
cultural opposition, in conjunction with the economic burdens of compliance on
sending countries that exceeds the burden on receiving countries that make the
major sending countries reluctant and slow to ratify the Hague Convention. This
paper concludes that, although the Hague Convention promotes and regulates the
practice of intercountry adoption, in an effort to protect both the children being
adopted and abolish corrupt practices, the treaty neglects to recognize economic
and cultural issues that impose barriers to some of the major sending countries. By
failing to recognize these major hurdles, the Hague Convention fails to provide
sufficient incentives for major sending countries to become parties to the treaty.
Accordingly, the Hague Convention may not achieve the goals of cooperation
between sending and receiving countries and the unification of international
adoption laws.
I. THE INTEREST AND NEED FOR INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS BEG FOR REGULATION
OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION PRACTICES

A. Interest in IntercountryAdoptions is at an All-Time High
The number of intercountry adoptions has progressively increased over the
last fifty years as sending countries looked internationally for solutions when they
encountered a domestic shortage in available homes for their orphans and
unwanted children. While the concept was virtually unheard of in the United
States prior to World War 11,21 a total of 18,447 foreign-born children were
adopted by U.S. families in the year 2000.22 In 2001, over 34,000 intercountry
21. Olsen, supra note 5, at 496-97 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (1986)).
22. Intercountry Adoption, National Adoption Information Clearinghouse 2001, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f inter/finter.cfm (last visited
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adoptions took place worldwide, with the United States receiving over 19,000
adoptees.23 20,000 foreign born children were adopted in 2003 alone.24 Interest in
intercountry adoption is escalating at such a rapid pace that families willingly foot
international adoption fees anywhere from $12,000 to $30,000 and wait one to
three years for the entire adoption process to be completed.25 The greatest number
of internationally adopted children come from China, Russia, South Korea,
Guatemala, Romania, Vietnam, Ukraine, India, and Cambodia.26 In general, these
countries resort to international adoption as a means of providing for some of their
children when they are faced with economic, social, and political changes or
problems.
B. Overpopulation and Domestic Family Policies Lead Countries to Allow
Their Orphans and Unwanted Children to be internationallyadopted
China and Korea have been two of the primary sending countries for over half
a century. Cultural gender attitudes, overpopulation, and in China's case, domestic
family law policies, lead Asian families to abandon their children, creating a large
number of orphans and unwanted children in need of adoptive homes.27 In Asian
culture, it is atypical to have non-relative adoption, which in part is the reason why
Asian families reject adopting children from overseas.28 The stigma associated
with adopting a non-relative makes it difficult to find willing adoptive parents in
the country of origin. Due to the nonexistence of domestic adoptions and the
increasing number of children overcrowding orphanages, China and Korea turned
to foreign countries for placement of their orphaned children in homes overseas.
1. China
Deeply engrained in the minds of China's people is the belief that sons should
be valued more highly than daughters, leading many Chinese women to abandon
their newborn girls.29 Statistics show that 95 percent of China's orphanages are
filled with females. 30 An estimated 150,000 baby girls are abandoned yearly,
though the Chinese government can hardly guess the number of babies
unknowingly drowned.3'
In conjunction with the dominant value placed on sons, Chinese family law
policies account for the increasing need for Chinese orphans to be internationally
Jan. 3, 2005) [hereinafter NAIC].
23. Kapstein, supra note 3.
24. Ann M. Simmons, U.S. Proposalson Adoptions Abroad get Mixed Reviews, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2003, at A24.
25. NAIC, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. See generally, Jessica L. Singer, Intercountry Adoption Laws: How can China 's One-Child
Policy Coincide with the 1993 Hague Convention on Adoption, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 283
(1998).
28. Id. at 296.
29. See Ivan Png, Change of Chinese Heart on Adoption, STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Nov. 8,
2004, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Straits Times File.
30. Id.
31. RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALSTEIN, ADOPTION ACROSS BORDERS: SERVING THE CHILDREN

IN TRANSRACIAL AND INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS 11 (2000).
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adopted. To control the serious overpopulation problem plaguing China, the
Chinese government implemented a one-child policy in 1979.32 Under this policy,
parents wanting to give birth to more than one child must obtain permission from
their regional government years prior to actual conception. 33 Violations of the onechild policy range from wage cuts to refusal of government benefits, such as food
rations and free education.34 By prohibiting families from having more than one
child, the government places Chinese families under extreme pressure to conceive
a son who can carry on the family name and provide support to his parents in their
old age.35 The government and cultural pressures contribute greatly to the number
of abandoned female newborns simply because they were the first-born children
and were not male.
2. Korea
Like China, Korea has become one of the largest sending countries in the
world for international adoption. The Korean government began allowing its
children to be placed through intercountry adoptions in 1954 and since then
between 150,000 and 200,000 South Korean children have been adopted
internationally. 36 The 1954 action resulted from the large number of Korean
37
Many of
children fathered by American servicemen during the Korean War.
these children were orphaned by the war or abandoned because of their mixed
heritage 38 and rather than deal with them domestically, the Korean government
allowed a large number of them to be internationally adopted. As of 2004, 7,000
Korean children are abandoned each year, and approximately 2,000 of those
children are adopted overseas. 39 For countries such as Korea and China who either
cannot, or are reluctant to care for their orphans, intercountry adoption poses a
good solution for overcrowded orphanages and allows countries to provide orphans
good homes. However, the increase of intercountry adoptions was accompanied
by corruption and wrongdoing, which set the stage for an important effort to
regulate intercountry adoption through international agreements.

32. Id. at 9; Singer, supranote 27, at 290-91. China's population grew from almost 700 million to
just under 1000 million people from the early 1960s to 1979, when the one-child policy was enacted.
at
Country,
Whole
the
of
Data
Demographical
Historical
China:
http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Asia/chinac.htm (last visited March 21, 2005). Since the
policy was enacted in 1979, China's population has only increased by approximately 100 million people
in ten years. Id.
33. Singer, supra note 27, at 291.
34. Id. at 292.
35. Id. at 294.
36. Khang Hyun-sung, Sweet Intent, Bitter Legacy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library, S. China Morning Post File.
37. Id.
38. It can be implied that children of mixed heritage have mixed bloodlines, tainting the purity of
treasured Korean bloodlines. See generally SIMON & ALSTEIN, supranote 31, at 7.
39. A Beautiful Wedding, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 13, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Korea Herald File.
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C. Corrupt Adoption Practices, Child Trafficking and Red Tape Created
Urgencyfor Uniformity of IntercountryAdoption Regulations and Procedures
Allowing children to be internationally adopted provides a service to both
sending and receiving countries. Sending countries can decrease overpopulation
and "get rid of' unwanted children, which in turn allows parents in receiving
countries to adopt a new member into their family when they are unable to have
their own children, or are moved to adopt a child in need. Unfortunately, the many
positive benefits of intercountry adoption opens the door to persons who willingly
facilitate adoptions solely in the interest of turning a profit. One major news story
that exposed corruption in the intercountry adoption process documented how
senior officials in Honduras aided in kidnapping children from poverty-stricken
families and sold them to interested foreigners in the early 1990s. 4 0 A U.N. report,
issued in 2000, revealed that Guatemala was the leading supplier of infants
worldwide, Guatemalans were involved in the "buying and selling of children, the
falsification of documents, the kidnapping of children, and the housing of (these)
Yet another instance of child trafficking
babies awaiting private adoption. '
surfaced, revealing that Romanian nuns coerced single mothers to give up all rights
to their children, allowing the nuns to make up to $15,000 profit per child.42 Over
the years, these stories of corruption tarnished the reputation of intercountry
adoption as a whole, making receiving countries skeptical about "doing business"
with sending countries for fear that they might inadvertently promote corrupt
adoption proceedings.43
The lack of uniformity among national procedures and laws regarding
intercountry adoption not only encouraged corruption, but created red tape for
parents interested in intercountry adoption. 44 For example, many Asian countries
preferred that all adoption proceedings be handled by U.S.-based adoption
agencies; contrastingly, countries in Central and South America preferred direct
adoptions, requiring the adoptive parents to directly contact orphanages and child
services in the foreign country.45 Along with the lack of procedural uniformity
came a lack of monitoring and enforcement of adoption procedures, allowing
governments in the sending countries to demand more "gifts" in return for
relinquishing a child.46
Faced with the reports of corrupt adoption procedures and child trafficking,
many receiving countries condemned countries known for their corrupt adoption

40. Kapstein, supra note 3.
41. Id.
42. Amy Grillo Kales, The IntercountryAdoption Act of 2000: Are its Laudable Goals Worth its
Potential Impact on Small Adoption Agencies, Independent Intercountry Adoptions, and Ethical
Independent Adoption Professionals?36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 477, 484 (2004).
43. Sending countries known for selling their children have tarnished reputations, as it shows that
the countries are not following regulations to promote lawful adoptions. See generally Kapstein, supra
note 3.
44. Bisignaro, supranote 14, at 125.
45. Id. at 125-26.
46. Id. at 126.
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practices, refusing to "do business" with them.47 A struggle emerged, as countries
could not condone the corrupt behavior of some sending countries, 48 yet so many
benefits came from the practice of intercountry adoption. There was an imminent
need for regulation of intercountry adoptions and protection of children's rights.
Individual countries, as well as international bodies of law decided that it was time
to take action and create some uniformity in adoption laws to prevent child
trafficking and safeguard proper adoption procedures.
II.

THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL UNIFORMITY OF PROCEDURES TO

GOVERN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS

A. Convention on the Rights of the Child
From the many instances of child trafficking that began soon after the
popularization of intercountry adoption, the United Nations made a formal push to
recognize the human rights of children by adopting the CRC on November 20,
1989.49 The CRC is rooted in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of
1924, the first international declaration to recognize that children are entitled to
special care and protection.5 ° The CRC defines a child as "every human being
below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier." 5' All parties to the CRC are responsible for protecting
children against all forms of discrimination and punishment.52 Two monumental
points of the CRC are the requirement that all action be taken in "the best interest
of the child,, 53 and that parties will protect against child trafficking by
"combat[ing] the illicit transfer and non-return of the children abroad. 54 These
principles carried over into the Hague Convention.
B. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in
Respect of IntercountryAdoption
Protecting the interests of the child and combating child trafficking were
important first steps made by the CRC, but regulation and monitoring of
intercountry adoptions were essential pieces missing from that treaty. Uniformity
of regulations and systematic oversight of intercountry adoption proceedings
represented key components to achieving the premises set forth in the CRC.
On May 29, 1993, the Hague Convention was completed, thereby introducing
measures to govern international adoptions.55 Signing the Hague Convention
47. Echegaray, supra note 2.
48. Countries infamous for their corrupt practices are Honduras, Guatemala, and other Central
American countries. See Kapstein, supra note 3.
49. CRC, supra note 16. The Commission on Human Rights drafted the CRC. Id. Human rights
of a child not only include humanitarian rights, but civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.
Id.
50. Id. at Preamb. The Declaration was drafted by Save the Children International Union, and
adopted by the League of Nations in 1924.
51. Id. at art.1.
52. Id. at art.2(2).
53. Id. at art.3(l).
54. Id. at art.1(1).
55. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1134-36, Introductory Note.
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indicates an intention to eventually become a party to the treaty; 56 however,
countries who sign the treaty are under no obligation to ratify it. 57 The Hague
Convention only legally binds those countries who ratify the treaty to become
members.58 Therefore, countries may choose to accede to the Hague Convention,
instead of ratifying 59it, affirming their commitment to the policy without becoming
bound by its terms.

As of August 1, 2004, sixty-four countries have become parties to the Hague
Convention. 60 To be successful, the Hague Convention needs the participation of
both the sending and receiving nations. 61 The four primary goals of the Hague
Convention are:
(1) to ensure that the international adoption is in the child's best interest;
(2) to create a cooperative system amongst participating nations, in efforts to
curtail child trafficking and prevent other abuses;
(3) to ensure that intercountry adoptions that conform to the Hague Convention's
requirements are recognized; and
62
(4) to ensure proper consent to the adoption.
To accomplish these goals, the Hague Convention poses three generalized
categories of compliance: (1) investigation of the child and the parents to ensure
that the adoption is in the child's best interests; 63 (2) creation of a central authority
in each member state to establish domestic adoption regulations and to oversee all
56. Meghan Hendy, Hague Convention: Next Steps for the United States, Bulletin of the Joint
available at
2004),
(Winter
Services,
on
International Children 's
Council
www.jcics.org/HagueNextSteps.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2005).
57. Id.
58. Notesong Srisopark Thompson, Note: Hague is Enough?: A Call for More Protective,
Uniform Law GuidingInternationalAdoptions, 22 WIS. INT'L L. J. 441,457 (2004).
59. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1144, Ch.VII, art. 44; Thompson, supra note
58, at 459.
60. Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, Status Table, Member States of the Organisation [herein "Status Table of
http://hcch.eat
available
Convention"]
Hague
with
States
Contracting
vision.nl/index en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last visited Jan. 15, 2005); see also
IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13. The sixty-four countries party to the Hague
Convention are: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea,
Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,
Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Id.
61. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1134-38, Context Summary.
62. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1139, Ch.l, art.I; see also U.S. Department of
Justice, Fact Sheet: The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Approval of the Hague Convention
Regarding Intercountry Adoption, Immigration and Naturalization Service [herein "US Approval of
Hague Convention"], available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/adoption.htm (last
visited Jan. 3, 2005); Thompson, supra note 58, at 456.
63. Hague Convention, supranote 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1139, Ch.l, art ..
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intercountry adoption proceedings; 64 and (3) cooperation among sending and
process to legitimize the adoption in
receiving countries throughout the adoption
65
both the sending and receiving countries.
The Hague Convention divides the initial investigation of the child and the
66
The sending
prospective parents between the sending and receiving countries.
country is responsible for establishing that the child is an orphan without existing
parental ties, 67 while the receiving country must conduct home studies to determine
68
the fitness of the prospective family to raise and care for the child. Both of these
processes are imperative to concluding that the adoption is in the best interests of
the child. In order to make such a determination, the sending country must
establish: (1) that the child is adoptable; (2) the adoption is in the child's best
interests; and (3) consent from necessary parties, such as persons, institutions, and
authorities that have been "duly informed of the effects of their consent," and have
given their consent freely. 69 A child may not be adopted unless he or she is legally
orphaned; 70 defined as one whose two living natural parents are incapable of
properly caring for the child and whose parents freely give written irrevocable
consent to terminate their legal relationship with the child, allowing the child to be
adopted and emigrate.71
The receiving state must ensure that: (1) the prospective adoptive parents are
both "eligible and suited to adopt"; (2) the prospective parents have been
counseled on intercountry adoption and the process; and (3) the child is authorized
to enter and permanently reside in the receiving state.72 These investigatory
parents coming forward in the future
procedures eliminate the possibility of birth
73
to declare that the child is not an orphan.
To ensure that the proper investigations and duties are performed, the Hague
Convention requires countries to establish a central authority to oversee all steps
of the intercountry adoption process.74 To effectuate the purpose behind the Hague
Convention, the central authorities set requirements for accreditation of non-profit
adoption agencies,75 as well as staffing requirements to ensure that adoptive
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1139-1136, Ch. I, artil, Ch. IIl.
Id. at 1139, Ch.l, art. 1.
Id. at 1139-40, Ch. 11,art.4-5.
Id., Ch. II, art.4.
Id. at 1140, Ch. [1, art.5.
Id. at 1140, Ch.ll, art.4(l)-(3).

AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS §3:15 (2004) [herein
IMMIGRATION LAW & BUS.].

71. Id.;

AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION HANDBOOK

[hereinafter

IMMIGRATION LEG. HANDBOOK] §4:34 (2004).

72. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1140, Chll, art.5.
73. Id. at 1142, Ch. V, art.26.
74. Id. at 1140, Ch.Ill, art.6-10; see also Madelyn Freundlich, Transracial & Transcultural
Adoptions: A Look at the Ethical Issues, 27 FAM. ADVOC. 40, 43 (2004);Thompson, supra note 58, at
458.
75. Hague Convention, supranote 12, 32 I.L.M at 1140, Ch.IlI, art.10-12. The Hague Convention
requires the accreditation of adoption agencies who wish to handle intercountry adoptions. Id. To
become an accredited non-profit agency (as the Hague Convention only regulates non-profit agencies),
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76
agencies are operated efficiently by trained, experienced, and qualified staff.
Other important functions relegated to the central authorities are maintaining
information on all children entering and leaving the authority's borders through
intercountry adoption, establishing the suitability and eligibility of the prospective
adoptive parents, and granting authorization for the child to enter and permanently
reside in the receiving state. 7' By supervising each step of the intercountry
adoption process, central authorities are kept well-informed, preventing any
potential financial gain by disallowing corrupt adoption practices to slip past
authorities.78

To ensure that the adoptions are legally recognized both in the sending and
receiving countries, the Hague Convention sets forth requirements for the sending
and receiving countries to actively communicate and cooperate with one another
throughout the process. 79 This partly involves the exchange of necessary
information such as statistics, standard forms, and laws.8° In addition, central
authorities must issue adoption or custody certificates for all adoptions of children
residing in Hague countries, providing conclusive evidence of the relationship
between the adopted child and the adoptive parents. 81 The Hague Convention
enumerated this requirement due to past problems with recognizing intercountry
adoptions once the child emigrated to his or her new home and country.82 By law,
adoptions certified by the authority of the country of origin must be legally
recognized in other receiving countries. 83 "Recognition" includes acknowledgment
of the legal relationship between the adoptive parents and the adoptive child, the
parental responsibility of the adoptive parents for the child, and the termination of
84
the pre-existing legal relationship between the child and his or her mother.
By setting forth these regulations that require member states' compliance, the
Hague Convention hopes to ensure, first and foremost, that all intercountry
adoptions are in the best interests of the child. In general, widespread ratification
or accession to the Hague Convention could unify intercountry adoption laws. The
Hague Convention needs the support of the majority of sending and receiving
countries to work together to end child trafficking and corrupt adoption practices.
The efficiency of the intercountry adoption process and the unification of
intercountry adoption laws stand to strengthen the reputation of the practice.
Though it is important to point out the positive effects of the Hague Convention, it
is equally imperative to review the pitfalls of the international treaty.

agencies must meet ethical standards, training standards for its employees, and be subject to
supervision by authorities of the State. Id.
76. Id. at 1140, Ch.lli, art.l l(b).
77. Id. at 1140, Ch.lll, art.6-18; Freundlich, supra note 74, at 43; Thompson, supra note 58, at
458.
78. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1140, Ch.lll, art.8.
79. Id. at 1141, Ch.Ill, art.7, 20.
80. Id. at 1140, Ch.Ill, art.7.
81. Id. at 1141, Ch.lll, art.15-16; IMMIGRATION LEG. HANDBOOK, supra note 71.
82. Bisignaro, supra note 14, at 130-32.
83. Hague Convention, supra note 13, 32 I.L.M at 1142, Ch.I1l, art.23.
84. Id. at 1142, Ch.Ill, art.26 (1)(C).
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C. The Hague Convention Fails to Address Important Issues Regarding
Compliance
Despite establishing safeguards and uniformity, the Hague Convention fails to
address several issues that are crucial to its ultimate implementation. These issues
perpetuate inequalities in sending and receiving countries' compliance with the
Hague Convention. For example, one would assume that the Hague Convention
would specifically prohibit intercountry adoptions with non-members, but this is
stated nowhere in the text of the treaty. Such a requirement would provide an
incentive and motivation for both sending and receiving countries to comply with
Hague Convention regulations. In addition, the signers of the Hague Convention
are not required to take any actions towards ratifying or acceding to the treaty,
imposing no obligations upon non-members. Countries that do choose to ratify or
accede to the treaty must incorporate the Hague Convention terms into their
domestic and international laws, which is no small feat.85 Although a sending or
receiving country may support the goals of the Hague Convention, the economic
and other costs of compliance may be overly burdensome, potentially causing nonparties to put off compliance with the Hague Convention to a point in the future, if
ever, thereby losing any incentive to become a party now.
Another interesting piece missing from the Hague Convention is a section
regarding penalties for non-compliance with the regulations-this job is reserved
for each member state to determine through its own legislation and its central
authority. 86 The problem with leaving punishment, such as sanctions or fines, up
to the individual countries is that self-regulation could encourage corrupt adoption
practices that will go unpunished without a non-partisan governmental
organization monitoring compliance and administering enforcement.
By failing to create an immediate incentive for countries to take measures to
become parties to the Hague Convention, the treaty allows for sending countries to
hold off on compliance-common sense indicates that receiving countries are
more likely to be punished by non-compliance than sending countries. Currently
the United States is one of the countries that has signed, but not yet ratified the
87
Hague Convention, and is not expected to ratify it until late 2006 or early 2007.
One potential repercussion of U.S. failure to ratify the Hague Convention is that
some member countries may limit their intercountry adoptions to other member
resulting in a suspension of adoptions with the United States
countries, possibly 88
ratification.
its
until
Interestingly, more frequently the sending countries will restrict working with
non-parties and seldom do receiving countries enforce such a restriction, unless the

85. In order for countries to be members of the Hague Convention, they must integrate the Hague
Convention requirements into their domestic laws. See generally Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32
I.L.M. at 1139-40, Ch.I, Ch. II..
86. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1139-41, Ch. II.
87. Hendy, supra note 56; IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13; Freundlich, supra
note 74.
88. Freundlich, supra note 74, at 42.
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sending country is well-known for child-trafficking. 9 Sending countries that have
historically prevented Americans from adopting their children, such as Bolivia,
Brazil, and Slovakia, would open their orphanages to Americans, if the United
States complied with the Hague Convention regulations.9" Receiving countries
actively seek intercountry adoption due to low birth rates and are therefore less
likely to place restrictions on the countries from where they may receive children
based on the desire to adopt and create families.
The Hague Convention created inequality among the receiving countries and
sending countries, making it more likely that receiving countries will comply with
the treaty in order to broaden the possibilities of places to receive children. At the
same time, sending countries have the liberty to be particular about the countries
that may adopt their children, and it is unlikely that receiving Hague countries will
cease to engage in intercountry adoptions with non-Hague countries. The cost and
organization required to conform with the Hague Convention pose two reasons
why some countries continue to avoid the Hague Convention 9' or have trouble
complying.
III.

THE UNITED STATES ENACTS THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF

2000

The United States is regarded as a wealthy receiving country, yet it is not one
of the sixty-four countries that has ratified the Hague Convention. Supporting the
Hague Convention's purpose and goals is one thing--complying with the
regulations to ratify the treaty is an entirely different matter. Taking the first steps
towards compliance, the United States passed the IAA in 2000,92 which is only the
first step to fully implement the Hague Convention. The delay in the U.S.
ratification of the Hague Convention in part stems from the long process of
reviewing the public comments regarding the proposed legislation, 93 and the
opposition voiced by many adoption agencies.
A. U.S. IntercountryAdoption Laws Priorto the ]AA
Strongly supporting the intentions and goals of the Hague Convention, the
United States, like other supporting countries, has worked to comply with the
regulations in order to become a party to the treaty. As one of the largest receiving
countries, the United States would benefit from becoming a party to the Hague
Convention through newfound access to adopt from countries that previously have
refused the United States as a recipient of children.94

89. See Echegaray, supra note 2.
90. Jeff D. Opdyke, Changes in Global Rules Toughen Process,WALL STREET J., Oct. 14, 2003

availableat http://www.lgrl.org/news/article.php?newslD=578 (last visited March 21, 2005).
91. Id.
92. See SARAH IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FAMILY,
§ 13:35, Hague Convention On Intercountry Adoption (2005).
93. The Department of State publishes the rules and reviews public comments submitted during
the public comment period. They may choose to incorporate the suggestions and modifications from
the public comments into the regulations but are not required to do so. The review period typically is
open for 90 days unless the Department chooses to extend the time period. See generally I Admin. L.
& Prac. § 4.32 (2d ed. 2005); Hendy, supra note 56.
94. Opdyke, supra note 90.
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The United States signed the Hague Convention on March 31, 1994,
demonstrating its intent to ratify the Hague Convention. 95 Congress passed the
IAA in September of 2000, establishing intercountry adoption regulations to
er20,teUS
comport with the Hague Convention. 96te Since September 2004, the U.S.
Department of State has been reviewing public comments to the proposed
regulations.97 By revamping the U.S. intercountry adoption policies, the IAA
benefits the United States, as well as starting the process of compliance with the
Hague Convention regulations.
Prior to the IAA, some called U.S. intercountry adoption policies and
procedures inefficient thanks to the repetitive nature of the process.98 Adoptive
parents not only had to comply with the country of origin's laws, where they might
only gain guardianship of the child, but also were required to go through the U.S.
judicial systems to fully adopt the child.99 Often times, parents of adoptive
children had to re-adopt the child in the U.S. after adopting the child in the country
of origin because two-thirds of the U.S. courts failed to recognize the validity of
the adoption in the country of origin. 100 Another redundancy that occurred during
the pre-IAA intercountry adoption process came from complying with the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) requirements to obtain an orphan's
visa. This process often duplicated the check that the country of origin performed
to ensure that the child was an orphan and that the adoption was in the best
interests of the child through home studies of the prospective parents. 10 1 In
addition, each state has adoption laws and procedures that must be complied with
in order to finalize an adoption.10 2 These administrative glitches and problems
served as deterrents to potential adoptive parents who otherwise would adopt
internationally, if not for the redundant process and red tape.
B. The IntercountryAdoption Act of 2000
The purpose of the IAA is three-fold:
(1) to implement the Hague Convention in the United States;
(2) to protect the rights and prevent the abuses against children, birth families,
and adoptive parents involved in adoptions subject to the Hague Convention,
ensuring the adoptions are in the children's best interests; and
seeking to
(3) to improve the federal government's ability to assist U.S.10families
3
adopt children from countries party to the Hague convention.
The IAA outlines the responsibilities of various federal agencies in regard to

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100
101.
102.
103.
at 494.

Thompson, supra note 58, at 457.
Anna Mary Coburn, et al., InternationalFamily Law, 38 INT'L LAW 493,493 (2004).
IMMIGRATION PROC. HANDBOOK, supra note 13.
Bisignaro, supra note 14, at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 131. See eg., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§19-5-200 to -216 (2005).
Bisignaro, supra note 14, at 131.
IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, §2(b); Cobum, supra note 96,
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intercountry adoption."° In accordance with the Hague Convention's requirement
that each country designate a central authority to be responsible for intercountry
adoption, the Department of State and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of
Children's Issues was designated as the central authority. 10 5 Along with the
Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services and the INS
worked to draft federal implementing legislation to conform with the Hague
Convention regulations. 0 6 As the central authority, the Department of State is
responsible for monitoring the adoption procedures in each adoption case and for
all incoming and outgoing adoptions, as well as
creating a case registry to record
10 7
an annual report to Congress.
A substantial portion of the IAA establishes an accreditation system for
adoption agencies and provides for the monitoring of accredited agencies to ensure
that the agencies comply with the IAA and the Hague Convention. One of the
most controversial sections of the IAA is Public Law Section 203(B)-G), which
requires agencies to: (1) hire a sufficient number of trained, qualified personnel;
(2) possess sufficient financial resources, organizational structure and procedures;
(3) hire social services professionals to capably provide adoption services; and (4)
have liability insurance.' 8 Agencies and approved individuals who fail to comply
with either the IAA or the Hague Convention are subject to enforcement actions
9
such as sanctions and suspension or cancellation of accreditation. 1
The IAA also adds a new Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(1)(G) for
international adoptions. 1° The new definition of child requires adoptive parents to
be U.S. citizens and at least twenty five years of age in order to adopt a child under
the age of sixteen at the time the immigrant petition is filed. 1 ' Similar to the
language in the Hague Convention, Public Law Section 103(b) requires that the
Attorney General be satisfied with the investigatory process before she can
parents are fit to care for the child and that the child
conclude that the prospective
112
is indeed an orphan.
On September 15, 2003, the Department of State published a proposed rule in
the Federal Register, addressing the accreditation of adoption agencies and
113
approval of persons providing adoption services in Hague Convention cases.
104. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit.l, §§101-103.
105. Id. at §101; U.S. Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62. See also Thompson, supra
note 58, at 458; Peter H. Pfund, Introductory Note to the U.S. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, 41
I.L.M. 222, 222 (2002).
106. Pfund, supra note 105, at 222.
107. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit.1,§§102(e), 104.
108. Id. at §203(b)(1)(B)-(G).
109. Id. at §202(3).
110. Id. at §302(a)(3); U.S. Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62; IGNATIUS & STICKNEY,
supranote 92.
111. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L.106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit.3, §302(a)(3); U.S.
Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62; IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supranote 92.
112. IAA, supra note 7, Pub. L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, §302(a)(i)-(IV); U.S.
Approval of Hague Convention, supra note 62.
113. Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercontry Adoption Act of 2000; Accreditation
of Agencies; Approval of Persons; Preservation of Convention Records, 68 Fed.Reg. 54064, 68
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Once a final list of accredited and approved adoption providers is completed, the
United States will be in a position to ratify the Hague Convention.! 14 The
Department of State has been preoccupied with reviewing public comments, many
of which voice an opposition to the legislation based on the imposing liability costs
and administrative costs of compliance for the adoption agencies.
C. Serious Concerns Over Financial, Licensing, and Administrative
Operations Issues Have Delayed Adoption of Regulations and Ratification of the
Hague Convention
Despite the time and energy put forth to draft and pass legislation reforming
intercountry adoption regulations, the United States still has a ways to go before it
can ratify the Hague Convention. One of the current controversies that keeps the
United States from ratifying the Hague Convention is the varied reactions of
adoption agency services in regard to the requirements of the IAA. 5 Some
adoption agencies are concerned that the costs of international adoptions will
increase with the regulations. 1 6 Typically, international adoption fees cost
anywhere between $15,000 - $25,000."17 The regulations may cause smaller
agencies to go out of business because compliance will impose greater liability
upon the agencies, as well as increased fees. 118 Weeding out the small adoption
agencies might make it impossible for anyone but the larger agencies with the
strongest financial profile and largest liability insurance policies to succeed in the
adoption business.
Many adoption agencies, large and small, 119 have voiced concerns that
compliance with the stringent regulations requires large extensions of insurance
coverage and carrying three months operating expenses as a financial base,
potentially putting many of them out of business. 120 The IAA, as written, makes
the U.S. agencies responsible for the actions of their employees working abroad,

Fed.Reg. 54119 (proposed Sept. 15, 2005), (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 96, 22 C.F.R. pt. 98),
available at http://www.gpoaccessgov/fr/index.html (last visited March 21, 2005); Public Comments
Update, at www.travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation/implementation_470.htm (last visited
March 21, 2005); Coburn, supra note 96, at 494.
114. Coburn, supra note 96, at 494.
115. Freundlich, supra note 74, at 43.
116. Simmons, supra note 24.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Spence Chapin may be considered a large agency, as it handles between 140-170 international
adoptions a year, while an agency like Angel's Haven Outreach only handles a total of 40-50 adoptions
in a year. See Spence Chapin Services to Families and Children, Comments on Proposed Regulations
Issued by the Department of State Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption and the Intercountry
Adoption Act of 2000, Accreditation of Agencies, Approval of Persons, Preservation of Convention
Records
[herein
"Spence
Chapin"],
Dec.
15,
2003,
at
1,
available at
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_1519.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2005); Angel's
Haven
Outreach,
Public
Comment,
Dec.
15,
2003,
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_ 519.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
120. See AAA Partners in Adoption, Inc. [herein "AAA Partners"], Public Comment, Nov. 6, 2003,
available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_1519.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2005).
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whether they committed errors as innocuous, as clerical errors, or serious problems
such as medical misdiagnoses or inaccurate documentation. 21 The New Jerseybased agency, Reaching Out Thru International Adoption, submitted a public
comment to the Department of State, declaring, "American agencies cannot
reasonably be expected to visit every orphanage, attend every' 22doctor's visit, file
every paper for every child eligible for international adoption.",
Despite their support for the goals and purpose behind the Hague Convention
and the IAA, Spence-Chapin Services to Families and Children (Spence-Chapin), a
private, non-profit adoption agency that handles between 140-170 international
adoptions a year, expressed opposition to the proposed regulations that hold
primary provider agencies responsible for actions of entities abroad. 23 SpenceChapin argued that, as written, the regulations would impose "an unmanageable
financial burden on the agencies," to the point that they are "unworkable and
Spence-Chapin voiced that compliance with day-to-day
unrealistic."'' 24
supervision of American adoption agencies' international counterparts would be
would be impossible, putting many
extremely costly, and therefore compliance
25
adoption agencies out of business.
The price of liability insurance would spike to prohibitive levels due to the
new liability placed on primary adoption services; furthermore, many insurance
companies are likely to refuse to insure the adoption agencies. 26 In addition, the
fail to
proposed regulations "invite litigation," because the proposed regulations
27
cap damages, provide a quantum of proof, or statute of limitations.
Another common concern and complaint of organizations writing in public
comments to the Department of State, is the unrealistic nature and impracticality of
all staff members to have a Master's Degree in Social Work (herein a
requiring 128
"MSW").
Spence-Chapin commends the State Department for requiring that
staff members conducting home studies and other social services functions, be
required to have a master's degree in social work or related fields, as well as
significant clinical experience. 29 For other agencies, such as the Family Adoption
Consultants, which handles between 100-120 international adoption cases yearly,
the master's degree requirement for staff members would heavily increase their
operations costs and limit available staff. 130 In their opinion, a Bachelor's Degree
in social work or human services is more than sufficient. 1 3 ' This IAA requirement
121. Simmons, supra note 24.
122. Id.
123. Spence Chapin, supra note 119, at 13.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.at 7.
127. Id. at 7-8.
128. AAA Partners, supra note 120; Family Adoption Consultants, Public Comment, Dec. 1, 2003,
(last visited Jan. 16,
available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/implementation_1519.htm
2005).
129. Spence Chapin, supra note 119.
130. Family Adoption Consultants, supra note 128.
131. Id.
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would prevent qualified staff members with years of experience and degrees from
working 2 for adoption agencies solely because these staff members never received a
13

MSW.

The concerns voiced in the public comments demonstrate that the language of
the IAA poses major issues to adoption agencies. Liability insurance premiums
will likely reject coverage of many adoption agencies, based on the new IAA
requirement that agencies be liable for all actions of overseas employees, over
whom agencies have limited control. 33 In addition, the requirement that staff
members earn a MSW precludes many qualified employees from operating
adoption agencies. 34 As the public comments show, it will be extremely difficult
for adoption agencies to be accredited in accordance with the IAA, and in turn the
Hague Convention, if the language of the statute remains unchanged. Over a
decade after signing the Hague Convention, the United States is still attempting to
ratify the treaty. 135 The message that comes across from the United States' slow
movement towards ratification is that compliance with the Hague Convention takes
a great deal of time, effort, and money and that it creates many conflicts along the
way.
The problems that the United States faces in its efforts to ratify and
implement the Hague Convention plague sending countries on an even larger scale.
Major sending countries allow their children to be raised with adoptive families
overseas due to the sending countries' inabilities to care for them. 36 In addition to
the financial burdens of compliance, cultural issues and national pride create
potential walls to the ratification and compliance of sending countries, which will
in turn, potentially undermine the goals of the Hague Convention.
IV.

RATIFICATION OF PRIMARY SENDING COUNTRIES
CULTURAL OPPOSITION AND ECONOMIC BURDENS

IS

THREATENED

BY

A. Social Stigmas and Conflicting Domestic Policies Make it Unlikely that
China and Korea will Ratify the Hague Convention
1. Domestic Policies Interfere with Compliance with the Hague Convention
Although China signed the Hague Convention in November 2000,137 the
country has yet to ratify it, or show signs that it will in the future.' 38 Chinese law

132. AAA Partners, supra note 120.
133. The IAA requires that each adoption agency have liability insurance. IAA, supra note 7, Pub.
L. 106-279, Stat. 682, 2000 H.R. 2909, tit. 3, §203(b)(l)(E).
134. AAA Partners, supra note 120.
135. See Freundlich, supra note 74, at 43.
136. See eg. Singer, supra note 27, at 306.
137. Status Table of Contracting States to the Hague Convention, supra note 60.
138. Singer, supra note 27, at 304. Russia has yet to ratify the Hague Convention, though it seems
like ratification could occur in the future, based on a comment by Russian Federation Council Social
Policy Committee Chairman, Valentina Petrenko, who says that the Education Ministry will be the
Central Authority "after the document's ratification." U.S. Senators Moves to Protect Adopted
Children's Rights, INTERFAX NEws AGENCY (RUSSIA), April 16, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Interfax News Agency File.
Some objections that Russians have against international
adoption is the belief that their children should be raised in the Russian culture. Penny Owen, From
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gives preference to friends and relatives of the biological parents adopting the
child.' 39 In 1992, China passed an adoption law stating that foreigners may adopt
Chinese children, thereby abandoning its old requirement that the adoptive parents
be of Chinese descent or have close ties to China. 140 The Republic of China agreed
to treat foreigners, regardless of heritage, the same as nationals. 14 1 Though China
established the China Adoption Organization to regulate adoption in order to stop
child trafficking, 142 China has yet to take steps necessary to ratify the Hague
Convention.
Part of the problem is that China would need to change its domestic family
laws. China's current law conflicts with the Hague Convention, as Chinese law
states, "an adoption shall not contravene laws and regulations on family planning
laws and regulations.' 43 Chinese parents who give up a child for adoption may
not have another child without violating the family planning regulations.' 44 The
one-child policy encourages Chinese families to abandon their female babies until
a male is born, conflicting with the Hague Convention's goal of taking all
145
appropriate measures to allow the child to remain in his or her family of origin.
In light of the China's difficulty in changing its domestic laws to comply with the
international regulations, it becomes clear that ratification of the Hague
Convention would be no small feat for China.
2. Underlying Beliefs that Adoption is Disgraceful Make Sending Countries
Wary of Further Encouraging Incountry Adoption
In Asian regions, particularly Korea, bloodlines are extremely important
because they establish one's character. 46 Despite this pride, Korea has a
reputation for being a major baby exporter, sending thousands of its children to be
adopted overseas. 147 Part of Korean opposition to sending Korean children
overseas to be adopted by non-Korean families is the belief that adoption will strip

Russia with Love: American Families Embrace Russian Orphans, THE SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 2,

1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Sunday Oklahoman File.
139. Singer, supra note 27, at 304.
140. Adoption Law of the People's Republic of China, April I, 1992, Ch.Il, art.2 (1992); see also
Crystal J. Gates, China 's Newly Enacted IntercountryAdoption Law: Friend or Foe, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 369, 386 (1999).
141. Gates, supra note 119, at 386 (citing Order of the President of the People's Republic of China
No. 54, Adoption Law of the People's Republic of China [herein "Adoption Law of the People's
Republic of China"], availableat http://www.fwcc.org/china-adoption-law_98.htm (last visited Jan. 1,
2005)).
142. Id. at 387-88. The China Adoption Organization supervises the intercountry adoption process
and coordinates adoption by foreigners. Id. at 387. The China Adoption Organization looks at the
applications and investigates the qualifications of each set of prospective parents. Id. If the China
Adoption Organization approves the adoption, then it will proceed to find a prospective child to be
adopted. Id. at 388.
143. Adoption Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 141, Ch. 1, art.3.
144. Singer, supra note 27, at 307.
145. Id. at 308-09; Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M at 1139, Ch. 11.
146. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 31, at 7.
147. Hyun-sung, supra note 36; Rethinking Adoption, KOREAN HERALD, Aug. 9, 2004, availableat
2004 WL 55442567.
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the child of his or her lineage and heritage, on which Korean culture prides
149
itself. 148 Culturally, Koreans see adoption as "disgraceful [and] shameful.
Korea's reputation as a baby exporter has fueled the societal belief that adoption
disgraces the country. 150 For example, one story that made headlines in the run-up
to the 1988 Seoul Olympics was, "Babies for Sale: South Korea makes them,
America buys them."' 151 In response to the worldwide publicity attracted by this
moratorium on the number
judgmental headline, the Korean government placed a 52
of Korean children available for intercountry adoption.1
When Korea's economy was growing in the 1990s, 153 the Korean government
contemplated ending intercountry adoption altogether by 2015,154 feeling that the
nation should move toward full dependency on domestic adoption. 55 To
encourage domestic adoptions, the government offered benefits in the form of
housing loans, tax exemptions, and school fee exemptions to Korean families
willing to adopt Korean children. 156 However, a slow down in Korea's economic
growth, forced the government to increase the number of overseas adoptions again
in 1998, at least temporarily delaying progress toward ending intercountry
adoption, 157 because Korea was not prospering at the rate it had hoped. 158 Thus,
to decrease the number of
nationalism and economics provoked the movement
159
children available for international adoption.
The national pride fueling the Korean government's desire to take care of its
children backfired, as few Koreans wanted to adopt children who were not of their
own family bloodlines. 160 Cultural beliefs prevent Korean families from wanting
to raise children outside of their blood lines.' 6 1 Of the 7,000 children who are
orphaned and abandoned in Korea each year, Koreans only adopt 1,600-1,700.162
Korean adoption laws are extremely particular in regard to who may be
certified as an adoptive parent. Foreign families are granted permission to
internationally adopt Korean children, only as a last resort once the government
163
has exhausted all methods to find willing Korean families to adopt the children.
148. SIMON & ALSTEIN, supra note 31, at 7.
149. Hyun-sung, supra note 36.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. SIMON & ALSTEIN, supra note 31, at 8.
154. Shin Hye-son, Foreign Adoptions Increase for the First Time in 11 Years, KOREA HERALD,
May 5, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Korea Herald File.
155. Margaret Liu, InternationalAdoption: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 187, 238
n.128 (1994).
156. Hye-son, supra note 154.
157. Hyun-Sung, supranote 36.
158. PM Thaksin is Right to Apply Business Practices to Military Procurement, THE NATION
(THAILAND), July 9, 2003 availableat LEXIS, News Library, The Nation File.
159. See id.
160. A Beautiful Wedding, supra note 39.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Liu, supranote 155, at 203.
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Though international adoption is allowed, the Korean government restricts eligible
prospective parents to married, heterosexual couples in good health and of solid
moral character and economic stability, with the stipulation that the parents
provide the child with an education, as well as freedom of religion.1 64
Based on national pride, cultural beliefs, and domestic policies, China and
Korea are unlikely to ratify the Hague Convention in the foreseeable future,
despite their consistent use of the intercountry adoption system to care for their
orphaned children. Although China and Korea both allow for intercountry
adoption, they both have expressed an inclination for having children domestically
adopted, preferably by relatives, or if relatives are not an option, friends of the
child's parents.
B. The Burden of Complying with the Hague Convention Establishes Another
Reasonfor Sending Countries to Refuse Ratification
The problems that the Hague Convention poses to sending countries are the
same as those posed to receiving countries, though the means of compliance
present a far greater burden on sending countries. 165 The United States is
unquestionably one of the wealthiest and most powerful countries in the world and
one of the largest receivers of internationally adopted children,166 yet the United
States has pushed off ratification of the Hague Convention year to year, currently
estimating full compliance and ratification sometime in 2006 or 2007.167
Compliance takes a great deal of time and money; for poorer countries facing
political turmoil and economic down turn, compliance poses an even bigger
problem. The Hague Convention delegates an enormous responsibility upon the
sending countries to investigate the legality of the child who168is orphaned and to
determine whether the adoption is in the child's best interests.
As history shows, intercountry adoption is at its peak when world disasters,
wars, and other economic or political changes occur because richer and more
stable countries have families who want to try to rescue children from the plight of
poverty and instability.' 69 These disasters and situations of turmoil make it
extremely difficult for affected countries to support their children, thus forcing
them to allow their children to be internationally adopted. China's orphanages in

164. Id.
165. See generally Kelly M. Witmer, Curbing Child-Trafficking in Intercountry Adoptions: Will
Treaties and Adoption MoratoriumsAccomplish the Job in Cambodia? 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 595,
617 (2003).
166. See discussion,supra.
167. Thomson, supranote 58, at 458; Freundlich, supra note 74, at 43; Hendy, supra note 56.
168. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M. 1139-40, Ch. 1, art.1-3, Ch. I1, art. 4-5.
169. See Kapstein, supra note 3; Echegaray, supra note 2.
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the 1990s were so heavily inundated with female infants that the staff and
resources could not care for the large number of children, resulting in high
mortality rates. 170 As recorded in 1999, the United States adopted between 80 and
90 percent of Chinese orphans.' 71
Although the Chinese and Korean economies are growing, and available
statistics demonstrate that only four to five percent of the people in each country
live in poverty, 112 neither country perceives itself to be economically stable enough
to place a moratorium on, or formally end, intercountry adoption. 173 Whether the
countries are truly in economic need or whether they are simply not willing to
allocate the resources to care for their orphans and unwanted children is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Despite its equal intentions, the Hague Convention favors compliance by
receiving countries with the laws, citizens, and resources that generally support
intercountry adoption and facilitate compliance. In the United States, the
Department of State has been preoccupied in part by the reviewing of public
comments to the IAA, the American attempt to implement the requirements of the
Hague Convention. In comparison, sending countries such as China and Korea
culturally oppose dependence on intercountry adoption to raise their children but
engage in the practice out of necessity. In light of the stigma these countries attach
to intercountry adoption, it seems logical to assume that if countries like China and
Korea had the resources, they would sooner take the money to devote to the care of
their orphans, ending the shameful practice, than to use the money to implement
and ratify the Hague Convention, which promotes intercountry adoption. By
failing to recognize the heightened economic burden of compliance and the
cultural opposition to intercountry adoption, the Hague Convention creates
disincentives for major sending countries to be come parties to the Hague
Convention, which potentially undermine the goals of the treaty.
CONCLUSION

The Hague Convention was drafted in such a manner that it encourages
cooperation among countries to unify adoption procedures and regulations; the
Convention's good intentions, however, leave room for problems that could
undermine realistic achievement of the treaty's goals. Nowhere in the treaty does
170. Human Rights Watch, March 1996, Vol 8, No.1, Summary, available at
http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.china963.2html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
171. Michelle Van Leeuwen, The Politics of Adoptions Across Borders: Whose Interests are
Served? (A Look at the Emerging Market of Infants from China), 8 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 189, 189
(1999).
2003,
available at worldbank.org/cgi-bin/sendoffat a glance,
172. See China
cgi?page=countrydata/aag/chn+aag.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). Korea, Rep. at a glance, 2003,
www.worldbank.org/cgiat
available
(last visited Jan. 23, 2005);
bin/sendoffpage=%2FdataFcountrydata%2Faag%2Fkor.aag.pdf
at
available
Korea,
of
South
Economy
(last visited
http://www.appliedlanguage.com/country-guides/korea-south-country-economy.shtml
Jan. 2, 2005).
173. See generally, Liu, supra note 155, at 192; Hye-son, supra note 154; Kapstein, supra note 3;
Singer, supra note 27, at 306.
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it restrict parties from entering intercountry adoptions with non-parties, providing
no push for countries to ratify or accede to it. For the Hague Convention to
operate and function as it was intended requires the ratification and cooperation of
both sending and receiving countries. The Hague Convention is blind to the fact
that the burdens of compliance on sending countries exceeded those of receiving
countries, both in the priority to draft and implement regulations, as well as the
economic stability to fund compliance.
Despite the goals and purpose behind the Hague Convention, it is highly
unlikely that intercountry adoptions between parties and non-parties will come to
an end, though receiving countries will have spent the time and money on
complying with the Hague Convention and major sending countries will not have.
The message this sends is that compliance and becoming a party to the Hague
Convention do not affect the sending countries' ability to participate in
intercountry adoption, making it questionable as to why they should spend their
resources and time on the compliance. After all, the old saying goes, "why buy the
cow when you can get the milk for free?" If sending countries are not penalized
for non-compliance with the Hague Convention, and the sending countries are
well-aware that they have a "hot commodity" that many people want no matter the
cost, then why would a sending country bother to spend the time and money to
implement the Hague Convention, despite its admirable purpose and goals. If the
sending countries possess the resources to implement solid regulation and
monitoring of intercountry adoptions, they are more likely to spend the money on
supporting their own orphans to save face and move away from intercountry
adoption based on social stigma and national disdain for the practice of
intercountry adoption.
The Hague Convention can accomplish great things with uniformity of
intercountry adoption laws, but as it stands, there is no motivation for sending
countries like Korea and China to ratify or accede to it. Without the cooperation of
major sending and receiving countries, the Hague Convention will not meet its
objectives. The United States, despite slow-moving efforts to ratify the Hague
Convention, supports intercountry adoption and the objectives and principles
behind the Hague Convention. In contrast, sending countries like China and Korea
lack the national support to ratify the Hague Convention , because intercountry
adoption practices promote shameful dependency on foreign countries. Korea
would abolish intercountry adoption if the country's economy were strong enough
to support its children, hence why the Korean government set a goal to end
intercountry adoption by 2015. Based on similar Asian values, it would not be
surprising if China followed suit one day in the future. The cultural opposition and
the economic burden of compliance are the two major influences that will keep
sending countries like China and Korea from ratifying the Hague Convention.
While it seems like the support of over sixty countries is a sign that the Hague
Convention is and will succeed, the fact that the treaty is unsupported by three of
the major sending countries sends a message that creating a system of unification
of intercountry adoption laws was not enough. The Hague Convention should
have stressed the need for compliance of all sending and receiving countries,
limiting member states to intercountry adoptions through other member states;
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thereby creating incentives for major sending countries to ratify. As it stands,
compliance with the Hague Convention is in the best interest of receiving
countries, who will benefit from adoption access to countries who previously
prevented them from adopting. Sending countries, on the other hand, are given the
liberty to limit the receiving countries that may adopt their children, because they
know that receiving countries are desperate to adopt children, no matter the costs.
The Hague Convention cannot succeed when sending countries may still benefit
from intercountry adoption without complying with the Hague Convention.
Despite the appearance of moving forward in intercountry adoption laws, the lack
of cooperation by major sending countries keeps this forward movement from
being a possibility.
Even though the United States' delayed implementation of the Hague
Convention does not turn on fundamental cultural or moral values, the continuing
failure of the U.S. ratification potentially sends a message to the world that the
United States does not consider the Hague Convention a necessary means of
regulating international adoptions. If one of the largest and wealthiest receiving
countries is not compelled to move on this issue, then why should major sending
countries, such as China and Korea, feel any particular need to take on the
economic burdens that might be associated with implementing the Hague
Convention in the fact of societal and cultural objections?
The Tsunami disaster, impacting the lives of thousands of children left
orphaned, has brought a public spotlight on the potential role of international
adoptions as a form of humanitarian outreach to children with needs that go
beyond aid in the form of water, food, shelter, and material items. As of now, the
Hague Convention has yet to realize its commendable goals and given the
problems discussed in this paper, may never do so. From this point forward, there
needs to be a serious public debate over the best means to regulate international
adoptions to protect the best interests of children and also to achieve maximum
The reaction of the
cooperation among sending and receiving countries.
tsunami orphans
families
to
adopt
Department of State to requests from American
that
would violate
will
not
take
actions
the
United
States,
in
principle,
suggests that
the spirit of the Hague Convention. Yet, until the major sending and receiving
countries ratify the treaty, there is no certainty as to what, if any, impact the Hague
Convention might have on future international adoption issues. The real question
that needs resolution is whether the international community truly needs a
controlling international treaty such as the Hague Convention to assure that the
best interests of intercountry adoptees are protected as the first priority. If so, then
proponents must undertake a concerted effort to persuade all countries, including
the United States, that ratification is a matter of urgency, or to come together to
explore an agreement that would be acceptable to the major sending and receiving
countries participating in international adoptions.

BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE COMMONS: ENSURING THE
RIGHT TO WATER IN RURAL COMMUNITIES
Jason Astle*
I. INTRODUCTION

More than one billion people in the developing world lack safe drinking
water.' The U.S. government estimates that by the year 2015 it is possible that up
to forty percent of the world's population will live in countries where water is in
short supply. 2 An estimated fourteen to thirty thousand people die each day from
water-related diseases. 3 Of those who die everyday from water infected with
disease, between 9,500 and 20,000 are children.4
While access to fresh water is not the only problem, limited supply is the
primary dilemma. The total fresh water supply on Earth is being diminished
through pollution, diversion, and depletion. 5 Only 0.77 percent of the total water
on Earth circulates as part of the water cycle, and even less circulates as rain
water-the only source of renewable fresh water.6 Less than one half of one
percent of the world's water is available for human consumption.7 Thus, the total
amount of water available for human consumption and use is extremely limited.
Population explosions, urbanization, industrialization, and agriculture have
increased demand for water while pollution has decreased the already limited
supply. 8 Increased demand for a limited water supply exacerbates the human crisis
worldwide.
The human right to water entitles everyone to an adequate amount of safe
water and is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of
water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal, and
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Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like to acknowledge the George Washington/Oxford
University International Human Rights Program for providing a forum within which this article was
able to more fully develop.
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domestic hygienic requirements. 9 Many of the efforts to meet this challenge by
governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have failed on many
levels.10 This article advocates for the privatization of wells in rural areas as an
incentive to maintain both the quantity and the quality of local water while
improving access and availability. Rather than putting the wells into the hands of
large corporations, this article suggests a middle path wherein the owner of the
well would be a non-profit, non-governmental organization that leases the
operation to a local business person, who is accountable to both the organization
and the village. The large scale provision of water is a serious and growing
problem everywhere, especially for urban areas, but is beyond the scope of the
discussion here. "
In the face of these alarming trends, governments are faced with the problem
of ensuring that every one of their citizens has access to safe, fresh water. Part II
asks the question what is water: a human need or a human right? Part III addresses
whose water is it, by examining three typical models: (1) private control; (2)
government ownership; and (3) the "development" model. Part IV narrows the
focus to the more limited problem of access to water in rural areas of Africa, and
concentrates on methods of delivery. The conclusion addresses the concerns of
anti-privatization advocates and many of the problems the current system faces in
ensuring that rural communities have access to enough safe water to meet their
basic needs. Moreover, the conclusion will evaluate how privatized wells protect
the right to water in a human rights framework.
II. WHAT IS WATER?
There are two basic ways of conceptualizing water: (1) as a need
(commodity); or (2) as a right (entitlement). It is important to distinguish water as
a right versus a need. A right is something that creates obligations; whereas a need
carries with it no assurance of its provision. 12 Because water is essential to all
aspects of life from the basic need for drinking water, to growing food, to
industrial uses such as coolant in power plants, there is no consensus on the
question of whether water is a need or a right.
Businesses and pro-market institutions such as the World Bank insist that
water is a need or commodity better managed in free markets.' 3 They argue that
9. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water, U.N. ESCOR Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C. 12 (2002) [hereinafter Comment 15].
10. For example, only 60 percent of a project to provide water to the Cameroonian capital of
Yaounde was completed and the contracting company quit after several officials were accused of
demanding payoffs. Sylvestre Tetchiada, Little to Quench the Nation's Thirst, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
May 17, 2004 at http://allafrica.com/stories/200405200689.html.
11. Much has been written in the last five years after many experiments by cities around the
world. Most of the sources used here draw on those examples and discussions. Few address the small
village except as farmers or customers hooked up to a municipal system. The focus here is on villages
that depend on surface and well water.
12. See JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP FOR SALE 78 (2001).
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markets are efficient and reduce waste, ensuring that limited resources will be fully
utilized. On the other side, environmentalists and local populations insist they
14
Kofi Annan, U.N.
have a right to water-that it cannot be denied to them.
that "[a]ccess to
by
stating
both
arguments
logic
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blended
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human right.'"' 5
basic
a
therefore,
and,
need
safe water is a fundamental human
The right to water as a human right, though controversial, is well established in
6
international legal theory as well as in traditional practice.1 This section addresses
both arguments in turn.

A. Water as a Human Need
Water is clearly a need in the broad sense as a fundamental necessity of life,
regardless of the label of need or right. Water as a commodity, a good that can be
sold in the market, is the more narrow meaning of need. It is important to
acknowledge from the start that water is in fact bought and sold, given a value, and
paid for everyday, in all contexts. Water, like lunch, is never free. Even where no
money is paid, opportunity costs are incurred when fetching and using water for
whatever purpose. For example, water taken from a river has to be carried, that
energy could be spent on other activities. Water could also be contaminated,
which would involve additional costs in terms of time and money for medical care.
Thus, even in circumstances where no money goes into developing the source,
7
there is a cost for using that water. Those costs can be translated into value.'
Value as an economic term means the amount an individual is willing to pay
for the good or service. 18 This means that value is inherently subjective, not
intrinsically connected to the water itself; it is a function of the buyer. Cost as an
economic term is more complicated, but essentially it is the amount the seller has
spent to make the water available. This can be broken down into two types of
costs: (1) opportunity costs (described above, they can also include environmental
19
Use costs are the
damage and other intangible costs); and (2) use costs.
2°
traditional costs associated with developing, transporting, and managing water.

14. See generally LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Romina Picolotti & Jorge D.
Taillant eds. 2003) (discussing a wide range of issues linking human rights and environmental issues).
15. Press Release, U.N. Information Service, Access to Safe Water Fundamental Human Need,
Basic Human Right, says Secretary-General in Message on World Water Day available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/sgsm7738.html (Mar. 13, 2001).
16. See THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 1; Comment 15, supra note 9; SALMAN M.A.
SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY

DIMENSIONS (2004).
17. See John Briscoe, Water as an Economic Good What it Means in Practice (1996), (World
Bank, A Paper Presented at the World Congress of the International Commission on Irrigation and
at
available
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18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 2.
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Making water sellable requires calculating its costs to sellers and its value to
buyers, and where those two numbers meet is the price of water. 21 In a simple
supply and demand curve, water is not sold below its cost, and not paid for above
its value. When traded at this point, water is used in the most efficient manner, not
wasted or lost, and thus conserved.22 Markets also solve the problem of allocation
by determining how water is used and who gets to use it.
Because there are many competing demands for water-consumption,
agriculture, and industry, a finite resource like water has to be divided up. Markets
do precisely that-divide and allocate the limited supply of water. Water is
allocated to those who are willing to pay a price that allows the supplier to recover
costs. This excludes those who charge too much or who pay too little. However,
individuals act differently than corporations-value is also a function of the
resources available to the buyer. In the Sahara, the opportunity cost to other users
and the use costs to get the water will both be higher. Scarcity of water is also
highly variable. For example, countries along the Nile should pay less than
Saharan countries for the same amount of water. The problem is that life cannot be
sustained long without water, so its value (in terms of what a person is willing to
give up to have it) cannot be measured in any accurate manner.23
The difficulties encountered in determining the price of water were
summarized by John Briscoe in a World Bank paper entitled, Water as an
Economic Good: What itMeans in Practice, which was presented in 1996.24
Briscoe outlined various methodologies and then concluded that "most certainly
these 'ballpark estimates' can never, and should never, be used to make
technocratic decisions on allocations and prices. ''25 That did not prevent him from
declaring that "the hegemony of the market model of development, and the
corresponding move to using market-like and market-friendly instruments for
managing all elements of the economy (including water)" is part of a group of
ideas that will shape society in the future.26
Building on this work, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and multi-national corporations have pushed (some would say forced)
privatization of water on developing countries as a loan condition.27 Any
meaningful acknowledgement of the world's water crisis (i.e. recognizing the
fourteen to thirty thousand deaths every day from water-related disease) requires a
21. This is the traditional supply and demand curve, with quantity on the x axis, dollars on the y
axis. A supply curve rises as both quantity and dollars go up. Demand starts at a high quantity and low
price and falls as price goes up. Id.at 4.
22. The "optimal price" is the foundation of basic supply and demand driven market economics.
Id.
23. See PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF
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26. Id.at 22.
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simultaneous recognition that water cannot be wasted. Waste is also an economic
term describing a condition that occurs when the price is set below or above the
optimal point where supply and demand meet.28 In practical terms, this means that
when water is treated as free, or is priced well below its cost and subsidized, water
is wasted.29 Additionally, corrupt governmental practices or use of water for
political patronage also create waste by diverting water to users or uses that are
inefficient.3" Private corporations, on the other hand, bring market efficiencies,
capital. 3'
management experience, and most importantly-private investment
Not surprisingly, many corporations have taken advantage of this situation
and have gone into the business of providing water. The annual revenue of the
three biggest multinational water corporations in 2001 was almost 160 billion
dollars.32 The most obvious example is the bottled water industry. Many
supplies. 33
countries, such as Cameroon, are also privatizing their municipal water
The Bolivian example described below is dramatic in terms of both the application
of market theory and the reaction by the population to such a scheme.
In 1999, the city officials of Cochabamba, Bolivia put water services under
the control of a for-profit corporation.34 The corporation, Aguas del Tunmari (a
subsidiary of Bechtel), seemed a sensible choice at the time because the
35
The
government did not have the money or resources for new investments.
36
that
assumed
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was
current system was dilapidated, costly, and inefficient.
37
the
contrary,
To
discipline.
private capital would improve services and impose
the ultimate results were high prices and a popular rebellion. 38 When the vast
majority of citizens could no longer afford the price of water, they took to the
streets. 39 Hundreds of thousands of protestors eventually drove Bechtel's
subsidiary from the country. 40 The same process occurred more recently in El
28. Briscoe, supra note 17, at 4.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., E.A. Brett, Participationand Accountability in Development Management, 40 J. OF
DEV. STUD. 1, 13 (2003) (describing cooperative systems in Uganda as having been captured by local
elites and becoming mechanisms for personal enrichment and fraud).
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Anderson, The Rising Tide of Water Markets at http://www.ittind.com/waterbook/tide.asp (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005); James Winpenny, Financing Water for All, 2003 REPORT OF THE WORLD PANEL ON
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Alto, Bolivia. In January of 2005, legions of angry residents rose up against Aguas
del Illimani (a subsidiary of French giant Suez) forcing President Carlos Mesa to
cancel their contract.4 1
There is no question that markets bring efficiencies to the allocation,
provision, and delivery of water.42 In addition, markets bring economic incentives
to those who profit from the sale of water. There is also no question that
governments in developing countries have generally done a poor job of providing
high quality water to their citizens.43 For that reason, the privatization of water has
been an increasingly attractive course." At the end of the day, it is governments,
no matter how they choose to do it, who are ultimately responsible for providing
water, regardless of how it is used.
B. Water as a Human Right
The growing consensus around the world is that water is more than just an
essential need-it is a human right. Since The U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (the "Committee"), issued General Comment 15, The
Right to Water, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), most of the world community has come to accept their
conclusions.45 Few international treaties or declarations explicitly establish a
human right to water, but in much the same way that customary international law
is established through objective acceptance of norms and a subjective sense of
obligation to acknowledge the right, water has become a human right.46 Examined
in conjunction with the right to development, water becomes an immediately
enforceable right, a right to be progressively realized, and part of a larger process
of ensuring the full range of rights, including political and social rights.47
Beyond international agreements, international actions such as three World
Water Forums and a U.N. declaration establishing 2003 as the International Year
of Freshwater have brought attention and focus on the right to water, generating
scholarship and commentary from all quarters.48 As previously noted, though farreaching agreement exists, it cannot be said that a true consensus exists. Private

41. Juan Forero, Even for Basics, Latin America Lacks Answers, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005.
42. Landry & Anderson, supra note 31; Winpenny, supra note 31.
43. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 2.
44. See Landry & Anderson, supra note 31; GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at iii-iv; Briscoe,
supranote 17.
45. The majority of the sources cited here support the acceptance of water as a human right. See,
e.g,. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 16 (outlining the legal and social basis for water
as a human right).
46. Customary International law is typically defined as conduct, or the deliberate absence of
conduct, by states as a general practice followed by a sense of legal obligation. See HENRY J. STEINER
& PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 69-72 (2nd ed. 2000).

47. The Right to Development will be more fully examined in Part Two infra.
48. See Al Gore & Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at U.N. World Summit for Social
Development, Copenhagen, (Mar. 12, 1995), in 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 235, available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1995/html/Dispatch6no13.html (Mar. 27, 1995); Ruana
Rajepakse, Water as a Human Right: Legal Social and Economic Implications, at
http://www.elaw.org/resources/printable.asp?id=2019 (July 29, 2005).
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corporations and the World Bank have tenaciously continued to describe water as a
need and a commodity without directly opposing the assertion of water as a right.49
1. The Legal Basis for Water as a Human Right
The Committee, in General Comment No. 15, directly addresses the legal
basis for the right to water. ° Article 11, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR recognizes
the "right of everyone to an adequate standard of living.., including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and the continuous improvement of living conditions.'
The Committee explicitly stated: "The right to water clearly falls within the
category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living,
particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival. 52
Other international treaties, declarations, and documents have also recognized the
right to water. 53 Under humanitarian law, the right to water is protected under the
Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners.54 The U.N. Convention on the Rights of a Child explicitly
states in Article 24 that:
States parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health... [and] shall pursue full implementation of this
right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures ... [t]o combat disease
and malnutrition.., through the provision of adequate nutritious food and clean
drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of
55
environmental pollution.

49. The main forum for this view is the World Water Council. The Council is criticized for
consisting mainly of "an exclusive membership of international financial institutions, large
multinational water corporations, and non-governmental organizations tied to these interests."
Hemantha
Withanage,
Water, An
Economic
Good or a
Public Good?,
at
http://www.elaw.org/assets/word/sri%201anka.water/2Oa%20public%20good.doc (last visited Mar. 20,
2005).
50. Comment 15, supra note 9.
51. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3,
1976, art. 11 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
52. Comment 15, supra note 9, at 9 3.
53. Id. T 4; see also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF WATER ISSUES at
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Water/heightened-awareness.asp (last visited June 30, 2004)
(listing major international conferences in the 1990's dealing with water).
54. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating
to
the
Protection
of
Victims
of
International
Armed
Conflicts
(Protocol I), entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, 125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 54 (emphasis added); Standard
Minimum
Rules
for
the
Treatment
of Prisoners,
adopted
Aug.
30,
1955
by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24
U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res.
2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977),
13, 15, 21; see also Jalvarez,
The Right to Water as a Human Right, in Picolotti & Jorge D. Taillant, supra note 14, at 75.
55. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted nov. 20 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44, art. 24.
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National action to regulate water and domestic policies enacted to protect
water quality and availability also recognize water as an entitlement.56 The South
African Constitution states: "Everyone has the right to have access to... sufficient
food and to sufficient water., 57 The United States has enacted domestic laws such
as the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 to ensure that water systems meet
minimum standards for protecting public health.58 Even the Vatican has declared
water a human right. 59 Finally, international instruments negotiated to divvy up
water across State boundaries recognize water as some form of entitlement.6 °
The Committee, in General Comment 15, essentially inferred the right to
water from the language of international instruments. 6' Water is deemed a human
right by linking such rights as the right to life, the right to food, and the right to
health, and recognizing that water is essential to human existence as a precondition to all rights. 62 Thus, water must be viewed in a larger context by looking
at the right to development and the interaction between established rights, human
needs, and domestic policies.
2. The Right to Development
The right to development was officially established in 1986 when the
Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the United Nations. 63 By
1993, full international consensus was reached when the United States (the only
dissenting vote) affirmed the right to development at the Vienna Second U.N.
World Conference on Human Rights. 64 Arjun Sengupta, author of The Human
Right to Development, has defined the right to development this way: "The right to
development is the right to a process of development, consisting of a progressive
and phased realization of all the recognized human rights... as well as a process of
economic growth consistent with human rights standards. 65
This definition contains within it two important characteristics shared by the
right to water. First, the right to development is a composite right where all rights
are interdependent and realized together-and not simply aggregated or added
up. 66 Second, the right to development can only be realized when other rights are
advanced and no others are violated.67 The effect of these characteristics is to

56. Jalvarez, supra note 54.
at
available
§
27(b),
2,
chapter
CONST.
AFRICAN
57. S.
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/bills/sacon96.htmlrebookmark=l (last visited April 16, 2005).
58. Jalvarez, supra note 54, at 76.
59. Water Access is a Human Right, Vatican Document Says, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Briefs, Apr.
18, 2003, at 9 (Gill Donovan ed.).
60. GLEICK ET. AL., supranote 23 at 11-20.
61. See generally SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 16 (detailing the human right to
water and the legal basis for the Committee's Comment 15).
62. See THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER, supranote 1; Picolotti & Taillant, supranote 14; SALMAN
& MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 16.
63. Arjun Sengupta, The Human Right to Development 32 OxFORD DEV. STUD. 179 -203 (2004).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 182.
66. Id. 183.
67. Id.
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create a right that reconciles any conflict between the civil and political rights and
the economic, social, and cultural rights. 68 Development as a right is both a
process and an outcome. As a process, the right must be realized in a legal
structure containing five principles: (1) equity, (2) non-discrimination, (3)
participation, (4) accountability, and (5) transparency (the "Five Basic
Principles"). 69 The right to development as an outcome creates duties on dutybearers. 70 Sengupta explains the relationship between duty-bearers and rightholders as follows:
Human rights are universally regarded as moral entitlements of individuals.
When they are translated into legal rights, the right-holders can legitimately
demand that the duty-bearers, once they are identified, be accountable for
carrying out their obligations and be subjected to a mechanism to monitor
and
71
adjudicate their performance, prescribing remedies in case of failures.
The right to water, viewed through this lens must include the economic nature
of water as a good to be provided and as a right that cannot be withheld. In this
way, the right to water is also part of the right to development.72 This approach
eliminates the problem of trying to determine which rights come first because the
right to water is part of rights such as the right to life and health. If all rights must
be realized to secure the right to development, then the provision of water is all
that is required of governments (the duty-bearer) in a rights-based system adhering
to the basic principles. Governments must also provide for the economic
development of water.73
3. Governmental Obligations
Every government has an obligation to ensure that all citizens have access to
enough water to meet their basic needs without discrimination.74 This obligation
comes in the context of the broad obligations all governments face with regard to
human rights-the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill. 75 The Committee
also recognized that the ICESCR provides for "progressive realization" of the
rights contained within it. 76 This is the acknowledgment that the availability of
resources constrains the ability of governments to provide the full range of rights
contained within the Covenant. 77 These constraints do not in any way relieve State
Parties (signatory governments) from their obligations or duties such as the
68. For a good description of this conflict, see Malcom Malone & Deryke Belshaw, The Human
Rights-BasedApproach to Development: Overview, Context and CriticalIssues, 20 Transformation 76,
78 (2003).
69. Sengupta, supranote 63, at 181.
70. Id. at 186.
71. Id.
72. For a good discussion of a rights based approach to development, see WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
9-11 RIGHT TO WATER (2003).
73. Sengupta, supra note 63, at 193, 194.
74. Comment 15, supranote 9, at 13.
75. Id., 20 (stating: "The right to water, like any human right, imposes three types of obligations
on States parties: obligations to respect, obligations to protect and obligations tofufi./l.")
76. Id., 17.
77. Id.
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requirement of forward progress and strict limitation on any regressive measures. 78
These general obligations were distilled into nine "Core Obligations" specific to
the right to water:
1. To ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water that is
sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease;
2. To ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a
non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups;
3. To ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide
sufficient, safe and regular water that have a sufficient number of water outlets to
avoid prohibitive waiting times; and that are at a reasonable distance from the
household;
4. To ensure personal security is not threatened when having to physically
access water;
5. To ensure equitable distribution of all available water facilities and
services;
6. To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action
addressing the whole population. The strategy and plan of action should be
devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent
process. It should include methods, such as right to water indicators and
benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored. The process by which
the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give
particular attention to all disadvantaged or marginalized groups;
7. To monitor the extent of the realization, or the non-realization, of the right
to water;
8. To adopt relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect
vulnerable and marginalized groups;
9. To take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in
particular ensuring access to adequate sanitation.7 9
The Committee also discussed violations of the right to water, including acts
of omission such as failures to take steps to provide water for everyone, failure to
create national policies on water, and the failure to enforce the laws. 80 Acts of
omission would include regressive actions that contradict any of the Core
Obligations such as the repeal of measures that provide for the realization of the
right to water. Finally, the Committee listed typical examples of violations of the
obligations to respect, protect, or fulfill the right to water.81
The obligation to respect the right to water prevents governments from
interfering with the right to water.8 2 Such interference would include inter alia:
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See
Id.,
/d.,
Id.,
Id.

id., 18-19.
38.
43.
44.
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the arbitrary exclusion from water facilities, discriminatory increases in the price
of water, and the pollution of water sources. 83 A violation of the obligation to
protect the right to water includes inter alia: a failure to protect against the
inequitable extraction of water, the failure to control water service providers, and
the failure to protect water distribution systems. The obligation to fulfill the right
to water requires that governments "take all necessary steps to ensure the
realization of the right to water., 85 Violations include: the failure to implement a
national water policy, the misallocation of public resources that harms vulnerable
or marginalized populations,
and a failure to ensure a minimal essential level is
86
enjoyed by everyone.
Drawing on the discussion of the right to development above, the progressive
realization of the right to water must also include adherence to the basic principles
(equity, non-discrimination, participation, accountability, and transparency). For
example, the obligation to implement a national water policy must come in a
context that ensures other rights, such as civil and political rights, are not
violated.87 This implies that a basic democratic structure is required to ensure the
full realization of the right to water in a national context. 88 Thus, a national or a
local water policy must be developed in accordance with human rights standards as
well as produce an outcome that ensures everyone has access to adequate amounts
of safe water.89 If they do not, the result is what happened in Bolivia-protests in
the streets forcing governmental action. Such a result leaves governments
suddenly saddled with the responsibility of managing a water system that was
privatized because it was too costly for them to manage in the first place. 90
III. WHOSE WATER IS IT?
Sylvestre Tetchiada, in Little to Quench the Nation's Thirst, declares: "If you
knew how many plans and resolutions there have been about [Cameroon's] water
problems, you would be hard put to understand why (people are) still without
potable water."9' There are three basic ways that water is actually provided to the
people: private companies, government entities, and community based
development projects. Each of these methods contains strengths and weaknesses.
This section briefly looks at all three methods relative to both how well they
provide safe, adequate water, and how well they comply with human rights
standards.

83. Id., 44(a).
84. Id., 44(b).
85. Id., 44(c).
86. Id.
87. For a more detailed discussion of the relation between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and Civil and Political Rights, see STEINER & ALSTON, supra 46 at 268-275.
88. This debate is beyond the scope of the discussion here. See id. However, it is important to the
discussion in Section III to see the relationship between these five legal principles and the differences
between private, government, and development approaches.
89. See generally Sengupta, supra note 63 (discussing the relationship between the means and the
ends of the realization of the right to development).
90. See Forero, supra note 4 1.
91. Tetchiada, supra note 10.
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A. Privatization
In a World Bank technical paper entitled, Evaluating Water Institutions and
Water Sector Performance, authors R. Maria Saleth and Ariel Dinar succinctly
state the goals of a privatization approach to institutional reform. These goals are
to "address water as an economic good, strengthen allocation capabilities, increase
the reliance on market forces, revive the payment culture, ensure financial selfsufficiency, promote decentralized decision structure, and encourage the adoption
of modem technology and information inputs." 92 It is with these goals in mind
(and, of course, turning a profit) that corporations get into the business of
providing water. As the name implies, privatization starts from the premise that
the government is the first owner/manager of water systems.
The manner in which governments turn water over to corporations can take
many different forms. Accompanying the transfer, governments may impose some
regulatory oversight or basically relinquish all control and responsibility. 93 Some
governments will simply sell off their water assets.94 Another method is to lease
assets. 95 Finally, countries may create a contractual relationship wherein a
corporation is guaranteed profits in exchange for investments. 96 Regardless of how
privatization occurs the result is a market driven pricing structure, usually with
subsidized pricing to protect the poor.97 Typically this is found in urban areas
where piped water is delivered to homes or communal spigots. 98 From the point of
view of the consumer, privatized water means paying a bill to a company who can
both raise prices and turn off the water based on cost and profit considerations.99
From the point of view of the government, privatization 00means investment in
upgrading, expanding, and improving existing infrastructure.'
The criticisms of privatization are strong. Jim Shultz, in an article entitled
The Right to Water criticizes: "Far from being an effective strategy for advancing
rights, privatization and subjecting water access to the inequalities of the private
market has too often turned out to be a blunt instrument for violating human
rights."' 0 ' The overwhelming concern is giving the power of excluding people
from water to unaccountable private organizations a lI Cochabamba or El Alto,

9,

92. R. Maria Saleth & Ariel Dinar, Evaluating Water Institutions and Water Sector Performance,
at
available
(1999)
447
PAPER
TECHNICAL
BANK
WORLD

http://www.worldbank.org/watsan/topics/economics.html.
93. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 26-28.
94. Id.; See also
PRIVATIZATION

OF

AFRICA-EUROPE FAITH AND JUSTICE NETWORK, WATER A RIGHT FOR ALL!
WATER

AND

SANITATION

IN

SERVICES

AFRICA

4

(2003),

at

http://www.aetjn.org/Documents/water.pdf (last visited January 29, 2005) (describing various models
of water management).
95. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 26-28.

96. Id.
97. Id. But see the Bolivian example in JEHL, supra note 2 and Forero, supra note 41.
98. Id.
99. For example, in El Alto, Bolivia, Aguas' profits were not as high as they would have liked, so
they raised the hookup fees from $300 to $450 in a country where the monthly wage is about $55.
Forero, supra note 41.
100. Landry & Anderson, supra note 31; Winpenny, supra note 31.
101. Shultz, supranote 31.
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Boliva, discussed supra. When privatization policies are linked to larger economic
reforms required by the IMF and the World Bank, desperate countries relinquish
control and the poor suffer the consequences. 12
The World Bank declares on its website: "Effective water resource
management requires that water be treated as an economic good."' 0 3 This has
alarmed many who fear commodification as an erosion of water as a traditional
social good. 1°4 Commodification undermines the status of water as a human right
and shifts it back toward being a need that can be sold for profit. This conflict is
summarized by Peter Gleick et. al. in the article, The New Economy of Water: The
Risks and Benefits of Globalizationand Privitizationof Fresh Water:
However, there is little doubt that the headlong rush toward private markets has
failed to address some of the most important issues and concerns about water.
In particular, water has vital social, cultural, and ecological roles to play that
cannot be protected by purely market forces. In addition, certain management
values require direct and strong government support and
goals and social
05
protection.1
The privatization model is fraught with problems. Among them are: usurping
the responsibility of government; worsening economic inequities; failure to include
public participation; lessening the protection of water quality; and transferring
assets out of local control.' 0 6 Water as a commodity requires the exclusion of
others to its use and enjoyment when owned as a private property right.'0 7 If every
person has a right to a minimum amount of water each day, the ability to exclude
people and charge money for access to their water seems to stand in direct
opposition to that right.
Critics like Vandana Shiva, author of World Bank, WTO, and Corporate
Control Over Water, also contend that privatization fails to provide the benefits
promised. Vandana Shiva asserts: "Just as the economic reform policies guided by
the World Bank logic of privatization of food distribution create hunger, the
privatization of water services will create thirst and water scarcity." 08 For proof

102. See Sara Grusky, Privatization Tidal Wave: IMFIWorld Bank Water Policies and the Price
Paidby the Poor,2001 at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Water/Privitization Tidalwave.html. (last
visited January 29, 2005).
103. WORLD BANK, supra note 13.
104. See Rothfeder, supra note 12 (examining the world's water crisis); see also Barlow & Clark,
supra note 5 (examining the corporate "assault" on water).
105. See GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 1.
106. Id.
107. This is a basic principle of the ownership of property and market economics. See Briscoe,
supra note 17.
108. Vandana Shiva, World Bank, WTO, and Corporate Control Over Water, 2001, at
(last visited Jan. 29,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Water/Corp-ControlWaterVshiva.html
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of this position, critics point to Bolivia, Ghana, South Africa, Australia, and even
Finally, critics point to the disproportionate burden
Atlanta, Georgia. 10 9
privatization imposes on women." o
These critiques are grounded in a concern for both the process of
privatization, via imposition of policies by the World Bank and others, and the
outcomes (e.g. high prices mean less access to water). The question remains
whether these are inevitable problems inherent to privatization. If privatization
were to be implemented within a structure that follows the Five Basic Principles of
human rights, many of these concerns may dissipate.
B. Government Control
The model of government control over water is the most familiar. In this
model, the government owns and develops water resources then provides it to the
public. "' Costs are off-set by taxes and other revenue including subsidized bills
to consumers."12 Govermnents manage water resources through different methods
such as out-right ownership, operation, and control through government
agencies. 13 Quasi-governmental agencies with a monopoly on water may be4
regulated by a board that has the power to determine water quality and pricing."1
These boards can be appointed or elected.1 5
The water crisis that faces the world today is the most powerful indictment of
government control of water." 6 The failure of government to provide waterrelated services underlies its desire to turn to private corporations to provide these
services.ti Governments, especially in the developing world, lack the financial
resources to meet the rising demand for water."18 For example, "[in Malawi]
limited financial resources, poor institutional structures and implementation of
environmental regulations, insufficient and unaffordable electricity supply, high
unemployment and insufficient public education and awareness have great

109. Maude Barlow, The Worlds Water: a Human Right or Corporate Good?, in JEHL, supra note
2, at 25-39.
Women
and
Water
Privatization,
2003,
at
110. See
Ana
Obando,
http://www.whrnet.org/docs/issue-water.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
111. See Guillermo Yepes, Do Cross-Subsidies Help the Poor to Benefit from Water and
Wastewater Services? Lessons from Guayaquil, 3, at http://www.wsp.org/pdfs/working-subsidy.pdf
(last visited January 29, 2005).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., AFRICA-EUROPE FAITH AND JUSTICE NETWORK, supra 94 (describing various
models of water management).
114. Id.
115. GLEICK, ET AL., supra note 23.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Jamal Saghir, Debate on current trends in water sector reform and pro-poor
partnerships, 4 (David Jones rapporteur, Sept. 2, 2002) (commenting: "However, in the last few decades
the result of funding the public sector to provide water and sanitation services has been quite
disappointing - the poor have not been reached and many resort to informal service provision as a
result.").
118. See, Winipenny, supra note 31; see also Forero, supra note 41 (reporting "governments like
Bolivia's tried the task themselves before, abandoned it as too costly, and turned to private companies
in the 1990's.").
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'1 19
Inefficient bureaucracies waste
influence on the scarcity of water resources."
sense when water is
water from both an economic standpoint and in a literal
20
allowed to be polluted or leaky pipes drain water away.'

The main problem with governmental operation of water resources is under122
Without
priced water. 121 Governments set the price of water at below cost.
enough money to cover existing services, there is little opportunity to generate
123
When water becomes
more revenue and expand services to meet rising demand.
12 4
sources.
unavailable, unreliable, or unsafe, the poor look for water from unsafe
The great advantage of governmental control is that governments are
accountable to the people. In democratic, or even pseudo-democratic states, the
people have some ability to express displeasure and hold decision-makers
Right-holders (the
accountable-again the Bolivian example is instructive.
people) can legitimately demand that duty-bearers (governments) respect their
right to water. 125 Governments or States Parties can also be held accountable in
26
Because water is a public good,
international institutions and organizations.
centralized democratic control by the government means greater adherence to
those Five Basic Principles underlying all human rights.
C. ParticipatoryDevelopment Projects
27
Elionor
When government policies fail, NGOs often step in to fill the gaps.'
Ostrom, author of Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action, observed that "neither the state nor the market is uniformly
successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural
resource systems."' 12 8 Where neither government nor markets are dominant,
communities manage common resources over long periods of time with some
success. 129 The Achilles heel of common control of a common resource is "the
tragedy of the commons."' 130 This is the name Garrett Hardin, author of the
influential essay titled The Tragedy of the Commons, gave to the problem of
13
individually rational strategies that lead to collectively irrational outcomes. ' The
basic problem is that each individual acts in his or her own interest, but

119. Wanja Njuguna-Githinji, Africa, at http://www.ittind.com/waterbook/afica.asp (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005).
120. Id.
121. Landry & Anderson, supranote 31.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Margaret Catley-Carlson, Worldngfor Water, in JEHL, supra note 2, at 65, 69

125. See Sengupta supranote 62.
126. See STEINER & ALSTON, supranote 46 at 305-316.
127. Jon Lane, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's): New Players in Water Policy, at
http://www.ittind.com/waterbookfNGOs.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
128. ELIONOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR

COLLECTIVE ACTION, 1 (1990).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2-4.
131. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243-1248 (1968); see also id. at
2-7 (explaining Hardin's article in the context of a prisoners dilemma game).
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collectively use a common resource (i.e. the commons). If each individual
maximizes their profit by using the commons to the fullest extent possible, the
32
commons are destroyed and everyone loses. A solution is collective agreement.'
At the center of the tragedy is the free-rider problem. 133 Ostrom described the
free-rider problem this way: "Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the
benefits that others provide, each person is motivated.., to free-ride on the efforts
of others."'' 34 Thus, even if collective action is established in the short-run, force
of the temptation to free-ride may eventually overwhelm any agreement over the
long term. 3 5 It is this problem that the participatory approach hopes to overcome
through education and community contributions to their projects. 136
A development project looks essentially like this: the NGO identifies a
community, conducts a needs assessment, identifies an appropriate project,
identifies local and other resources, acquires funding, implements the project, and
follows up with evaluation. 137 Participation at each step along the way is crucial to
achieve education of the community and to create a sense of local
empowerment. 3 8 Thus, participation is both a means and an end. 139 It expands
people's capabilities and improves performance by involving users in the decisionmaking process. 140
This has two important benefits: transparency and
independence.
Promoting transparency within the project increases the
participation of women and creates a greater consensus within the community.
Independence can be particularly important when working in countries with more
oppressive regimes because it allows communities to improve their situation
without needing to rely on slow, under-funded or corrupt bureaucratic government
agencies.
Criticisms of participatory development cover a wide spectrum.' 4 1 Here the
focus is on three important drawbacks of the participatory approach: (1) the short132. Id.
133. OSTROM, supranote 128, at 5.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. These two principles, education and community contribution, were at the heart every
development model this author studied as a Peace Corps volunteer. See generally WORLD BANK,
RURAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION TOOLKIT 33-39 (2004) (outlining the project cycle). See also

Brett, supra note 30, at I (exploring participatory theory in development).
137. Id. The exact process, and the way in which these steps are implemented, can vary greatly
depending on a huge number of factors. See also, Karen Fisher & Peter Urich, Information and
Communication in Stakeholder Participation:the Bohol-Cebu Water Supply Project, 40 ASIA PACIFIC

VIEWPOINT 251 (describing a step-by-step approach using an "instrumental participation" model).
138. E.A. Brett defines "participation" this way, "a process by which people, especially
disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them." Brett, supra note 30, at 5 (citing a World
Bank document). See also Trevor Parfitt, The Ambiguity of Participation:a Qualified Defense of
ParticipatoryDevelopment, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 537, 538 (2004) (listing four alternative definitions of
participation).
139. Brett, supra note 30, at 6; but see Parfitt, supra note 138, at 539 (describing participation as
either a means or and end, not necessarily both).
140. Brett, supranote 30, at 6.
141. See Mary Anderson, Aid: A Mixed Blessing, 10 DEV. IN PRACTICE 495 (2000); Sebastian
Mallaby, NGO's FightingPoverty, Hurting the Poor,FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept-Oct 2004, at 51.
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termist problem; (2) ignoring power differentials within communities; and (3)
dependence. 142 Short-termism describes a scenario wherein a local population is
mobilized for the project, but once the task is completed, participation
evaporates. 43 Ignoring power differentials can result in projects where the
intended beneficiary is the populace at large, but the more powerful members of
the community actually capture that benefit. 44 Finally, the inherent problems of
dependence on outside help or aid, despite the empowering effects of a
participatory approach, can be real.145 These are the problems
that ultimately
46
doomed well intentioned projects in Cameroon and elsewhere.
IV. How CAN WATER

BE DELIVERED?

In Ghana, in the 1990's, as few as forty percent of the 8,600 hand-pumps
constructed by the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) and NGOs
were working at any given time. 147 As a Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon this
author saw first-hand the problem of broken pumps.
In Cameroon, hundreds of wells had been built by an international NGO with
the help of the villagers. They were lined with cement and covered with a hand
pump. Yet women and children were getting their water from streams running
under roads because the pumps were broken. In one village, a technician estimated
that it would cost about eighteen U.S. dollars to repair their pump. What about the
water committee that had been formed to manage the pump? They had collected a
fee from everyone who used the well on a monthly basis-where was that money?
The chief's brother had borrowed the money and was going to pay it back as soon
as he could. The loan was two years past due. Raising the money was equally
problematic because the chief's brother, head of the water committee, would be
organizing the effort. Although a donation of one dollar per month by each family
head for a period of three months would have raised enough money to fix the well,
when it came to making the requireddonation no one contributed.
A. Broken Pumps
On its face, the program that created these wells was a model of good
development practices. The villagers had to contribute by doing all the manual
labor and providing materials such as gravel and sand to mix with the cement.
Two villagers were trained on how to keep the pump working, to repair it, and to
keep the water clean. The whole village was given lessons on the importance of
clean water, proper hygiene, and sanitation. The water committee was comprised
142. Parfitt, supra note 138; NGO's, Gina Porter, Poverty Reduction in a Globalizing World:
Perspectivesfrom Ghana, 3 PROGRESS IN DEV. STUD. 131, 141 (2003).

143. Parfitt, supra note 138, at 539.
144. Id. at 539-540.
145. There is much debate as to whether aid creates dependency. Cf Mark Bradury, Normalizing
the Crisis in Africa, 22 DISASTERS 328, 332 (2000) (describing the "myth of dependency" and
"dependency syndrome" and then arguing against them).
146. The author spent two years as a Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon as a Health and Water
Sanitation Volunteer. He draws on this experience throughout the remaining sections. Many
observations are the author's opinion, the verification of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
147. WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAM, supra note 33, at 2.
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of both women and men. This model is followed by almost every international
development agency in the world, including the Peace Corps. 48 Yet, it failed.
There were two fundamental problems: (1) there was no accountability for
those in charge of the wells; and (2) there was no incentive to maintain the wells.
Once a well broke, the villagers would go back to getting water from whatever
source they used before the well was built. Then the villagers would wait for the
government or a development agency to come and fix their well. The water
committee was designed to prevent these problems from occurring. As part of
ensuring a sustainable project, the village was organized to participate in the
building and maintenance of the well. This participation was designed to create a
sense of ownership and a lasting ability to keep the well working. Unfortunately,
the development model described above did not take into account the deep and
troubling effect that corruption has on rural communities. In many of these
communities, there is no accountability and no faith that laws will be enforced
fairly because the powerful are protected. Add to this a perception of time that
encourages short-term benefits over long-term plans and the chances of this model
succeeding decrease dramatically.
The lack of accountability stems from the very nature of village lifehierarchical structures that protect the men in charge from their misdeeds. Chiefis
not an elected position. Lack of accountability also stems from the pervasive
nature of corruption that plagues all levels of society. No consequences flow from
a broken pump to those responsible for repairs. There are consequences
however-disease and death from unclean water.
The severity of the
consequences should be incentive enough to fix the well, but sadly it is not. Life is
lived in the short-term. The realities of village life dictate that it does not make
sense to give up money you need now, particularly in light of the high risk that the
donation will achieve nothing-even though a baby may die from dehydration
brought on by diarrhea caused by polluted water. Malaria or AIDS is just as likely
to kill and there are crops to tend to and mouths to feed. The communal model,
designed on principles of empowerment and self-reliance, fail because the model
does not address the deeper cultural obstacles inherent in village life or the impact
that corruption has on the basic trust required to maintain a community resource.
B. Private Wells
Elinor Ostrom proposed what she termed a "fifth game" in the prisoner's
dilemma.1 49 In this scenario, the community makes a "binding contract" to commit
themselves to a cooperative strategy before they use the resource and share equally

148. See Parifit,supra note 138.
149. Ostrom, supra note 128, at 15. The Prisoners Dilemma a non-cooperative (no communication
between players) "game" in which players must choose one of two paths. The first is a "defect" path in
which players maximize their personal use of the commons; unless the other player picks the same
strategy. If that happens, both players get zero. The second path is a "cooperative" choice to reduce
their maximum by half risking either zero or half the maximum, depending on what the other person
does (the player's choices are unknown by others until after they have been made). The dilemma is that
the individually rational strategy (maximize) leads to a collectively irrational outcome (zero). Id. at 4-5.
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in the cost of enforcement.15° She then adds a private party to take on the role of
an external enforcer to arbitrate decisions, but not make or impose them. This
article advocates a similar proposal combining certain aspects of both the common
ownership and private ownership models and uses basic market incentives to
ensure both quality and access to water without sacrificing local control. The
scenario used to demonstrate how such a system would work is modeled on the
village described above, one with a well, broken pumps, and a corrupt water
committee.1 51
Under the model proposed here, the NGO would go into villages and offer to
fix their well in exchange for the exclusive right to manage the well. 52 The
process of explaining the implications of this transfer of control would conform to
well-established methods using participative discussions that include women and
occur over a period of time. This would enable villages to make an educated
decision. The process would have to be transparent to ensure consensus within the
village. Next, the NGO would find a villager (the "Manager") to lease the well to
after it had been refurbished. Both the village and the NGO must approve the
Manager. The Manager would receive extensive training on the technical aspects
of maintaining the well and would be personally responsible for completing all
repairs and ensuring water quality. The Manager would also receive extensive
training on running a small business, pricing models, and accounting. The
Manager would then sell the water to the village. Pricing schemes would include
monthly fees for unlimited access and charges on a per unit basis or other methods
offered as a menu. The Manager would be competing with the free (unsafe) water
source so prices would have to be reasonable and at the same time make him
enough money to pay the NGO each month for his lease. Any money the Manager
makes above his monthly rent would profit to him.' 53
To compete, the water must be cleaner, safer, and closer than the free water.
This provides the manager with the incentive to both keep the prices low but the
quality of the water high. The NGO will oversee all of this, providing guidance
and accountability by periodic testing of the water. Creative managers may offer
services as well, such as having water delivered (employing locals to haul the
water) or by selling bottled water. Finally, managers that abuse their position,
charge high prices, or otherwise extort the community would be removed by the
NGO at the request of the community. Evaluations and surveys of the manager's
performance would be conducted to provide both an ongoing source of information
for improving the program and to ensure accountability. Because the manager has
to pay a monthly fee as well as all maintenance and repair costs, they would have

150. Id. at 15, 16.
151. In Cameroon the government has proposed the provision of a well or borehole (deep well)
equipped with a hand-powered pump for every 300 to 500 people. Tetchaida, supranote 10.
152. The legal implications of enforcing such a deal would require conformity with local laws and
usually the agreement of a government official to actually enforce the agreement should a dispute arise.
Similar agreements were used in the Ghana. See WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAM, supra note 33, at
3.
153. The masculine pronoun is used here to represent both potential male and female managers.
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an incentive to use the water efficiently and avoid waste. 154 The NGO would use
the money from the monthly lease payments 155
to cover its own costs and as capital
to repair more wells and expand the program.
V. A RECOMMENDATION:

DO PRIVATIZED WELLS PROTECT THE RIGHT TO WATER?

According to Ostrom: "What is missing from... well developed theories of
human organization... is an adequately specified theory of collective action
whereby a group of principals can organize themselves voluntarily to retain the
residuals of their own efforts."' 5 6 The concerns that have been raised about the
privatization of water are very real. Putting such a valuable resource in the hands
of unaccountable corporations driven by profit motives rather than humanitarian
concerns is troublesome. With global water shortages looming in the future, world
peace will depend on an equitable and secure system of meeting the demand for
water. 157 The possibility of actual war over water is serious enough that U.S.
intelligence services have identified a number of potential areas where water wars
could erupt. 158 Thus, control over water resources will be critical to meeting
human needs and maintaining peace in the future.
In a privatized system, those who have water provide it to those who do notbut only to those who can pay. In a purely market driven system the poor will
always be excluded based on an inability to pay, which violates their human right
to water. However, turning water over to governments or communities that are
unable to manage it effectively produces the same effect. Though it is selfinflicted, the obligation to provide water does not end just because a community
itself is responsible for any failure to provide for its own needs. 159 The plan set
forth here meets the obligations outlined by the Committee and the practical
concerns of the villagers on the ground who deserve clean water.
A. EvaluatingCompliance with Human Rights Standards
Evaluating compliance with the human right to water begins with the three
basic obligations under human rights standards: to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.
The duty to respect requires a government to ensure the activities of its institutions
154. See generally Ostrom, supra note 128, at 41 (using the theory of the firm and the theory of the
state to explain collective action can be maintained when the burden of that action falls on an individual
whose returns are directly related to the surplus generated).
155. The most fundamental question is: will villagers ever pay for water if they are used to it being
free? The answer is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say, given the evidence of how
many villagers have been willing to pay for water at some point, it follows that they would pay for safe,
high quality water. See e.g., GLEICK ET. AL., supra note 23, at vi (stating: "Experience has shown that
water users are often willing to pay for improvements in service when such improvements are designed
with their participation and when improvements are actually delivered.").
156. Ostrom, supra note 128, at 25.
157. PETER
ALLISON,
WATER
WARS-THE
GLOBAL
VIEWPOINT,
at
http://www.ittind.com/waterbook/world.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (outlining the real possibility of
water shortages and advocating for privatization).
158. Id.
159. See Comment 15, supra note 9, at 38 "[T]he Committee wishes to emphasize that it is
particularly incumbent on States parties, and other actors in a position to assist, to provide international
assistance and cooperation..." (emphasis added).
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and agencies do not interfere with a person's access to water. 160 The proposed plan
requires that governments have laws in place that would permit the NGO to own
and lease wells. It would require the NGO to work with the government to share
information and to ensure that the government's interests are being protected. The
proposed plan would also require that the NGO be free from interference by those
who would use it for political patronage. These requirements would have to be
conditions precedent to implementation of this plan. By supporting this plan, the
government would also fulfill the obligation to not go back-the duty of nonretrogression.161
The obligation to respect the right to water means that people cannot be
unfairly or arbitrarily disconnected or refused water by laws, government
regulations, or pricing policies. This plan is designed to have the flexibility to
respond to each individual situation and to price water in such a way that, when
disaster strikes, no one is left without water. Rather than dealing with a faceless
bureaucrat, the villagers would be working with a Manager they participated in
choosing, and if that Manager abuses his position he can be removed.
The obligation to protect requires that governments do not allow others to
endanger the right to water.' 62 It also means that the quality of water provided is
protected.163 This plan empowers the NGO to remove the water concession from
an abusive or ineffective Manager. By monitoring water quality, the NGO holds
the Manager accountable while also supporting his enterprise by showing villagers
that his water is higher quality. Other conditions such as the distance between the
well and latrines or graves can also be monitored so that pollution can be avoided.
Finally, because the Manager is personally responsible for ensuring water quality,
there is an incentive to protect the well as a source of revenue. The work required
to keep the well covered, chlorinated, and clear of animals is compensated by the
profit the Manager makes.
The obligation to fulfill is a forward-looking obligation to facilitate, promote,
and provide for the full realization of the right to water. 64 This means that
programs such as this should be encouraged and promoted, but not imposed.
Solutions must be tailor-made to the individual situation of each population. One
of the most enduring efforts is to educate communities about the hygienic use of
water and its protection. 165 Beyond this, a rights based approach to development
includes educating people about their rights and empowering them to take control
of their lives.' 66 The education process that precedes the purchase of the well and
the lease to the Manager meets these obligations. Even if a village decides not to

160. Id.121.
161. Id. 19.
162. Id. 23.
163. Id.
164. Id. 25, 26.
165. Paragraph 25 reads: "The obligation to promote obliges the State party to take steps to ensure
that there is appropriate education concerning the hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and
methods to minimize water wastage." Id. 25.
166. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supranote 72, at 9.
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go through with the program, they will have learned a great deal, enough to
provide hope that they will protect and manage their water source better than
before.
Finally, this plan should be evaluated against the Five Legal Principles
discussed as part of the right to development: equity, non-discrimination,
participation, accountability, and transparency. The process of educating the
village, including women and children, is essential to meeting the first three
principles. The on-going oversight of the NGO provides the accountability and
transparency needed not only to comply with human rights principles, but also to
overcome the problems typically faced by programs created through participatory
development projects. Finally, providing a conflict-resolution mechanism helps
reinforce all these principles as well as discourage the free-rider problem. 167
B. Evaluating Compliance with the Nine Core Obligations
The nine core obligations are to: (1) ensure access to sufficient and safe
water; (2) ensure non-discriminatory access; (3) ensure physical access; (4) ensure
secure access; (5) ensure equitable distribution; (6) ensure adoption of a national
water strategy and plan of action; (7) monitor the realization of the right to water;
(8) implement low-cost programs targeted at marginalized groups: and (9) prevent,
treat, and control diseases linked to water. 68 The proposed plan, if implemented
with governmental support, directly meets the first five and the last two core
obligations. A well located in the village that is available to everyone within a
system that differentiates between differing ability to pay through creative pricing
meets those seven obligations.
This program also indirectly addresses obligation six and seven by
implicating the government in its creation and implementation. 69 Monitoring is
part of every NGO's grant funding requirements, and by drawing on development
models, NGOs can effectively report their progress to governmental and
international organizations. Further, the incentive to have accurate information is
strengthened as regular feedback from the evaluations and surveys are built into
the program's success. Because future funding comes from the manager's lease
payments, success is tied directly to funding in much the same way a profit
incentive motivates private companies.
The fear that people will not pay and therefore be denied access to high
quality water is the principle objection to this plan. Aside from creative pricing
schemes that can be adopted to avoid denial of access, an additional reality of
village life should be taken into account--communal existence. Nothing prevents
a manager from extending credit, or giving away water in times of need.
Additionally, a family that pays a fee for unlimited access can provide water to
those who may not have the same level of resources. The potential for abuse is
undeniably high but the problem can be confronted directly during the educational

167. See Ostrom, supra note 128, at 101.
168. Comment 15, supra note 9.
169. Id.
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discussions with the village at the programs inception. 170 Villages are never as
poor as outsiders perceive them to be. Alternative forms of payment or barter
schemes are possible as well. The Committee directly addressed the question of
failure to pay in paragraph 56 of General Comment 15: "Where such action is
based on a person's failure to pay for water their capacity to pay must be taken into
account. Under no circumstancesshall an individual be deprived of the minimum
essential level of water."''
C. Final Considerations
Two final qualifications regarding implementation of the proposed plan must
be considered. First, this program is designed for relatively small rural villages not
likely to be connected to municipal systems--exactly the people contemplated in
obligation eight. A program such as this implemented on a larger scale in urban
areas begins to resemble government-private sector partnership schemes that
already exist in many places.1 72 Second, the proposed plan would have to be
implemented in several phases. This paper is not intended as a description of how
to actually implement such a program and real questions remain about its
feasibility.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to offer a solution to the failures of programs
advanced by both the proponents of privatization, who view water as a need and
commodity on the one hand, and the proponents of water as a human right and
communal resource on the other. Water is a human right, and governments have
real obligations in realizing those rights. The challenges faced by governments
and the global community to meet those obligations will only grow in the coming
decades. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to these problems, but the program
offered here addresses both the challenges and realities on the ground. Market
incentives are powerful and by harnessing those forces, safe, clean water can be
available to everyone. The key to any program will be accountability. Larger
forces such as the spread of democracy and the rule of law will have to be part of
long-term solutions to resource scarcity. By working with existing development
models and learning from past failures, problems can be addressed in small ways,
village-by-village, and well-by-well. Experimentation by rectifying the failures of
existing development models on an ad hoc basis may be the only way to ensure the
right to water in marginalized and poor rural communities.

170. As Elinor Ostrom points out, "when appropriators design at least some of their own rules...
they can learn from experience to craft enforceable rather than unenforceable rules." Ostrom, supra
note 128, at 96.
171. Comment 15, supra note 9, at 56 (emphasis added).
172. See generally GLEICK ET AL., supranote 23 (discussing different public/private partnerships).

PRIVATIZATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND
RELIANCE
John E. Rhea*
INTRODUCTION

Since the discovery of oil, world power brokers have fought over the price,
production, and control of the once vast and still vital natural resource.' Some
allege that the recent occupation of Iraq is motivated by the control over oil
supplies in the Persian Gulf.2 This view suggests that recent military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are in truth, strategic precursors for the eminent wars to
procure oil.3 Yet, the critical discussion, in this writer's opinion, should
contemplate how the world will function without oil and how civilization will
come to terms with the fact that fossil fuels as an energy resource are no longer an
inexhaustible resource. 4 In the very near future the world will experience an
energy crisis and a shock to economic systems much like that experienced in
the1970s and mid-1980s. Only this time, the end of production will not be the
result of any unilateral exercise of sovereign power. Instead, the crisis will result
from an actual worldwide depletion of fossil fuel resources. Some predict that
petroleum 5 resources will peak by the year 20206 and that by the year 2080,

* John Rhea received his Juris Doctor from the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law in May
2005.
1. See generally DANIEL YERG[N, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER
(1991). Daniel Yergin's THE PRIZE, is widely known as one of the most prolific accounts of the power,
politics, and economics that has existed within the petroleum industry since its inception. Yergin
provides a comprehensive overview of petroleum explorations and the interactions between
governments and multinational companies. Yergin's book also provides an in-depth analysis of
petroleum price and production and its impact domestic and international policies.
at
Oil,
of
Peak
Problem
and
the
Iraq
Engdahl,
William
2. F.
http://www.spinninglobe.net/iraq&oil.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005); see also Matt Savinar, Life After
the Oil Crash: Deal With Reality Or Reality Will Deal With You (Dec. 1, 2004), available at
http://www/lifeaftertheoilcrash.net/.
3. Engdahl, supra note 2; see also Savinar, supra note 2.
4. Tim Appenzeller, The End of Cheap Oil, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, June 2004 at 80, 85, 88.
5. For purposes of this discussion, "petroleum" refers crude oil and natural gas. The petroleum
industry is also referred to as the "oil and gas industry." The term is synonymous with fossil fuels,
hydrocarbons, and non-renewable resources. But in the international energy context, petroleum
primarily refers to oil and gas.
6. Geological surveys, according to THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, estimate that oil production
will peak in either 2010 or 2020, resulting in 2.3 trillion barrels of recoverable reserves. See THE
WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, 44-148 (Int'l. Energy Agency ed.,1998) reprinted in ERNEST SMITH ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTION 18, 19 (2d ed.2000); see also, Appenzeller, supra note 4,
at 90.
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petroleum resources will be completely exhausted. 7 The grim reality that crude oil
is indeed a finite resource places a real threat to the way of life of developed
countries and will drastically impair world economies. Currently, the world
consumes over thirty billion barrels of oil per day (bpd).5 The United States alone
consumes approximately ten billion bpd 9 and by 2025, U.S. consumption is
expected to balloon to nearly thirty-five billion bpd.' ° As world populations and
demand grow at a faster rate than production, the global energy outlook becomes
disastrous.
Dr. M. King Hubbert, discussed infra, alerted the world in 1950 that
petroleum was a finite resource and that the production of conventional oil would
reach its peak between 1970 and 1980." At which point we would have used half
of all the recoverable oil that ever existed on our planet. 12 This alarming
information has likely been known to previous administrations. Surely the Bush
Administration, through the eyes of Vice President, Dick Cheney, is well aware of
the impending crisis. 1 3 For instance, Cheney, a former Halliburton executive,
stated during a speech to the International Petroleum Institute in 1999 that: "by the
14
year 2010 we [the world] will need on the order of an additional 50 million bpd."'
It is further estimated that by 2020 the world will require 120 billion bpd for
economic growth.' 5 Rather frighteningly, for oil-dependent countries, a mere 10 to
15 percent shortfall between demand and supply can trigger an enormous
economic crisis. 1 6 In short, in apocalyptic fashion, life as we know it will cease as
world oil supplies come to an end.
Be clear that there is no feasible replacement for oil. An end to world reliance
on fossil fuel based energy in the form of renewable energy or other alternative
energy sources is at best a supplement but more realistically a theoretical fantasy.
In most cases, oil is required to develop these alternatives to oil.' 7 For example, oil
is required in the mining and extraction of the hard rock minerals required to

7. See generally THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIs,

THE HUBBERT PEAK FOR WORLD OIL,

available at htttp://www.oilcrisis.con/summary.htm (last updated Dec. 22, 2003) [hereinafter THE
COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL]; see also THE COMING GLOBAL OIL CRISIS M. KING HUBBERT:

HUBBERT PEAK OF OIL PRODUCTION, available at http://www.hubertpeak.com/hubbert/ (last visited

June 3, 2005) [hereinafter THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK]; see also A
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BOOK, ENERGY AND POWER 39 (1971).

8. Savinar, supra note 2.
9. bpd references the phrase, "barrels per day."
10. Savinar supra note 2; see also, THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 6, at 18-19.
11. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL

CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7. Other scholars, including Dr. C.J. Campbell predicted that world
depletion would begin in 1999. See THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7.
12. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL
CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7.

13. See Engdahl supra note 2.
14. Dick Cheney's Speech to the International Petroleum Institute in London reprinted in
Engdahl, supra note 2.
15. Savinar, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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develop solar power. 18 Moreover, recovering "oil" from oil shale also requires the
use of crude oil to convert the oil shale into a usable product. 19 Additionally, the
promise offered by fuel cells is questionable due to limited global reserves of
platinum. 20
Thus, despite efforts to develop alternative energy resources,
petroleum remains the world's primary source of energy.2'
In this writer's view, energy companies, heads of states, and the major power
brokers of the primary consuming countries, should realize that reliance on oil
suppliers with hidden political agendas and narcissistic international policies like
those of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, can no longer be entrusted to bear the
sole key to the future of the energy market place.
It is not surprising that, in the last three decades, strategic efforts have
commenced to globalize the petroleum industry under the auspices of privatization.
Hence, privatization of the international petroleum industry serves as an economic
alternative to the power and control exercised by producing nations over this vital
commodity. In that sense, by privatizing the petroleum industry, multinationals
and importing nations, regained control over the world energy market.
Several theories account for the rationale behind the privatization of the
international petroleum industry, most of which propose that the decline in
socialist regimes and profit maximization are the driving forces behind energy
privatization trends.
This writer contends, however, that two political and
economic factors drive global petroleum privatization. First, and arguably the
most significant driving force behind the privatization of the international
petroleum industry, is the need for consuming countries to decrease their reliance
on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)23 and the Middle
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Dr. Walter Youngquist, who further contends that oil derived from oil shale is not
actually crude oil).
20. Savinar theorizes that a single hydrogen fuel cell require 20 grams of platinum. With only 7.7
billion grams of proven platinum reserves, the approximate 700 million internal combustion engines on
the road today, would require annual replacement, excessive costs, and would become exhausted in a
relatively short period of time. Savinar, supra note 2; but see William Vincent, Hydrogen & Tort Law:
Liability Concerns Are Not A Bar to Hydrogen Economy, 25.2 ENERGY LAW JOURNAL 385, (2004).
Vincent espouses that hydrogen is the most abundant element in the universe and hence hydrogen fuel
cells will ultimately become a common fuel source.
21. Alternative energy such as nuclear power, solar energy, and hydro- power do not have the
present capacity to replace petroleum resources as the primary energy needed to generate electricity
fuels and automobiles worldwide. ERNEST SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTION
4 (2d ed. 2000); see also WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCES: CRUDE OIL AND
NATURAL
GAS
LIQUIDS
(2001)
at
http://www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/reports/ser/oil/oil.asp (last visited Apr.5, 2005).
22. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,

PRIVATIZATION AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF

ENERGY MARKETS 3 (1996), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/financial/060996.pdf
[hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS].

23. OPEC is the acronym for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; the 11 member
countries are: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia, Libya, Algeria, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates. OPEC, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES (OPEC) BRIEF HISTORY, at http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm (last visited
Apr. 5, 2005).
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East. By developing foreign investment activities with Non-OPEC producers,
western entities exercise greater control and participation in the market, thereby
stabilizing the market, increasing capital revenue, and securing future economic
growth. Second, is the economic disparity within the petroleum producing
countries, which consists of three sub-factors: the absence of economic diversity,
the economic burden of external debt owed by host countries, and primarily, the
exclusive economic reliance on petroleum revenue by producing nations.
Historically, the threat to the security of fossil fuel resources, as triggered by
the 1973 Saudi-led Oil Embargo, is significant in the analysis of privatization in
Additionally, conflicts and unstable
the international petroleum industry.
government regimes in OPEC member nations are also considerable factors in the
surge to develop foreign direct investment (FDI) with non-OPEC producers. This
discussion attempts to demonstrate that privatization, in the international petroleum
sector, is a necessary vehicle to avoid reliance on OPEC and the Middle East. And
as such, it is a reflection of political strategies, aimed at securing rapidly depleting
energy resources. And secondly, that privatization is also an economic necessity
for producing countries whose excessive reliance on petroleum revenue has left
them vulnerable to the very foreign control which many anti-globalists protest.
This discussion begins with an analysis of importing nations' reliance on
foreign supplies. Next, a brief historical account of foreign investment in
petroleum producing countries follows, which includes the demise of the
traditional concessions and the shift of power over price and production. The
historical approach serves as insight into current anxieties surrounding reliance on
Middle Eastern oil.
Central to this discussion is the impact of the 1973 Oil Embargo and the
driving forces behind the modem trend of privatization in the world oil market and
the development of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) as a response to the formation of OPEC. The totality of
which resulted in the shift by consuming countries from reliance on OPEC member
countries as a means to economic stability. Finally, this article provides an
analysis of the economic disparity and economic reliance on petroleum revenue by
host countries, which ultimately makes those nation states more apt to seek foreign
direct investment as a means to spark economic growth.
I. PRIVATIZATION: A VEHICLE TO AVOID OPEC RELIANCE

A. Hubbert Peak Oil
Since much of this discussion references the end of fossil fuel resources and
the political and economic reactions thereof, adequate analysis of the transition
from state-owned enterprises to privatization, requires some treatment of the end of
the oil age. The Hubbert Peak or Peak Oil, as it is often referred, is a theory
developed by geologist, Dr. M. King Hubbert in the 1950s. 24 Hubbert's theory is
represented by a bell-shaped curve depicted on a typical linear graph. Hubbert

24. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL
CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7.
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predicted that between the time of the first production of oil in 1860 and the end of
oil in 2050, a collision between world supply and world demand would result in a
peak of world oil supplies.25
The Hubbert Peak was estimated to occur between 1970 and 1980, whereby,
half of all proven reserves of conventional oil would have been used.26 Hubbert's
bell-curve demonstrates that when conventional oil has peaked, the total resources
that were ever and will ever be available for production will be known.27 Once the
peak occurs, production will decline until the resource is completely depleted.28
Although Hubbert's prediction that U.S. reserves would peak in the 1970s proved
to be accurate,29 new geophysical studies estimate that (globally) Peak Oil will
more likely occur in 2020.30
The World Energy Outlook estimates that ultimate recoverable reserves are
roughly 2.3 trillion barrels. 31 Dr. C.J. Campbell of Petroconsultants estimates that
the global ultimate is 1750 Gb. And since there haven't been any significant
discoveries in the past two decades, this means that after 2020, production will
begin its decline. Hence, for each year that world populations increase, the
possibilities
of locating new accommodating supplies will become less and less
33
likely.
Is it possible then, that U.S. military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is merely
a camouflage to ensure security over future energy resources? Several scholars
have proposed that the competition for world oil supplies will be carried out
through actual war.34 Such positions support the proposition that American
military instillations established during Desert Storm near Saudi Arabia, the
present occupation of Afghanistan, near the Caspian Sea, as well as the military
presence in Iraqi, are but preliminary maneuvers to prepare for the destined
military battles for the last drop of oil. 35 Since the aftermath of Peak Oil will likely
result in catastrophic global crisis, 3 6 the argument for strategic military operations
may not be completely far fetched. However, a more practical theory, as this
discussion asserts, is that energy resource strategists opted for controlling
participation and influence over the global energy markets, in the form of
petroleum privatization.

25. See THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supranote 7.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. David Ross, Plan War and the Hubbert Oil Curve, ZMAG (May 2004), available at
http://www.zmagsite.zmag.org/May2004/ross0504.html.
30. THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 6 at 18-19.
31. Id.
32. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL
CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 20-22.
33. See Ross supra note 29, at 1.
34. See id. at 4; see also Engdahl, supra note 2; see also Savinar, supra note 2.
35. Ross, supra note 29.
36. See THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF
GLOBAL CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7.
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B. The History of Global Petroleum Transactions
This section attempts to shed light upon the historical factors which led to the
geopolitical conflicts between importing nations and exporting nations over
petroleum resources. Likewise, this section seeks to demonstrate that the historical
encounters between petroleum dependent states and producing states are the
fundamental mainspring for the modem trend toward petroleum privatization.
Privatization at its purest form can be traced back to the early exploration and
concession agreements beginning in the late 1800s with the Royal Dutch
Company. 37 The first concession agreement occurred in 1901 when William
D'Arcy was granted a concession agreement by the Shah of Persia to explore
500,000 square miles in search of oil.38 In 1925, D'Arcy's concession agreement
with Iraq became the model upon which future concession agreements were
based. 39 During the first half of the twentieth century, seven multinational oil
companies known as the "Seven Sisters, set price and production levels providing
minimal control and low financial compensation for host countries." 0 Much like
modem privatization models, early concession agreements involved foreign capital
and technology used to explore and develop petroleum resources from passive host
Arguably, these contractual arrangements were
country participants.
representative of the imbalance of power that persisted in the industry and in our
view, laid the foundation for future conflict between importing nations and
exporting nations.
C. The Demise of ConcessionAgreements
Following World War II, the shift of oil production from North America to
the Middle East began to define international roles between importer and exporter
in the United States, oil
nations. 4 1 And as a growing demand for oil occurred
42
became the greatest factor in Middle Eastern politics.
Although multinational companies continued to dominate the petroleum
industry between 1945 and 1971,43 gradually, a changing of the guards in the
international petroleum industry became eminent. The Joint Agreements between
the majors and the producing nations became extinct by 1984.44 The subsequent
loss of market share, once held by the seven multinationals, was accompanied by

37. ZHIGUO GAO,

INTERNATIONAL

PETROLEUM CONTRACTS:

CURRENT

TRENDS AND

NEW

DIRECTIONS 9 (1994).
38. See Ernest Smith, A Fifty Year Perspective on World Oil Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 13,

17-18 (1989).
39. GAO, supra note 37, at 9.
40. Id.
41. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, THE ARABS: PEOPLE AND POWER 189 (1978) [hereinafter THE
ARABS].

42. See id.
43. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY, GLOBALIZATION OF MATERIAL LIFE 3 (2001),
availableat http://www.bartleby.com/67/2640.html [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF MATERIAL LIFE].
44. Philip K. Verleger, The Long Term Implications of Oil as a Commodity, in WORLD ENERGY
MARKETS: STABILITY OR CYCLICAL CHANGE? 132 (William F.Thompson & David J.DeAngelo eds.
1985).
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the demise of joint producing agreements.45 Countries such as Qatar, Iraq, and
Kuwait, after acquiring technology and capital procured through their partnerships
with Western multinationals, began to rely less on foreign participation and began
to demand control over their natural resources.46 Adding to this dynamic was the
end of Colonialism and the exercise of sovereignty over a nation state's natural
resources. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution §1803 of 1963, providing for
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, gave nations a sense of self
reliance and dominion over their petroleum resources.47
The demise of the traditional concessions agreement began in the early 1940s
when producing countries became discontent with the existing arrangements of the
concessions agreements.4 8 In 1943 Venezuela began to impose taxes against the
petroleum countries in addition to receiving royalty payments. 49 In 1950, a profit
sharing agreement between Saudi Arabia and Arabian American Oil Company
(ARAMCO), gave Saudi Arabia 50 percent of the profits, as opposed to per-barrel
royalties. 50 In 1973, Saudi Arabia acquired 25 percent of ARAMCO, 60 percent in
1974 and full ownership in 1980. 5'
The demise of the concessions agreement occurred mostly by negotiation, yet
in some cases producing countries regained control through expropriations or
nationalization.52 Consequently, by the late 1970s nearly all Middle Eastern oil
in North and West Africa became nationalized or
and petroleum resources
53
otherwise state-owned.
D. The Birth of OPEC
Armed with U.N. sanctioned sovereignty over their petroleum resources and
liberated from exploitive concessions agreements, producing countries asserted
their influence over the world oil market. Producing countries sought to increase
revenue by increasing production rather than increasing the price of oil, while
multinationals sought to maintain prices.54 What ensued was a battle over what the

price should be and who should set that price. 55 This battle over the price and
45. Id.
46. See generally, THE ARABS, supra note 41; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 55-60.
47. G.A. Res.1803, U.N. GAOR,17th Sess., Supp. No.17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962)
(Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources); U.N. Resolution § 1803 as discussed in SMITH ET
AL., supranote 21, at 340, 342-343; see also GAO, supra note 37, at 17.
48. GAO, supra note 37, at 14, 17.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 15.
51. GLOBALIZATION OF MATERIAL LIFE, supra note 43, at 4.
52. GAO, supra note 37, at 18-19; see generally Stephen A. Zorn, UnilateralAction by OilProducing Countries 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 63, 90-94 (1985-1986). Under President Cirdenas'
leadership, Mexico expropriated its petroleum sector and created PEMEX; see also SMITH ET AL., supra
note 21, at 386.
53. Michael Economides & George E. Kronman, The Role of Politics and Economics in
International Exploration and Production: Future Implications, in INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS
VENTuRES: A BustNEss PERSPECTIVE, 41-42 (George E. Kronman, Don B. Felio & Thomas E.
O'Connor eds., 2000); see also GAO, supra note 37, at 17-19.
54. See generallyYERG1N, supra note 1, at 514-23.
55. Id.
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production of oil culminated in the establishment of OPEC in 1960.56 Ironically,
America's Interstate Oil Compact of the 1930s became the model for OPEC price
and production policies.57 The primary goals of the five founding members of
OPEC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela, were to control price and
production levels. 58 By 1973, the Saudi-led OPEC entity had grown in power and
influence. 59 This writer contends that with the major producing markets in the
Gulf region being state-owned, the Western countries feared the implications of
reliance on the Gulf region.
E. Western Reactions to Priceand Production Wars
The "Oil Crisis" of 1973 and 1985 raised new anxiety to the already existing
power struggle between world powers and producing countries. For example, in
1973, in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia reduced production
causing a decline in OPEC output. 60 Non-OPEC members capitalized on the
opportunity and created inflated "spot prices" making the price of oil increase
dramatically. 6' Then in 1985, a Saudi-led OPEC flooded the market, making the
price of oil drop substantially. 62 Hence, the need to stabilize and diversify the
petroleum market became paramount.
These events and their economic
implications, created the need to regain control over the petroleum industry
through privatization.
History reveals that in the last thirty years following the Saudi-led Oil
Embargo of 1973, there has been a surge toward privatization and exploration in
Non-OPEC markets.63 The 1973 Oil Embargo created a threat to the security and
future of fossil fuels as an energy resource throughout the world, and subsequently
justified a shift from market reliance on OPEC producers. Exploration and
production (E&P) investors vigorously began to develop new resources and new
E&P ventures in un-mature markets and with Non-OPEC members 64 .
The Saudi Oil Embargo crippled the American economy and created an
almost permanent psychological fear of reliance on Middle Eastern oil. 65 In the
United States economic strategies diverted economic growth and led to economic
56. See BERNARD TAVERNE, PETROLEUM, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
(1999); see also GAO,
supra note 37, at 17; see also Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 43.
57. YERGIN supra note 1, at 257, 259.
58. GAO, supra note 37, at 17; see also TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 110.
59. GAO, supra note 37, at 17-18; see also TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 110-11.
60. See M.A. Adelman, Worldwide Oil and Gas: Permanent Instability, in WORLD ENERGY
MARKETS: STABILITY OR CYCLICAL CHANGE? 119-21 (William F. Thompson & David J. DeAngelo,
eds. 1985); see also YERGIN, supra note 1, at 714-18.
61. See Adelman, supra note 60, at 111-12; see YERGIN, supra note 1, at 712.
62. See William L. Fisher, The Global Dimension ofOil: The Roles of the Three Critical Players,
25 TEX. INT'L L.J.389, 393 (1990).
63. See M. Michot Foss, Major Influences in the International Exploration Business, in
INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS VENTURES: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 12-13 (George E. Kronman, Don B.
Felio & Thomas E. O'Connor eds., 2000).
64. Seeid. at 16,17.
65. Col. Stanislav Lunev, Caspian Oil Could Reduce Our Dependence on Arab Oil,
NEWSMAX.COM(July 12, 2002) at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/7/1 2/174411 .shtml.
PETROLEUM REGULATION, ECONOMIES AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES,I 10-12
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depression through 1983.66 Clearly, the 1973 energy crisis shook the world market
67
For example, in
and forced policy makers to reassess existing energy policies.
the wake of the increased political power of OPEC, both the Carter administration
and the Nixon administration, developed 68national energy policies aimed at
oil.
becoming independent of Middle Eastern
As such, privatization became the vehicle through which to avoid reliance on
Middle Eastern oil. The world conflict over price, production, and demand
burdened the world oil market and further led to OPEC's loss of its controlling
share of the market. 69 OECD nations began to rely less on OPEC production as
70
For example, in 1985
substitute suppliers from non-OPEC countries emerged.
non-OPEC production reached a high of 71 percent of the total world oil market
71
The increase in
and in 2003 accounted for 62 percent of world oil production.
non-OPEC production between 1973 and 1983, although contributing to the
uncontrolled flow of petroleum to the market, also displaced the cartel influence
over production and price.72 This surge for a competitive global market place is
reflective of the importing country's desire to preserve energy security and reduce
reliance on OPEC supplies.
F. Modern Privatization Trends
Fossil fuels will account for 95 percent of global energy demand through
2020 and oil importing countries dependence upon Middle East supplies will
increase until and unless alternative sources are developed.73 As fewer discoveries
of giant fields are made it is likely that major consuming countries will once again
be reliant on Middle Eastern oil supplies.74 For instance, three oil discoveries
made in the last two decades, in Norway, Brazil, and Columbia are estimated to
produce roughly 200 thousand bpd. 75 These reserves will not meet the predicted
76
additional 50 million bpd consumption rate needed to meet new demands. Thus,
Middle Eastern reserves in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabia, and Iraq, will likely
be sought to meet world demand.77 Hence, the fact that reliance on Middle Eastern

66. See Adelman, supra note 60, at 114.
67. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW & POLICY FOR THE 2117 CENTURY 20 (2000).
68. Id., ch.6 at 20-27.
69. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 718.
70. Attempts by the OPEC cartel to dictate price and production was circumvented by spot market
suppliers, which provided market stability. Adelman, supra note 60, at 119-121; see also YERGIN, supra
note 1, at 714.
71. ENERGY

INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATION,

NON-OPEC

FACT

SHEET

at

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nonopec.html (last modified June 2004) [hereinafter NON-OPEC];
see also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, OPEC REVENUE FACT SHEET at
http://ww.eia.doe.gov/opecrev.html (last modified June 2004).
72. Verleger, supranote 44, at 132-35.
73. See THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 6 at 46.
74. See Engdahl, supra note 2; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 2 1, at 27-28.
75. See Engdahl, supra note 2.
76. See id.
77. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 33:4

oil supplies is unavoidable, it follows that the political power struggles over price
and production are those challenges that Western importing countries seek to avoid
by privatizing world oil markets.
The uncertainty of price stability in the twenty-first century raises further
concern for Western reliance on the Middle East.78 Such conflicts work to the
disadvantage of western importing countries. Therefore, continued strategic
private development in non-OPEC markets, such as Canada, Russia, and Mexico,
should top the list of priorities for the current administration. Transnational
investment policy changes are reflective of the paradigm shift away from state
participation and toward privatization.79
The geo-politics of privatization requires a distinction between OPEC
producers and non-OPEC producing countries. Control over petroleum resources
in OPEC countries are typically held by government bodies such as State Owned
Enterprises, 80 while in most non-OPEC nations the industries are not state owned. 8'
Further, non-OPEC countries are seemingly more receptive to privatization, thus
making foreign direct investment (FDI) ventures with non-OPEC countries more
favorable. 82 Moreover, government controlled sectors tend to use petroleum
resources for political leverage rather than merely a tradable commodity.83 Such
practices conflict with international economic norms and the rule of law.84
G. A Globalized Energy Market Reduces Reliance on OPEC
Reliance on Middle Eastern oil supplies has long been a concern of the United
States and other importing countries, namely Western Europe and Japan. 85 As the
historical accounts of the 1973 Oil Embargo attest, prior to petroleum
privatization, Western economies have been vulnerable to cartel influences. A
recent poll conducted by the Hudson Institute and pollster Frank Luntz indicate
that most Americans want to decrease reliance on Middle Eastern oil. 86 In fact,
since September 11, Americans have become increasingly aware of the link
between oil and politics. 87 The Hudson-Luntz poll indicated that 83 percent of
Americans agree that "reducing our dependence on foreign oil must be a top
priority for the next administration ' '88 and that the majority of Americans favor

78. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 49.
79. Thomas Waelde, InternationalEnergy Investment, 17 ENERGY L. J. 191-93.
80. Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 42-43.
81. NON-OPEC, supra note 71.
82. See generally Foss, supra note 63, at 34-36.
83. Sovereign interests have been replaced by market-based economies. See e.g., Foss, supra note
63, at 34-35.
84. Jonathan Carlson, Answering AntiglobalistAngst, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & COTEMP. PROBS. 13,
14 (2002) (fearing that anti-globalist complaints about the loss of sovereignty will promote the
unilateral exercise of sovereign prerogative, unfettered by respect for international norms).
85. SAM H. SHURR & PAUL T. HOMAN, MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND THE WESTERN WORLD:
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 1-5 (1971).
86. Randall Parker, Americans Want To Reduce Reliance on Middle Eastern Oil, PARAPUNDIT,

(Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.parapundit.com/archives/002460.html.
87. Id.
88. Id.

2005

PRIVATIZATION IN THE INT'L PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

reducing reliance on foreign oil over cheaper gasoline prices. 89 The Hudson-Luntz
poll seems to indicate that many fear that reliance on Middle Eastern oil
jeopardizes national security and compromises the War on Terrorism. 90
Recent counter-terrorism campaigns have left many with the belief that Arab
producing countries will respond to the War on Terrorism by launching an
embargo or drastically raising oil prices. 91 Such fears are reminiscent of the
anxiety felt during the 1973 Oil Embargo.92 Yet, fears that the War on Terrorism
will affect an embargo are unwarranted. The interface between national security
and energy security should not cause such alarm because the advent of a globalized
energy market has displaced the control of OPEC with a competitive energy
marketplace.93 In a globalized petroleum industry, the Middle Eastern producing
countries can no longer dictate price and production without causing their own
economic suffrage.94 Globalization of the international petroleum industry,
therefore, creates a competitive global energy market place and results in equitable
economic security and mutual economic vulnerability for both producing countries
and importing countries alike.95 In short, producing countries must sell oil supplies
to sustain their own economies and can ill afford to allow politics to interfere with
their economic stability. 96 It follows that a globalized energy market provides
freedom to pursue national security policies without fear of a Middle Eastern oil
embargo or energy crisis. 97

The globalization of the petroleum industry means the dispersing of power
over production and diversity among resource suppliers, resulting in a competitive
market place whereby one cartel can no longer control the fate of the world
market. As such, globalization reduced U.S. reliance on Middle Eastern oil and
created competition among oil-producing countries.98 The modem trend toward
globalization of the petroleum sector stems from the privatization of non-OPEC
markets during the later decades of the twentieth century. 99 Prior to the emergence
of petroleum privatization, OPEC member states had a stronghold on world supply
and production which left importing countries vulnerable to both energy and
economic crisis.'0

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Donald Losman, Oil Denial: An Empty Fear, CATO INST., Oct. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/10-13-01 .html.
92. Id.
93. Bill Richardson & Thomas F. McLarty III, OPEC's Clout isn't what it used to be, (Nov. 4,
2001) availableat http://www.oilcrisis.com/debate/richardson.htm.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Losman, supra note 91.
97. Richardson & McLarty, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. See generally Foss, supranote 63, at 11-17.
100. See generally id. at 18, 25-26 (discussing the impact of OPEC decision-making regarding
price and production, on the world market. Foss further asserts that Non-OPEC markets defuse the
once dominant position of the cartel).
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Privatization is a rapidly growing phenomenon and touches many once
nationalized or state-owned core industries. Between 1988 and 1993, nearly three
thousand state-owned enterprises in over ninety-five countries were transferred to
private ownership.' 0 ' Yet unlike the privatization of a country's telecommunication
system or water purification system, the privatization of a nation's petroleum
industry is seldom without political significance. Most oil producing countries
hold strong nationalistic ties to their petroleum resources, 0 2 making the transfer of
ownership to private companies a reluctant national process.
Privatization is but one facet of a global economy, yet without private
ownership or at least significant private participation, Western nations are left
Not
without recourse and are vulnerable to host government influences.
host
with
interact
states,
Western
and
oil
companies
multinational
surprisingly,
country governments in manners that have less to do with economic transactions as
they do with the geopolitics of petroleum.'0 3 Geopolitical interactions with host
countries have historically been disruptive to the world market and in some cases,
resulted in severe economic crisis. °4 In this author's view, the intensity of
geopolitical interactions around downstream activities is precisely the motivation
for the evolution of international petroleum privatization.
H. PrimaryPetroleum Consumers
The shift from OPEC reliance is most prevalent amongst the primary
petroleum consumers. The OECD, for example, was formed by Western countries
in response to the influence of the OPEC cartel.'0 5 The OECD nations and the
United States, consume the majority share of the oil market and as such, the
function of Western economies greatly depends upon the availability and stability
of fossil fuel resources.' 0 6 In 1999 Western countries accounted for 63 percent of
the world's oil consumption, 70 percent of which is imported from beyond its
borders.' 0 7 OECD countries privatized their own once state-owned petroleum
enterprises, making petroleum privatization in OECD countries a model for the
subsequent demise of public ownership of core industries. 0 8 Countries such as
Norway, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy are exemplary of early petroleum
privatization. 10 9 In an effort to avoid reliance on OPEC and the Middle East,
OECD nations sought to form economic alliances with non-OPEC producing

101. GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 4.

102. See id.
103. Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 41, 42.
104. Id.
105. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), formed the
International Energy Agency (lEA), aimed at taking measures to reduce its members' dependency on
the import of oil and to promote replacement by other energy sources. TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 121;
see also, SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 5-6; see also Waelde, supra note 79, at 212-13.
106. OECD nations include the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, Norway, and
initially the United States. Moreover, Western Countries and OECD are referred to interchangeably.
See TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 35; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
107. Id.
108. See generally GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supranote 22, at 3-12.
109. Id.
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nations in Latin America and CIS countries.110 By implementing policies and
practices of privatization in non-OPEC markets, OECD countries were able to
encourage host governments to reassess the efficiency of state operated petroleum
sectors."' In recent years, OECD nations implemented privatization efforts in the
Former Soviet Union, China, and Latin America, resulting in a competitive pool of
suppliers.'t 2 These privatization efforts proved to be a successful alternative to
reliance on OPEC oil and forced Saudi oil supplies to remain competitive with the
global market. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration and Mexican President
Vincente Fox have forged an alliance, which may 3bring increased private
investment in Mexico's tightly held state-owned market." 1
Similarly, non-OPEC countries like Norway and Russia have became viable
competitors in the globalized market, and thereby enhanced an efficient petroleum
industry and improved the overall security of energy resources." 4 As the world's
third largest oil exporter, Norway and the world's second largest oil producer,
Russia, these countries have almost completely privatized their industries. 15 Both
are cooperative with international bodies in the effort to modify local statutes
which once prohibited the exercise of private ownership." 16
These privatization efforts are significant in the advent of growing world
demands. The United States is the most mature oil basin in the world, but the
disparity between consumption and production has forced the United States into a
net importing nation." 7 The United States is the world's number one consumer of
crude oil while, historically, Japan and Russia followed respectively" 18 . Recently,
however, China has emerged as a major consumer and will join the United States
and Japan as one of the world's largest petroleum consumers." 9 In 2003, China
surpassed Japan as the second largest oil importer next to the United States.'2 °
Additionally, the growing middle class and rapidly growing economies in India
and China place a competitive demand on world supplies.

110. Id. CIS Countries refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
111. See generally OECD, PRIVATISING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICES
AND PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES (2003).
112. Several countries including Canada, France, Argentina, Italy, Bolivia, and Peru have policies
that facilitate the privatization of their petroleum resources. See generally GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY
MARKETS supra note 22, at 3-20.
113. Richardson & McLarty, supra note 93, at 2.
114. See id. .
115. GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 3-12.
116. See id.
117. Appenzeller, supra note 4, at 89.
118. Id. at 89.
119. Id. at 92.
120. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 4.
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As such, it will be difficult for future production rates to accommodate the
growing demand. China, for example, consumes 20 percent of total OECD
energy. 12 1 Together, India and China make up 2.5 billion of the world
population. 122 Clearly, the security of oil supplies will rapidly become a priority
for both governments.
However, the security of oil supplies is exacerbated by the geographic
localities of several Western powers. Western Europe and Japan, for example, are
geographically situated near present and former state owned petroleum producers
and thus are greatly impacted by OPEC market fluctuations. 123 Arguably, these
nations sought to secure imports through the formation of multilateral agreements.
The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, for example, was created to encourage petroleum
trade between OECD and CIS countries. 124 As a result, the Energy Charter Treaty
provides alternative petroleum suppliers for OECD countries and therefore less
reliance on Persian Gulf oil.
A similar trend exists in U.S. foreign policy. Prior to the Saudi Oil Embargo,
the United States maintained an exorbitant reliance upon OPEC imports. Since
then, the United States has diversified its imports. 125 From 1978 to 1990, Saudi
Arabia was primarily the top importer to the United States. 126 With the emergence
of private markets in Venezuela and Canada, reliance on imports from Saudi
Arabia decreased. In 1997, the top suppliers of oil to the United States were
Venezuela, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, respectively. 127 Presently, Canada has
emerged as the largest supplier of oil to the United States 128followed by Saudi
Arabia, Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, and Iraq respectively. 129 Canada's proven
reserves have been enhanced by including oil sands reserves in the estimates of
total Canadian crude oil reserves, thus placing Canada second only to Saudi Arabia
at 178.9 billion bbls. 130 Clearly, the Canadian private market places economic
pressure on OPEC members to circumvent the seepage of political ideologies into
market performances. Similarly, Canada has demonstrated her loyalty as an
exporting trade partner with the United States. In 2001, 99 percent of Canadian
crude oil exports were sent to the United States.'

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. SCHURR & HOMAN, supra note 85, at 23, 31.
124. Energy Charter Treaty 1994 signed by Western nations, Eastern European Countries and
members of the
Community of Independent States (CIS), recognizes sovereignty over natural resources but discourages
nationalization. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 5-6; see also Waelde supranote 79, at 212-13.
125. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 67, ch. 1, at 10.
126. EIA Annual Report to Congress 1980, vol 2, at 55, reprinted in THE ENERGY LAW GROUP,
ENERGY LAW & POLICY FOR THE 21 sr CENTURY, ch.7, at 10-11 (2000).
127. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 67, ch. 1, at 11.
128. Alastair R. Lucas, Canada's Role In The United States' Oil and Gas Supply Security, 25
ENERGY L. J. 403,405 (2004).

129. See Losman, supra note 91, at 1.
130. Lucas, supra note 128, at 405.
131. Id. at 407.
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Currently, the Persian Gulf accounts for 27 percent of the world's oil supply
and holds over 66 percent of the world's proven reserves. 32 In an effort to avoid
Middle Eastern geopolitics and market disruption, importing countries anticipate
that new reserves will be found in the Caspian Sea.' 33 The Caspian Sea is believed
to hold the world's third largest petroleum reserve1 34and once unlocked could
dramatically reduce Western dependence on the Persian Gulf.135 The United States
and other Western countries hope to develop economic and political alliances with
the CIS countries of the Former Soviet Union as a means to develop the vast
potential of the Caspian Sea reserves.' 36 The Caspian Sea has become a central
focal point within the last fifteen years by Western capital, technology, and
diplomacy aimed at reducing reliance on the Middle East.' 3 7 Kazakhstan, holds
the Caspian Sea region's largest crude oil reserves, and is second only to Russia in
net exports from the region. 38 This explains the multitude of Western FDI
ventures that have persisted in that area.
Yet, others argue that the Caspian basin will not replace the need for Persian
Gulf oil.' 39 Recently, the Persian Gulf held roughly 600 billion barrels of oil and
1,600 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, whereas the Caspian basin only holds 28
billion barrels and 243 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.' 40 Moreover, Caspian Sea
production rates are expected to reach only four million bpd by 20154 as compared
to forty-five million bpd produced stemming from OPEC countries.' '
Still, multinational oil companies have spent the past two decades attempting
42
to develop new oil fields that could potentially replace existing mature basins.
Between 1996 and 2002, major oil companies invested approximately $560 billion
in attempts to increase daily production. 43 Unfortunately, however, no significant
discoveries have occurred in over two decades.' 44 When the Hubbert Peak begins
to drastically effect economies, the private sector may begin to force the hand of
the National Forest Service by seeking to develop the reserves in the Artic
National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR). 45 Yet, developing ANWR will not solve the

132. Lunev, supra note 65.
133. See id. (asserting that Caspian oil will help lower the cost of any disruption from the Gulf); see
generally, Waelde supra note 79, at 191, 197, 210 (discussing the legislative challenges and promise of
petroleum investment in former socialist countries, referred to as CIS countries).
134. Lunev, supra note 65.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes: Russia, Asebajin, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekiastan, and Turkmenistan.
137. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA REGION: COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF,

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.htm (2004) [hereinafter CASPIAN SEA].
138. 1d; see also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, KAZAKHSTAN: OIL AND NATURAL GAS

EXPORTS (2002) at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabskazaexpo.html.
139. A Survey of Central Asia: A Caspian Gamble, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1998, at 5-6.
140. Id.
141. CASPIAN SEA, supra note 137.
142. Engdahl, supranote 2, at 3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Savinar, supra note 2 at 4.
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problem. ANWR only contains ten billion barrels of oil, which merely equates to
one year of current U.S. consumption. 146 Likewise, the development of oil shale
and tar sands are not yet economically efficient because of the amount of energy
required to develop those resources. Geologist, Dr. Walter Youngquist, informs us
that: "although US oil shales hold recoverable oil equal to more than 64 percent of
the world's total proven reserves, all attempts to get this oil out of the oil shale
but the net
have failed economically. Furthermore, the oil may be recoverable
147
it.,,
recover
to
used
energy
the
equal
not
may
energy recovered
I. Alternative Theories for the Modern Trend Toward Privatizing the
Petroleum Sector
Some scholars contend that other market forces lead to modem privatization
that have less political implications than this discussion asserts. 4 8 One view is that
venture capitalists sought increased profit returns through FDI projects in unmature basins.' 49 Still others view privatization as market reform. 150 Another
contention is that the emergence of natural 5 ' gas as a viable resource has altered
future reliance on crude oil generally. Possibly the strongest argument is that
privatization efforts is a direct result of a significant increase in available
technology. 52 New methods of gathering seismic data as well as innovative
153
production technologies have led to new discoveries and more production.
Likewise, the increase in technological exploration methods, led to more
possibilities of E&P ventures in historically difficult geographic regions such as
the Caspian Sea and the Former Soviet Union. 154 Thus, foreign investors are less
reluctant to pursue E&P ventures in non-traditional reserves.
Others argue that in the thirty years following the Oil Embargo, the shift from
OPEC was due to a decline in OPEC production quotas, thus reducing profits. 55
And that new reserves in non-OPEC regions would yield more favorable economic
return 156. Economists contend that low production levels and lack of resource
exploration contribute to investor's abandonment of OPEC regions.' 57 Yet,
collectively, OPEC members continue to hold the largest proven reserves in the
Saudi Arabia alone has the highest production capacity. 159
world.' 58
146. Id.
147. Excerpt of geologist, Dr. Walter Youngquist reprintedin Savinar, supra note 2.
148. Foss, supra note 63, at 14.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 22-25.
152. Id. at 12-13.
153. See Wolfgang E. Schollnberger & Ronald A. Nelson, The Role of Technology in Modern
International Oil and Gas Exploration Strategies, in INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS VENTURES: A
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE, 99, 102-07 (George E. Kronman, Don B. Felio & Thomas E. O'Connor eds.,
2000); see also Foss, supra note 63, at 15-16.
154. See id; see also Foss, supra note 63, at 13.
155. See generally id., at 17, 27-28.
156. See generally, Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 41-46.
157. See Foss, supra note 63, at 14-15.
158. See TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 67-68.
159. See id.
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Comparatively, OPEC and the Middle East far surpass most non-member states in
with the Former Soviet Union, China, and
reserves and production capacity
6
Mexico as the few exceptions. 0
Competing theories espouse that privatization stems from the decline of
socialism and the endorsement of free enterprise as a means to advance a nation's
wealth. 16 ' This theory is supported by the rapid growth in international trade
through the globalization of world economies. 62 Thus, it is urged that the
emergence of a global economy, coupled with the end of major socialistic regimes,
laid the foundation for the privatization of the energy market.' 63 Also, inefficiently
managed state-owned enterprises discovered that international competitiveness
was a key factor in a nation's ability to generate wealth.' 64
These alternative theories suggest that a historic change in attitudes toward
state ownership and a desire to become more internationally competitive drove the
evolution of privatization.' 65 Such may be the case for developed countries and for
countries whose national revenue is not dependent upon the export of oil. Yet, for
oil rich countries whose national identity and economy are defined by the
production and sale of oil, the analysis is quite different. In fact, in major
producing countries, nationalistic views and state ownership are emphatically
supported and explain why OPEC countries have resisted privatization trends.
Unlike globalization generally, privatization of the petroleum industry is not a
creature of profit maximization or market reform whereby western nations are
driven by an unquenchable thirst for capitalistic gains. Instead, the historic
geopolitical power struggles reveals that petroleum privatization coexists within
political structures and strategies aimed at securing nationalistic interests. It is
clearly a direct result of the 1973 Saudi-led Oil Embargo and the adverse unilateral
decision making of Middle Eastern sovereign powers. Where its effect may be
competitive market facilitation, petroleum privatization is a reflection of Western
energy polices aimed at reducing reliance on Middle Eastern oil and thereby
Furthermore, allegations that globalization imposes
securing oil supplies.
capitalistic ideologies upon transition economies are not central to the discussion
of a global energy market. Far more is at stake here. Capitalistic ideologies serve
only as an infrastructure to implement the economic mechanisms of petroleum
privatization.
Petroleum as an energy resource has far greater significance than other global
commodities. 166 Because the dominant source of world energy is petroleum, the
absolute dependence of modem economies on fossil fuels will be greatly impacted
by the end of oil. 167 Worldwide dependence on non-renewable fossil fuels is
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 3-7.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 3-12.
See id.
See generally YERGIN, supra note 1, at 715; see also Foss, supra note 63, at 30.
THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 67, ch.1 at 7.
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68
reflected in the daily uses and consumptions existing among industrial societies.'
For instance, transportation, electricity, heat, plastic products, agricultural
production, and other commercial distribution networks are all petroleum
dependent. 169 In short, every facet of modem life in industrialized societies is
powered by petroleum products. 170

J. Iraq and InternationalConflicts
Beyond the politics of price and production, conflicts and social instability
within OPEC member states further exacerbated the need to decrease reliance on
OPEC suppliers. Politics is often pervasive in international petroleum transactions
Political risk
that involve sovereign state ownership of the minerals.'17
actions, and
host
government
unilateral
assessments involving expropriation,
72
Iraq, under
investments.
of
foreign
to
ensure
protection
production must occur
world
production,
threatened
has
frequently
the leadership of Saddam Hussein,
with a plethora of unilateral decisions which affected world supplies and foreign
relations. 173 U.S. relations with Iraq were amenable during the 1980175Iraq-Iran
war. 174 Yet, these relations collapsed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
The affect that Iraqi governmental instability has on the market is
demonstrative of need for private participation in producing countries. For
instance, during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the subsequent Persian Gulf War of
1991, several Kuwaiti oil fields were set afire, thus disrupting world oil supplies.
Fortunately, alternate suppliers eventually provided relief for the loss of production
during the Gulf conflict. 176 The ambitions of Saddam Hussein to become the
world's leading oil power, 177 is indicative of the unstable nature of global
transactions involving Middle Eastern producers. If the invasion of Kuwait had
been successful, Saddam Hussein arguably may have developed the financial
capacity to develop a formidable nuclear weapon. 178 The implications of which,
would have dramatically altered the balance of world power. 179 Additionally, the
loss of Iraqi production manifested by the U.N. plan and the imposed international
80
sanctions meant a shortage that other OPEC and non-OPEC countries must bear.'

168. Id.
169. See generally id.; see also Savinar, supra note 2, at 2.
170. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 14-15; see also THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supranote 67, ch. I at
7-8; see also Appenzeller, supra note 4, at 80-88.
171. Marlan Downey & Edwin Corr, Politics and InternationalExploration, in INTERNATIONAL
OIL & GAS VENTURES: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 60-61 (George E. Kronman, Don B. Felio & Thomas
E. O'Connor eds., 2000).
172. Id.
173. In the 1970s, Iraq formed alliances with the then Soviet Union. Economides & Kronman,
supra note 53, at 43.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See generally Foss, supra note 63, at 26.
177. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 12.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Foss, supra note 63, at 26-27.
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More recently, allegations of corruption surrounding the "Oil for Food Program" in
Iraq cause further market disruption in that it may further hamper the re-entry of
Iraqi pre-war production levels.' 8'
Clearly the use of oil as a political weapon, along with the economic
instability resulting from price battles, internal conflicts, and instability within
OPEC nations, created an impetus for western nations to develop new markets to
rely.' 82 Yet despite the cartel's attempt to dictate price and production, the world
endured the 1973 and 1985 crisis through the use of standby suppliers and
demonstrates that there are sufficient reserves to meet world demand with less
reliance on OPEC. 83 As such, present privatization in non-OPEC nations
increases the vitality and stability of the oil market. Despite the inevitability that
non-OPEC producers will dry up, 184 increased technology will one day unlock the
vast resources of the Caspian
Sea, creating sufficient relief for OECD nations
85
located near that basin.'
In the years to come, natural gas will replace crude oil as the primary
hydrocarbon resource. 86 And although natural gas deposits are not concentrated
in OPEC regions, a vast amount of natural gas occurs there.' 87 No conclusion
should be reached that a return to reliance on OPEC nations is inevitable for
natural gas purposes. Instead, since most OPEC countries lack the requisite
technology or capital to develop their natural gas resources, most will rely on some
form of privatization to initiate production. 88 Similarly, the abundance of natural
gas in the United States will89offset the potential for a Middle Eastern monopoly
over natural gas production.'
In summary, the private petroleum sector will continue to seek innovative
strategies to secure energy supplies and increase private participation in traditional
markets, and thereby reduce Western reliance on OPEC influence. The means by
which are subject to debate, yet privatization efforts have demonstrated that a
globalized energy market places pressure on otherwise unilateral geopolitical
strategies to conform to an equalized and cooperative world market.

181. See generally Claudia Rosett, Exposing the Rot Behind Oilfor Food, NAT'L. POST, Mar. 3,

2005, at A19; see also Bill Nichols, Oil For Food Chief Undermined Integrity of U.N., USA TODAY,
Feb. 4, 2005.
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II. PRODUCING COUNTRIES: ECONOMIC RELIANCE & VULNERABILITY

Privatization, along with economic globalization, exists along an intensely
polarized continuum, between sovereignty and private ownership, separating
private sector outlooks and anti-globalist rhetoric. In the case of petroleum
privatization, the intersection of national sovereignty and globalization collide
along a variety of geo-political lines enmeshed with energy demands and economic
power. Thus, countervailing camps are often uncompromisingly opposed to each
other. And motives and ideologies of respective counterparts are emphatically
conclusive. Considering that 99 percent of the world's oil stems from only fortyfour countries, twenty-four of which are past their peak, including the United
States, Russia, and the United Kingdom,' 90 Part II of this discussion examines the
socioeconomic norms and viewpoints of producing countries in reaction to the
encroachment of petroleum privatization.
A. Privatizationand Economic Reliance
In addition to the geopolitics steering Western countries away from their
reliance on Middle Eastern petroleum, the second critical factor driving
international petroleum privatization is born within the producing countries
themselves. That factor is the exclusive economic reliance on petroleum revenue
by producing nations.
Depending upon which vantage point petroleum privatization is viewed, the
economic disparity among producing nations could have several implications. One
might perceive that privatization exploits economically vulnerable states, or that it
is an imperialistic cloud over sovereign resources. Others may view the trend as
Whichever the chosen
an economic opportunity for transition economies.
perspective, present economic stagnation, emphatically leaves producing countries
vulnerable to foreign ownership and in need of foreign investment to promote
economic growth.
For petroleum producing countries, the threat of petroleum privatization is
less a creature of imperialistic globalization, but rather a product of national debt,
economic disparity, and above all the producing countries' excessive reliance on
petroleum export revenue.
B. PrivatizationDefined
Privatization is a capital venture in a market-driven economy by profitseeking companies who enter national economies and replace state ownership and
control with private ownership and control. 191 These profit-seeking companies are
typically representative of Western countries and foreign to the nation state.
In her article The Selling of Argentina: Is the Path to the First World
Privatized?, Carla Davidovich outlines factors that suggest both the benefits and
burdens of privatization. 192 She suggests that privatization: (i) increases efficiency
190. Savinar, supranote 2.
191. SMITH ETAL.,supra note 2l, at 379.

192. Carla Davidovich, The Selling of Argentina: Is The Path to the First World Privatized?, 28
LAW& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 154, 163-70 (1996).
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of the industry; (ii) reduces the government's role in the economy; (iii) maximizes
use of natural resources; and (iv) introduces capital flow to the government and
increases technological capacity. 93 However, she also notes that privatization
creates: (i) an increase in unemployment; (ii) decrease in the power of labor
unions; (iii) the states194loss to all future revenue; and (iv) fosters public resentment
of foreign ownership.
Privatization, as a form of market facilitation, clearly coexists with private
economic mechanisms, yet has implications of denationalization and trade
liberalism that often conflict with sovereign interests.
C. Fearof Privatization
Anti-globalist fear that privatization of the petroleum industry is an
implication of a loss of sovereignty over natural resources, deregulation of national
policies, and a reduction in state revenue. The views of world bodies concerned
with the trend of privatization were reflected at two international conferences. The
International Conference on the Impact of Globalization on Middle East Oil &
Gas Industry, sponsored by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), held on
July 23, 2003,'9' discussed the effects and implications of the World Trade
Organization, deregulation, and the impact of privatization on the Middle Eastern
Petroleum Industry. In April 2004, the University of Maryland held a symposium
titled, Globalization and Nigerian Oil that discussed among
other things, the
96
international political economy and international negotiations.'
These international conferences reflect a concern that privatization implies a
return to imperialistic conditions previously experienced in the first half of the
twentieth century. Furthermore, many fear that privatization affects a retreat from
national identity and self-determination. 97 Moreover, because most producing
countries were at some point under imperial or colonial rule, privatization
increases domestic resentment of foreign intervention and control.1 9i
From the host country perspective, privatization often means a loss of
sovereignty. Under the umbrella of economic globalization, privatization asserts
pressure for the deregulation of markets, economic sectors, and national borders. 199
It entails a transformative process of the state, which extends well beyond the loss
of power. 20 0 As such, privatization installs private actors and thereby affects denationalization. 20
Keep in mind, however, that most of the major petroleum

193. Id..
194. Id.
195. The Impact of Globalization on Middle East Oil and Gas Industry, Exhibits and Conferences,
National Iranian Oil Company (July 23, 2003) available at http://www.nioc.com/exhibit/.
196. Globalization and Nigerian Oil, Icons Project, University of Maryland (Apr. 2004) available
at http://www.icons.umd.edu/pls/staff/website.simulation-description?v-sim-type-id= 7.
197. See generally, Sakia Sassen, State & Economic Globalization: Any Implications for
InternationalLaw?, I CHI. J. INT'L 109, 110 (2000).
198. Davidovich, supranote 192, at 168.
199. Sassen, supra note 197, at 109-10.
200. Id. at 110.
201. Id. at 111.
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producers; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Mexico, Venezuela, and
Nigeria have resisted full scale privatization. 20 2 In fact, most of the producing
nations maintain a state-owned enterprise system whereby all royalties, revenue
stemming from the petroleum industry, goes directly to the central or federal
government. As one writer states: "most state-owned petroleum enterprises have
remained immune to privatization trends. 2 °3 In fact, many former communist
countries and some Latin American countries restrict foreign investment projects
to Joint Venture agreements with a national oil company. 204
D. Privatizationand the Loss of Sovereignty
There are different ways to view the effects of privatization on state-owned
petroleum enterprises, primarily because there are different methods of
privatization, 20 5 all of which do not lead to a complete loss of state control,
participation, or revenue. Obviously, most sovereign nations are resistive to the
implications of a Total Sale of Assets (TSA) and Acquisition model. Other models
such as the Joint Venture and the Lease and Management Contracts prove more
palatable to some producing countries with transition economies.20 6
The TSA model is best exemplified by the Argentina projects. Argentina
privatized its petroleum industry in 1993 .207 The oldest-state owned petroleum
company in Latin America, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), was sold to a
Spanish company Respol.2 ° 8 In 1993, Argentina's natural gas company, Gas de
Estado (GdE) was sold and divided into ten private companies few of which
In return, the Argentine
occurred through employee buyout programs.2 °9
government received over $22 billion. In 2003, a Brazilian company, Petrobas,
acquired a majority stake in Perez Companc, another large oil company in
Argentina. By the end of 2003, Argentina's entire petroleum industry had become
privatized.21 °
Other forms of privatization, which often have fewer implications of foreign
dominance and serve as beneficial economic mechanisms for transition economies,
include the Joint Venture agreement. 21 1 The Joint Venture model, which is

202. Waelde, supra note 79, at 193-96.
203. Keith J. Russell, Time Is Now for Full Privatization of PEMEX, 20 HOus. J. INT'L L. 176
(1997).
204. GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 7.

205. Id. at 37-55.
206. Id.
207. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 383.
208. Id. at 384. See also, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ARGENTINA, COUNTRY
ANALYSIS BRIEF, (2005) available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/argentna.html [hereinafter
ARGENTINA].

209. See Anna Gelpern & Malcolm Harrison, Recent Development, Ideology, Practice and
Performancein Privatization:A Case Study of Argentina 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 240, 243 (1992).
210. ARGENTINA, supra note 208.
211. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN NIGERIA 33, 34 (1994).
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essentially a partial sale of assets, provides investment opportunities for foreign
investors while simultaneously supporting economic and technological growth
211
among host countries.
For example, Joint Venture agreements account for 95 percent of Nigeria's
crude oil production. 21 3 One such Joint Venture agreement involves the
development of the West African Pipeline, entered into by the Nigerian National
Petroleum Company (NNPC), Shell and ChevronTexaco.2 14 ChevronTexaco holds
36 percent interest, Shell 18 percent, Ghana Volt River Authority 16 percent, and
the NNPC 25 percent. 215 The project serves multiple purposes. On the one hand,
it rids Nigeria of its gas flaring dilemma, which results in traumatic environmental
and health problems.2 16 Secondly, the West African Pipeline will spark economic
growth for Nigeria and ECOWA member states.217
Other major producing countries appear open to limited levels of foreign
investments. For example, Mexico PEMEX and Venezuela PDVSA have provided
8
limited opportunities for foreign direct investment.21 Neither state appears willing
to provide opportunities with any resemblance to the Argentine model.
The PEMEX, NNPC, and PVDSA contracts appear to serve the interest of
both sides of the debate. Each allows foreign investors the opportunity to expand
economic ventures while simultaneously increasing the financial viability of the
nation. Similarly, because many producing countries lack either the technology,
capital, or expertise to develop or expand the production of their petroleum
resource, private foreign investment is a means to utilize the resources, and thus,
create a capital base for the country. 219Under the PEMEX, NNPC, and PVDSA
model, nations are able to maintain sovereignty over their resources and maintain
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state participation. In addition, these models further allow the host countries to
increase their technical and managerial skills, which can ultimately lead to self
reliance and a self sufficient state-owned company. °
E. Debt and Economic Disparity
In the wake of the privatization era, one of the greatest dilemmas facing
producing countries is the ability to satisfy insurmountable foreign debt. In a
declining economy foreign debt is possibly the single most crucial factor which
incites a producing country to privatize its petroleum industry. Largely because in
a state-driven economy the government revenue has the responsibility of sustaining
all aspects of national needs. 22 1 Export revenue is distributed among social and
economic programs including, health, education, and other core industries, making
it difficult to balance the demands of competing economic burdens.222
Foreign debt owed by many of the producing countries to the World Bank or
foreign governments, stem from receipt of foreign aid, export credits, loans from
other governments and IFC loans. 2 3 External debt poses a serious problem for
producing countries because (i) the loan must be repaid in hard currency, (ii) the
country must pay debt servicing cost, (iii) historic debt relief and debt rescheduling
programs only prolong the life of the loan thereby increasing the total amount paid
over a period of time, and (iv) debt export ratios are often disproportionate,
creating financial dilemmas in declining economies.224
Producing countries, like other Lesser Developed Countries, must repay their
foreign debt in hard currency. 225 This is a difficult task when a producing
country's debt export ratio is disproportionate. When export revenue is down or
stagnant, the ability to pay debt servicing costs puts a daunting strain on the
national economy.226 Therefore, many producing countries seek alternative
repayment methods such as debt rescheduling.
This alternative, however,
increases the total amount needed to satisfy the loan and hence debt increases. 227
Faced with this financial dilemma, along with the responsibilities for the overall
economic and social well-being of the state, governments often seek privatization
as a means to satisfy foreign debt and increase economic growth.228

220. DOING BUSINESS iN NIGERIA, supra note 211, at 33-34.
221. Persian Gulf States Country Studies: Kuwait Society, COUNTRY STUDIES.COM at
http://www.country-studies.com/persian-gulf-states/kuwait---society.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
222. Id.
223. The Third World Debt Crisis, NEW INTERNATIONALIST MAGAZINE (1998) [hereinafter The
Third World Debt Crisis].
224. Id; see generally, Anup Shah, Debt and the Global Economic Crisis, in THIRD WORLD DEBT
UNDERMINES

DEVELOPMENT

available

at

http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/EconomicCrisis97.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
225. See The Third World Debt Crisis, supra note 223; see also Anup Shah, Causes of the Debt
Crisis,

in
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DEBT

UNDERMINES

DEVELOPMENT

available

at

http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/Causes.asp (last updated October 5, 2004).
226. See The Third World Debt Crisis,supra note 223; see also Shah, supra note 225.
227. See The Third World Debt Crisis,supra note 223; see also Shah, supra note 225.
228. Privatization was a vehicle by which Argentina, for example, reduced foreign debt, reduced
inflation and provided the government with a large influx of capital. See Davidovich, supra note 192, at
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For instance, prior to privatization, Argentina was in steep economic crisis,
with foreign debt in excess of $45 billion. 229 The backlash of the economic crisis
in 1980 left Argentina crippled with foreign debt. In 1985, Argentina began
privatizing its core industries. 230 In 1991, President Memem's "Argentina Plan"
opened the state-owned petroleum sector to foreign direct investment ventures.231
From the earnings made through completely privatizing state-owned enterprises,
Argentina reduced its foreign debt by twelve billion dollars.232
When a government no longer has the resources to sustain or develop their
state- owned enterprises and experiences a decline in export revenue, the potential
to default on foreign loans becomes apparent. Mexico, for example, defaulted on
its loan with the World Bank in 1982 due to a decline in decline in export revenue
and profit. 233 In 1993, the government adopted a Foreign Investment Law, aimed
at encouraging foreign investment in Mexico's petroleum industry.234
Another example is seen in Nigeria, which has $30 billion in foreign debt.235
Recently, the president of Nigeria, Obasanjo, made a plea to the international
community to cancel its foreign debt. Obasanjo insisted that debt relief was not
sufficient, that his country was in a state of economic depression, and the only
solution is debt cancellation.236
Discussions condemning the World Bank, IMF, and the HIPC 237 programs are
beyond the scope of this discussion, but have thematic relevance bearing on the
decision to privatize a core industry when faced with insurmountable foreign debt.
In many cases, a country allocates more of its revenue to debt servicing costs than
they are able to allocate to social and economic development programs. 238 Hence,
when faced with looming foreign debt and debt servicing costs, a country is
increasingly unable to sustain state-owned enterprises. Accordingly, privatization
is often the sole economic solution.

165-66.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 157.
SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 384.
Id.
Davidovich, supra note 192, at 164.
See Shah, supranote 225; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 387.
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235. JUBILEE
RESEARCH,
NIGERIA
(2000),
at
http://www.jubileeplus.org/jubilee2000_archives/nigeria.htm;
but see CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK, NIGERIA, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter THE WORLD FACT BOOK].
236. Press Release, Jubilee 2000, President Obasanjo Appeals For Immediate Debt Relief for
Nigeria
(Mar.
23,
2000),
at
http://www.jubileeplus.org/jubilee2000/j ubilee2000_archive/nigeria230300.htm.
237. HIPC is an acronym for "Heavily In-debt Poor Countries" initiative.
238. See JOHN SERIUEX &YIAGADEESEN SAMY, THE NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTE, THE DEBT
SERVICE BURDEN & GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM LOW INCOME COUNTRIES (2001), available at
http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2001-2/parallel%20papers/4_2_Serieux.pdf
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Nigeria is a prime example. Despite the fact that Nigeria is the world's eighth
largest oil producer, 239 the largest petroleum producer in Africa, and the fifth
largest U.S. supplier,240 Nigeria is among the poorest countries in the world.24'
Nigeria has four oil refineries: Port Harcourt I & II, Warn, and Kaduna, and in
1999 the four refineries combined operated at less than 38 percent capacity.242 In
2003, the four refineries reportedly operated well below their utilization capacity.
Kaduna operated a 31 percent capacity, Warri at 48 percent, and Port Harcourt I &
II at 60 percent utilization capacity. 243 Consequently, Nigeria functions as a net
importer state. 2 " Unmercifully, imported refined oil is purchased in hard
currency. 245 Traditionally, downstream activities were reserved to the state. 246 But
the lack of investment capital needed to revive the four refineries forced Nigeria to
enter into Joint Venture agreements with Shell and other multinationals.247
Presently, Nigeria has a privatization plan, offering 51 percent foreign ownership
in her petroleum sector and in some cases 100 percent private ownership.248 Such
decisions conflict with the historic exercise of unilateral sovereign prerogatives
and directly correlate with the burdens of external debt.
Other producing countries with large external debt include: Qatar with $15.4
billion, Mexico with $150 billion, Venezuela with $38 billion, Indonesia with $131
billion, and Iraq with $120 billion. 249 As long as producing countries lack the
economic capacity to reduce external debt, the potential for foreign direct
investment as a means to stimulate state economies remains an unavoidable reality.
F. Reliance of Oil Revenue: An Imbalanced Economic Strategy
Each producing country has its own unique geopolitical paradigm by which
they participate in the international petroleum industry. Some have common
threads of colonial or imperialistic rule. Others have transition stages of military

239. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, NIGERIA (2004),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/nigeria.html [hereinafter NIGERIA]
240. Id.
241. Ike Nijaman, Nigeria Is A Poor Country, ZNETAFRICA (Nov. 18, 2003) at
http://www.zmag.org/content/print article.cfm?itemlD=4516&sectionlD=2.
242. VIATON, NIGERIAN OIL & GAS ONLINE, DOWNSTREAM, at http://www.nigerianoil-gas.com
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
243. Id.; see also, Aluko Mobalaji, Fuel Subsidy, THE MORNING REPORT (July 9, 2003).
244. SHAHABUDDIN M. HOSSAIN, TAXATION & PRICING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (IMF Working Papers No. WP/03/42, 2003), available at
http://.www.IMFPublications.org.
245. Id.
246. See Adedolapo Akinrele, The Nigerian National Petroleum Company at a Crossroads:An
Analysis of the Challenges of Funding, Commercialisation and Autonomy, I OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.
INTELLIGENCE
2
(Mar.
2003)
available
at
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_43.htm.
247. See VIATON, supra note 242.
248. NAT'L COUNCIL ON PRIVATIZATION, BUREAU OF PUB. ENTERPRISES, COMPANIES FOR
PRIVATIZATION (2004).
249. THE WORLD FACT BOOK, supranote 235.
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rule and democratic rule. Others are plagued with war. Yet, all share one common
denominator: their absolute reliance on petroleum revenue.25 °
Hence to refer to producing countries as "oil rich countries" is a misnomer, as
few of the producing countries have any other significant export resources and
many are ranked among the poorest countries in the world.25' In a state-driven
economy, the reliance on a single source of revenue, dictated by fluctuations in the
petroleum market has dramatic results. As one scholar suggests: "When the price
of oil falls it creates real pain. They [producing countries] have to feed and give
welfare to their people, the same as Western countries." 252
In the typical producing country the state owned petroleum company,
generates 70 percent or more of its annual export revenue.253 For instance, in
Nigeria petroleum revenue accounts for 95 percent of its federal revenue. In
Venezuela, petroleum accounts for one-third of its GDP, 80 percent of its export
earnings, and more than 50 percent of government revenue. In Kuwait petroleum
revenues comprise 95 percent of their export revenue and 80 percent of the
government revenue. Petroleum makes up 85 percent of Qatar's export earnings
and 70 percent of government revenue.254 This list is not exhaustive, but
representative of the extent to which producing countries rely on petroleum
revenue.
Reliance on single export revenue, in a state-driven economy, when viewed in
relation to population growth and budgetary restraints, places producing countries
in a uniquely vulnerable economic position. Petroleum, being the most actively
traded commodity on the world market, is highly susceptible to market
fluctuations. 25 5 Hence, the unpredictable nature of the petroleum market can have
an adverse impact on an exporting countries economy. 256 In a given month, the
unstable petroleum markets, resulting from fluctuations in demand, production,
and price, can cause sporadic and declining petroleum revenues; thus, causing
economic demise among petroleum countries. And since petroleum countries are
concentrated in regions with low per capita income growth rates, 257 the economic
status of most producing countries does not avail itself to total reliance on the
revenue generated by petroleum.

250. According to Tony Scanlan, of the British Institute of Energy Economics, OPEC countries
cannot afford to treat oil as just another commodity. OPEC: The Oil Cartelin Profile, Feb. 12, 2003,
BBC NEWS, at http://new.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/3768971 [hereinafter BBC, The Oil Cartel].
251. Id.
252. Id. (quoting Tony Scanlan).
253. When averaged, the World Fact Book and Energy Information Administration export revenue
data reflect that petroleum revenue makes up 70 percent of the country's export revenue. See THE
WORLD FACT BOOK, supranote 235.
254. Id.
255. Oil Markets Explained,July 14, 2003, BBC NEWS [hereinafter BBC NEWS].
256. BBC, The Oil Cartel, supra note 250; see generally BBC NEWS, supra note 255.
257. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L. STUDIES, OIL CRASH & OIL
BOOM (2001); see also DAN BEN-DAVID, ET AL, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: SPECIAL STUDIES,
TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY 2, tbl.la (2003). Latin America, the Middle East, North
Africa and West Africa have populations living on less than $2 per day. Id. at tbl. lb.
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G. Economic Growth Through Economic Diversity
In light of the assertions that liberalism is a tool which brings wealth to the
wealthy nations and market exploitation of the poorer nations, one concept is clear.
Those nations which have grown faster have: (i) diversified their economy, (ii)
practiced liberalism, and (iii) developed an industrial market, which in turn
resulted in manufactured exports.258 This section does not dispel or support
theories of global trade regulations or liberalization. Here, the attempt is merely to
demonstrate how trade positively impacts economic growth.
This discussion suggests that producing countries should examine the
economic strategies of export led economies, particularly that of developing Asia.
Combined, developing Asia accounted for 18.5 percent of exports among
developing countries in 1990.259 Similarly, developing Asia held 59 percent of the
share of exports to the world and 67 percent among developing countries in
1990.260 Developing Asia has since been the largest exporter among developing
Increased export earnings are largely due to exportation of
countries. 261
manufactured goods and refined merchandise, while other non- manufactured
primary products account for only 20 percent of their overall exports.262 By
contrast, international exports have fallen in the oil producing regions such as,
Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.263 In fact, the Middle East and Africa
have not expanded their share of merchandise exports and export few
manufactured goods.26
On average, the highest growth rates were recorded in high-tech categories,
whereas resource based products were among the lowest.265 Petroleum countries
with low exports of non-petroleum products, may explain why these countries
26
Without
experience economic growth rates below the global average. 266
manufactured merchandise to place on the market, reliance on petroleum revenue
exacerbates the need to stimulate economic growth through privatization.
H. Globalizationand Trade Leverage
In the wake of liberalism, reciprocal trade barriers are now being relaxed,
allowing opportunities for developing countries to actualize trade income in the
world market. In the 1990s, trade liberalization has resulted in high instances of
economic growth for those countries with internal strategies and resources to
258. T. Ademola Oyejide, Low Income Developing Countries in the GA7T WTO Framework, in
FROM GATT TO THE WTO: MULTILATERAL TRADING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 115, 117-121
(ed.WTO Secretariat 2000).
259. See MARC BACCHETTA & BUrT BORA, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL TARIFF
LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1,2 (2003).

260. Id. at 3.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 3.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Out of 144 developing countries, only 54 countries recorded an export expansion above the
global average, while 90 developing countries recorded below average growth. BACCHETrA & BORA,
supranote 259, at 3.
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capitalize on the free market access. 267 Hence, the implications under a global
trade environment have the potential to increase national income and thus reduce
economic disparity.
The theory that a Global Trade system will be mutually rewarding and
thereby spark economic growth, questions whether open trade policies promote
economic growth. According to T. Ademola Oyejide, "[t]hose that do grow used
trade opportunities. Those that created trade barriers declined., 268 If the key to
alleviate poverty is through economic growth, and, if the key to economic growth
is in having an export led economy, then it follows that in order for producing
countries to sustain economic growth they must develop competitive export
products.269
To withstand further vulnerability to petroleum privatization and to create
economic growth, producing countries need to develop internal economic
infrastructures that facilitate an export-led economy.
Internal economic
infrastructures work to increase local consumption of products made within
national borders, and also provides an outward mechanism for transnational
activity.
Admittedly, issues of non-reciprocal market access and protectionism impact
the capacity of developing countries to fully participate in global markets. 270 Yet,
petroleum countries, unlike other developing countries, have decades of
transnational exposure and should be able to effect negotiation and terms.
Additionally, producing countries possess a vital export and should be able to
accomplish leverage through existing mechanism. Despite the challenges of a
rules-based system, petroleum countries, need take to heed to the proposition that
there is a link between trade and economic prosperity.
Although many
socioeconomic realities contribute declining economic conditions, global trade
arguably increases a countries earning capacity. Hence, the question of export
diversity hinges on economic resources and national trade policies.
III.

GLOBALIZING THE PETROLEUM MARKET: GOOD FOR WHOM?

A. Privatization:A Mutually Beneficial Policy Choice
Privatization as both a political and economic strategy provides mutually
beneficial outcomes for petroleum countries and consumers. Yet, full scale
privatization, whereby a nation liquidates 100 percent of its petroleum industry, is
likely more beneficial to the foreign investor, and merely achieves short term goals
for the petroleum country. For example, Argentina liquidated all of its core
industries, yet defaulted on its $145 billion dollar loan in December 2001, and in
2004, Argentina's external debt stood at $155 billion.27' Other methods of
267. Oyejide, supra note 258.
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. BACHETrA & BORA, supra note 259, at abstract. The issues for LDCs are the degree of
effective market access granted by developed countries, and the high levels of protectionism faced in
developing country markets.
271. Conrado Ramos, Challenges Posed by an Argentina Post-Default Scenario, CHIOKE.ORG. at
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privatization seem to serve the interest of foreign investments as well as
nationalism. First, transition economies are able to capitalize on the influx of
technological and managerial expertise.272 These countries are then, theoretically,
able to increase their participation in global markets. Thirdly, foreign investment
allows undercapitalized economies to develop unutilized natural resources. Fourth,
producing countries are introduced to Westernized business strategies, which if
subsequently applied, help further their capacity to develop economic
infrastructures and overall economic performances.
For importing nations, the globalization of the energy market has affected
market facilitation and market stability.273 As a policy choice, privatization served
to decrease anxieties surrounding the exercise of cartel influence on price and
production.274 Yet given the unavoidable return to reliance on Middle Eastern oil
supplies, the question is whether the Middle East will act as a stable supplier of
petroleum at market driven prices.275
B. The Collision Between Geopolitics and DecliningFuel Supplies
In the wake of the end of the Oil Era, the question is whether disruptive
geopolitical encounters will yield to the urgency of petroleum depletion, or will
unilateral decision making once again dictate market stability. In the coming
decades, the clash between nationalistic views, global economic trends, and
increased energy demands, will bring to the fore, an "epic quest" for control over
world oil supplies. 276 This quest for remaining oil supplies will result from the
increasing awareness of the finite nature of already declining oil resources.
Similarly, increased global demand will heighten the already intense battle to
secure oil imports.
To avoid international conflict, multilateral efforts should be exercised in
resolving hierarchical relations between consumption demands and sovereign
interests. International legislative bodies such as the United Nations and the
International Court of Justice must play a formidable role in the development of
international strategies aimed at increasing equitable relations among competing
national interests. Moreover, international energy policies which contemplate less
dependence on liquid petroleum will assist in circumventing global confrontations.
Although recent history reinforces pessimistic outcomes, multilateral
cooperation is imperative in circumventing global crisis. Clearly, petroleum
resources will be the focal point of international policies in the coming decades.
As such, any multilateral energy plan implemented by global powers must address
http:// www.chioke.org/nuevo-eng/informes/2753.html; see also Peter Calvert, Argentina: The Crisis of
Confidence, DEPT. OF POLITICS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHHAMPTON (Apr. 2002).
272. Davidovich, supranote 192, at 162-70.
273. See Foss, supra note 63, at 30-36; see also Richardson & McLarty, supra note 93.
274. Richardson & McLarty, supra note 92.
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nationalistic concerns as well as Western economic objectives. Failure to do so
will only exacerbate an already critical situation. In short, global responses to the
eminent global energy crisis need not be antagonistic but instead reflective of
modem sociopolitical awareness and aptitude.

ARE UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN REALLY GETTING A
FAIR TRIAL?
AN OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW AND CHILDREN

ChristineM Gordon*
INTRODUCTION

Sudha is an 11-year old girl from India.' Her parents abused her, placed her
in a home for unwanted children, and then gave her to a male stranger who
accompanied her to the United States. 2 During immigration proceedings, her
attorney argued that Sudha was a victim of child trafficking; her parents had sold
her for child labor.3 Each year approximately 7,000 unaccompanied alien children,
like Sudha, are detained by United States immigration officials.4
Alien children are classified as "unaccompanied children" when they arrive or
are found in the United States alone and are under the age of 18. 5 The average age
of unaccompanied children held in immigration detention facilities is 15 years old,
with some as young as 18 months old.6 A majority of the unaccompanied children
in detention come from Latin America and are caught trying to cross the United
States/Mexico border illegally. 7 Many of these children are victims of poverty,
abusive child labor practices, human trafficking, rape, forced prostitution, or armed
conflict in their home countries and travel long distances to reach the United States
in the hope that they can find a better life for themselves. 8 In other instances,
children are unaccompanied because they have been separated from their families

* Christine M. Gordon was born in Richmond, Virginia. She is a recent graduate of the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law and graduated from American University, Magna Cum Laude with a
degree in International Business.
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during travel or have been abandoned by their parents. 9 Upon arriving in the
United States, parents are sometimes afraid of coming forward to "claim" their
children, because they fear being deported. 10 These unclaimed children are left to
face United States immigration officials alone."
Currently in the United States, child asylum applicants face the same
immigration procedures as adult asylum applicants. 12 United States immigration
law does not afford child asylum seekers special treatment in determining their
claims, does not appoint legal representation, and does not provide appropriate
care for these children as they await determination of their claims.' 3 Age, level of
education, and language skills affect not only a child's ability to communicate with
immigration officials, but also his or her understanding of the United States'
immigration process. 14 International law has taken into account the special status
of child asylum seekers. For example, the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees has promulgated guidelines for dealing with unaccompanied alien
children which state that the "best interests of the child" is the standard under
which child asylum claims should be determined, has provided procedures for
appointing guardians and counsel, and has asserted that the detention of such
children should be prohibited.' 5 Despite such international guidance, the United
States had not yet implemented legislation which takes these concerns into
account. Without proper standards and safeguards, unaccompanied alien children
in the United States face being deported to a country where their parents may no
longer reside or do not want them and where their human rights will be violated.
This article focuses on issues related to the custody and detention of
unaccompanied alien children seeking asylum and is broken into four sections:
international refugee law, United States immigration law and the asylum process,
current conditions of unaccompanied alien children, and developments in the
United States law regarding unaccompanied alien children.
I. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW

A. Background-Role of the UnitedNations
Because United States law is influenced by international law, it is important
to first review international refugee law and how it relates to children. This section
will describe the role of the United Nations, the legal effects of international law,
and the specific international laws that pertain to unaccompanied alien children
seeking asylum.

9. PRISON GUARD OR PARENT, supra note 5, at 5; see also Who Will Stand Up For Them?, supra
note 6,at 5.

10. Who Will Stand Up For Them?, supranote 6, at 5.
11. Id.
12. PRISON GUARD OR PARENT, supra note 5, at 5.

13. Id. at 5-6.
14. Id.
15. UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN DEALING WITH UNACCOMPANIED
(1997),
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgiCHILDREN
SEEKING
ASYLUM
bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdftbl=PUBL&id=3d4f91 cf4 [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDELINES].
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On October 24, 1945, 50 countries, including the United States, created the
United Nations through ratification of its Charter. 16 As set forth in the Charter, the
purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain international peace and security; to
develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international
economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respectfor
human rights and fundamentalfreedoms; and to be a centre for harmonizing the
actions of nations in attaining these ends"'17 (emphasis added).
In promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the United18
Nations has worked toward creating a comprehensive body of human rights law.
The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, are the foundations of this body of
law. 19 General Assembly decisions have gradually established United Nations
human rights laws as universal, indivisible and interrelated with the development
and democracy of all nations. 20 Today human rights law encompasses specific
standards for "women, children, disabled persons, minorities, migrant workers and
other vulnerable groups. 21
B. Duties of Member States - Customary InternationalLaw
The United Nations, according to its charter, is charged with the codification
and development of international law. 2 The United Nations has developed a
framework for promoting international peace, security, and economic and social
development through over 500 conventions, treaties and standards.23 The General
Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations, which votes on
those conventions, treaties, and standards.24 Each member state to the United
Nations has a representative, with one vote in the General Assembly.25
"Any form of intentional agreement that formally creates legal obligations for
the parties thereto is considered a treaty. '2 6 Treaties are legally binding. 27 Several
different terms are used to refer to treaties: conventions, covenants, protocols,
charters, and statutes.28 However, "convention" is the most commonly used term
16. UNITED NATIONS, BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED
ORGANIZATION, http://www.un.org/aboutun/basicfacts/unorg.htm
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for treaties in the human rights arena.29 The importance of identifying a treaty is
that some forms of international law are not legally binding. 30 For example,
only represent a moral commitment and therefore are not legally
declarations
31
binding.
Though member states do not have to adopt all of the necessary legislation
foreseen by a convention prior to its ratification, member states are expected to be
in compliance with a convention within a reasonable time after ratification.32 If a
member state has not ratified or acceded to a convention, the convention is not
formally binding upon that country.33 However, the provisions of all conventions
customary law and
have an effect on all countries as they are part of international
34
represent an international consensus on a certain topic.
If a member state signs a convention after it has been adopted by the General
Assembly, this is treated as a "preliminary or general endorsement of the
convention" and is not legally binding. 35 The signature is treated as "an indication
that the country intends to undertake a careful examination of the treaty in good
faith" prior to its ratification of the convention.36 Though not legally binding, the
defeat the
signature does bind the member state "to refrain from acts that would
37
objectives of the convention, or to take measures to undermine it."
C. InternationalLaw on the Rights of UnaccompaniedChildren
1. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set the stage for creating
international standards of human rights and asylum law.38 The Preamble of the
declaration states that a world where "human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people" 39 (emphasis added). The Preamble further states
that the member states pledge to achieve "the promotion of universal respect for
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. ' 4° According to
Article 2 of the declaration, "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status."'4

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. THE PROCESS: FROM SIGNATURE TO RATIFICATION, supra note 26.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

37. THE PROCESS: FROM SIGNATURE TO RATIFICATION, supranote 26.

38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc. A/810, at pmbl.
(1948), http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.htm.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at art. 2.
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Several articles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
pertain to asylum law. For example, Article 14 guarantees "everyone the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 'A2 Article 3
establishes the right to life, liberty, and security of person.43 Article 5 prohibits
any person from be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment. 44 Articles 18 and 19 guarantee the right to freedom of thought
(conscience and religious) and the freedom of opinion and expression.45
Of most importance to unaccompanied children, Article 25 proposes the
concept that "motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance. ' 46 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrates to the
international community that as early as 1948, children were deemed to deserve
special treatment. Furthermore, this international document that proposes special
treatment for children, guarantees that all human beings have the right to seek
asylum from persecution. As one of the founding members of the United Nations,
the United States is morally bound to uphold the ideals of this declaration and
protect the human rights of all individuals within its boundaries. This should
include affording child asylum seekers special treatment.
2. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees affirms the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' principle "that human beings shall enjoy
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination." 47 The 1951 convention
went further to "assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental
rights and freedoms. '"4
Under Article 1 of the convention, "refugee" was defined as any person who
had been considered a refugee as a result of events occurring before January 1951
and who:
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable,
or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of4 9such events, is
unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 3.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 38, at art. 5.
Id. at arts. 18-19.
46. Id. at Art. 25.
47. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, entered into force Apr. 22,
1954, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm.
48. Id. at pmbl.
49. Id. at art. 1.
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This convention created the international standard for evaluating an asylum
seeker's claim of persecution, a standard that continues to be used by the United
States today. 50
Several other articles in the convention outline the rights of refugees as they
seek asylum in member states. Article 16 of the convention guarantees refugees
"free access to the courts of law ... of all [c]ontracting [s]tates.,, 51 This article also
provides refugees the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access
to the courts, such as legal assistance. 2 Article 31 prohibits contracting states
from imposing penalties on refugees "on account of their illegal entry or presence.
provided [refugees] present themselves without delay to the authorities and
show cause for their illegal entry or presence. 53 Without this provision, many
asylum seekers would never have their claims heard. Article 33 also prohibits
contracting states from "expel[ling] or return[ing] a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. 54 This provision prohibits member states from
returning an asylum seeker to a country in which they may face persecution.
Though much of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was
incorporated into the asylum provisions of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Act of 1952, the United States did not ratify the 1951 convention. 5 Canada
ratified the convention on June 4, 1969.56
3. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
In 1967 the United Nations introduced the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. The main purpose of the Protocol was to amend the definition of a
refugee.57 Under the 1951 convention, only refugees who had become refugees as
a result of events occurring before January 1951 were protected. 8 The 1967
protocol omitted the words "as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951"
and the words "as a result of such events., 59 By omitting this language, the United
Nations established asylum as a permanent and continuing form of protection for
all people.

50. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2005).
51. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 47, at art. 16.
52. Id.
53. Id at art. 31.
54. Id. at art. 33.
55. United Nation Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Conventions Deposited with the
to
the
Status
of
Refugees,
Secretary-General,
Convention
Relating
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterV/treaty2.asp.
56. Id.
57. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 19 U.S.T. 6223, entered into
force Oct. 4, 1967, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o pjref.htm.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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The United States ratified the 1967
However, the United States' ratification was
to the taxation of non-resident refugees.61
convention, its ratification carried over to the

protocol on November 1, 1968.60
accompanied by reservations relating
Since Canada 62had ratified the 1951
1967 protocol.

4. 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
In 1989 the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the
Child 63. The convention recognized that children "by reason of [their] physical
and mental immaturity, need special safeguards and care, including appropriate
legal protection." 64 The 1989 convention lists and strengthens the importance of
several other United Nations conventions and declarations addressing the special
65
needs, rights, and protections that childhood requires.
Article 1 of the convention defines a child as "every human being below the
age of eighteen years." 66 Perhaps the most important provision in the convention
67
is Article 3 which created the "best interests of the child" standard. International
law requires that in all matters concerning children, the best interests of the child
shall be the primary consideration. 68 This is a standard that the United States has
not yet adopted in evaluating a child asylum seeker's claim.69
Article 22 of the convention specifically outlines how state parties should
treat unaccompanied child asylum seekers. 7° State parties are to "protect the child
If the child's family
and trace the parents or other members of the family.'
cannot be found, then the State Party is to provide for the child according to Article
Under Article 20, children who have been deprived of their family
20.72
73
environment are entitled to special protection and assistance. State parties are to
ensure alternative care for these children such as foster placement, adoption, or
placement in a suitable institution for the care of children.74

60. United Nation Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Conventions Deposited with the
Refugees,
of
Status
the
to
Relating
Protocol
Secretary-General,
www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu3/b/treaty5.htm.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., annex,
(1989),
A/44/49
Doc.
U.N,
167,
at
49,
No.
Supp.
http://www.unhchr.ch/htm1/menu2/6/crc/treaties/crc.htm
64. Id. at pmbl.
65. See id.
66. Id. at art. I.
67. Id. at art. 3,para. 1.
68. Id.
69. Memorandum from INS on Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims, to Asylum Officer
Corps (Dec. 10, 1998), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/lOa-ChldrnGdlns.pdf
[hereinafter INS Guidelines].
70. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 63, atart. 22.
71. Id. at art. 22, para. 2.
72. Id. atart. 20.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Another important aspect of the 1989 convention relates to the rights of
detained children. According to Article 37 "the arrest, detention or imprisonment
of a child . . . shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time., 7 5 The provision further states that while in detention a
child should be treated "in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons
of his or her age. 76 In particular, unless it is in the child's best interest, the child
should be separated from adults and have the right to maintain contact with his or
her family through correspondence and visits. 77 Lastly, perhaps most importantly,
Article 37 states that "every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right
to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance. 78
Though the United States signed the 1989 convention on February 16, 1990,
to date it has not yet ratified the convention.79 In fact the United States
and
80
Somalia are the only two countries which have not ratified this convention.
D. InternationalGuidelinesfor UnaccompaniedChildren
1. Canadian Guidelines
After the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Canada became the
first government to publish its own guidelines for handling child refugee claims.81
Canada created the guidelines because the country's immigration legislation did
not "set out specific procedures or criteria for dealing with the claims of children
different from those applicable to adult refugee claimants. 82 Canada felt that the
procedures being followed by its Convention Refugee Determination Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board
(CRDD) for an adult claimant were not
83
always suitable for a child claimant.
Canada's guidelines specifically apply to unaccompanied children and define
children as persons under the age of 18.84 The guidelines note that the "best
interests of the child" principle is a principle recognized by the international
community as a fundamental human right of a child. The Canadian guidelines
take into account the age and unaccompanied status of these children because
Canadian officials feel that children warrant special attention while their claims are
being determined.86 The guidelines also take into account gender, cultural
background and past experiences as factors that affect the best interests of a
75.
76.
77.
78.

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 63, at art. 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.

79. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS

OF

THE

PRINCIPAL

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS

TREATIES,

www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
80. UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, www.unicef.org/crc/introduction.htm.
81. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 5.
82. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINE 3: CHILD REFUGEE CLAIMANTS, available at
www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/Child-e.htm [hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES].
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 63, at art. 3, para. 1.
86. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 82.
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child.
As a consequence the "best interests of the child" principle is heavily
utilized in the different stages leading to the determination of a child's claim. 88
Under current Canadian law, once an unaccompanied child asylum seeker has
been identified, the provincial authority responsible for protecting children is
notified and put in charge of the child's care pending determination of his or her
claim. 89 To limit stress and trauma, child asylum claims are given scheduling and
processing priority. 90 A CRDD panel and Refugee Claim Officer (RCO) are
immediately assigned to the claim and the child's representative is designated as
soon as possible following the assignment of the CRDD panel. 9' Prior to
designating the representative, the provincial authorities responsible for protecting
children will bring forth any relevant information that would affect the
appointment of the representative. 92
At the pre-hearing conference the
representative is assigned (if one has not already been assigned), issues in the
claim are identified, and evidence that will be presented is identified (the CRDD
panel determines what evidence the child is able to provide and the best way to
elicit that information).93 In determining what evidence the child is able to provide
the CRDD panel will consider the age, mental development of the child, the
capacity of the child to recall past events, the amount of time that has elapsed since
the events, and the capacity of the child to communicate. 94 Following the prehearing conference, a hearing will take place to determine the child's asylum
claim. 95
In addition to placing specific provincial authorities in charge of child asylum
seekers, the Canadian guidelines are significant in that they guarantee that child
asylum seekers do not face proceedings alone. The guidelines require the
designation of a representative for all child claimants. 96 The role of the designated
representative is not that of legal counsel, but rather that of a guardian that
guarantees the child's rights are always protected.97 Child asylum seekers have a
separate right to be represented by legal or other counsel. 98 In fact, the duties of
the designated representative are to:
[R]etain counsel, instruct counsel or help the child instruct
counsel, to make other decision with respect to the proceedings or help
the child make those decisions, inform the child about the various stages
and proceedings of the claim, assist in obtaining evidence in support of

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

91.

CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supranote

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

82.

CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 82.

Id.
Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 33:4

the claim, provide evidence and be a witness, and act in the best
interests of the child.99
In order for a person to be considered a representative for a child claimant, the
person must be over 18 years old, must have an appreciation of the nature of the
proceedings, must not be in a conflict of interest situation with the child, and must
be willing and able to fulfill the duties of representative and to act in the best
interest of the child.'00 Before the CRDD will designate a representative, they will
inform the proposed representative of his duties and then make an assessment of
the person's ability to fulfill those duties.01
Canada's guidelines take into account the important differences between child
and adult asylum seekers. The guidelines guarantee the protection of child asylum
seekers, specifically unaccompanied alien children, through guarantees of legal
representation, designation of a representative, and the utilization of the "best
interests of the child" standard in assessing the child's claim. 10 2 However, the
Canadian guidelines fail to address what happens to children while they await
assignment of a representative and the conditions of detention.
2. UNHCR Guidelines
In February 1997, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) published its Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in dealing
with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum. 10 3 The UNHCR guidelines
referred to the following as the main international standards with regards to
unaccompanied children seeking asylum: the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, and the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.'0 4 The guidelines define an
unaccompanied child as "a person who is under the age of eighteen ...and who is
separated from both parents, and is not being cared for by an adult ....,,105 The
UNHCR felt that it was important for unaccompanied children to receive
"effective protection and assistance in a systematic, comprehensive and integrated
manner."' 1 6 Not surprisingly, the basic guiding principle behind the UNHCR
guidelines is the "best interests of the child. ' '"°
The UNHCR guidelines state that because of their special vulnerabilities,
unaccompanied children seeking asylum should be guaranteed access to all
territories, should be provided with legal representation upon arrival to a territory,
should have their claims examined in a manner appropriate for their age, and
should have access to asylum procedures regardless of their age.108 The guidelines
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 82.
Id.
UNHCR GUIDELINES, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
UNHCR GUIDELINES, supra note 15.

2005

AN OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW AND CHILDREN

also state that in order to ensure that a child is properly treated as an
unaccompanied child asylum seeker, port authorities should take necessary
to ensure that they are identified promptly and on a priority basis upon
measures
109
entry.
The UNHCR feels that in order to ensure that the interests of a child are
safeguarded and that his or her needs are appropriately met, a guardian or adviser
should be appointed as soon as the unaccompanied child is identified. ° The
guidelines suggest that an independent and formally accredited organization be
identified or established in each country which would be responsible for
appointing guardians or advisers as soon as the unaccompanied child is
identified."1 Such a guardian should have expertise in the field of childcare to
of the child are safeguarded and the child's needs are
ensure that the interests
1
appropriately met. 12
One of the most important aspects of the UNHCR guidelines concerns the
interim care and protection of unaccompanied children seeking asylum." 3 The
UINHCR feels that children seeking asylum require special care and protection,
especially if they are unaccompanied.'l 4 While awaiting determination of their
asylum claims, children's changes in residence should be kept to a minimum,
siblings should be kept together, children who have adult relatives already living in
the country of asylum should be allowed to stay with them pending determination
of their status, and children living in foster homes should be kept under regular
supervision by qualified person." 5 The UNHCR also felt strongly that children,
especially unaccompanied alien children should not be kept in detention.' 1 6 The
guidelines do allow for limited detention of children, in accordance with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, but only as a "measure of last resort" and
only for the "shortest appropriate period of time." '" 7 For those children being
detained in airports, immigration holding centers, or prison, the conditions of
detention should not be prison-like." 8 Lastly, if it is impossible to release the child
from detention, then "special arrangements must be made for living quarters which
UNHCR's primary objective with regard to
are suitable for children."'' 9 The
' 20
custody is "care," not "detention."'
The UNHCR guidelines are very similar to the Canadian guidelines. Both
considered it essential for child asylum claims to be given priority and prompt
decision, that children be represented by an adult who can protect the child's best
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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interests, and that they be given access to a qualified legal representative. 121 The
UNHCR guidelines go one step further in the protection of unaccompanied child
asylum seekers, in that they strongly advise22against detention of these children and
provide alternatives to jail-like conditions.1
II. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS

As stated previously, it is of interest to review U.S. refugee law after
reviewing international refugee law, as they are very similar. This section will
briefly review the individual laws that affect unaccompanied children and the
United States asylum process.
A. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) was a compilation of
U.S. immigration policies from as far back as 1790.123 Since 1952 many new
immigration laws have been passed and new provisions are continually being
added to the original INA. 12 4 The main purpose of establishing the INA was to set
125
forth guidelines and criteria for allowing aliens to become United States citizens.
In order for an alien to begin the process of becoming a citizen, he first must
be inspected and admitted into the country. 126 According to the INA, aliens can be
inspected for admission purposes at United States ports of entry or at any location
within the country. 127 Admission requires a valid visa or valid immigration status
in the United States.' 28 Those aliens who are deemed inadmissible at a port of
entry will be ordered removed unless they indicate an intention to apply for asylum
to avoid immediate removal. 129 For those aliens who have been found within the
United States without proper status, an immigration judge will determine their
admissibility or deportability during removal proceedings. 130 Those aliens who
wish to avoid deportation may also choose voluntary departure.13' Voluntary
departure allows an alien to leave the United States at his or her own expense
that would hinder when he or she may legally
without incurring any penalties
32
States.'
United
the
to
return

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT, at

http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/INA.htm.
124. Id.
at
SERVICES,
NATURALIZATION,
&
IMMIGRATION
125. U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/natz/index.htm.
126. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, GENERAL NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENTS, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/natz/general.htm.
127. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(1) (2005).
128. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6-7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6-7) (2005).
129. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
130. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(a)(1) (2005).
131. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240B(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2005).
132. Id. at (a)(1).
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In addition to requiring that aliens been inspected for admissibility, the INA
provides those aliens in removal proceedings the right to counsel. 13 3 However,
aliens wishing to be represented by counsel during removal proceedings must do
so at their own expense, counsel is not appointed by the government. 134 Of further
importance, there is no provision in the INA that requires appointment of counsel
to unaccompanied alien children.
B. Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the INA by adding and defining the term
"refugee" as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or
135
political opinion.
This addition established an asylum process to protect individuals who were
physically present in the United States and held a "well-founded fear of
persecution" in their home country. 136 It is important to note here that the
definition of "refugee" used in the Refugee Act of 1980 is very similar to the
definition 1used
in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
37
Refugees.
The Refugee Act of 1980 also created the Office of Refuge Resettlement
(ORR) under the Administration of Children and Families (ACF), an agency of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 138 The goal of this office is to
help refugees "achieve economic self-sufficiency and social adjustment" as they
begin new lives in the United States. 39 Through the ORR's Unaccompanied
Refugee Minors Program, refugee children are placed in foster care, group care,
independent living, or residential treatment facilities and receive the same benefits
and services as United States children in foster care.' 40 The ORR will be described
in more detail later in this article.

133. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2005).
134. Id.
135. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 6; see also Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101 (a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(42)(A)(2005).
136. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS 0 CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 6.

137. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 47, at art. I.
138. Immigration and Nationality Act § 411 (a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1521(a)(2005).
139. ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, OFFICE OF REFUGE RESETITLEMENT, FACT

SHEET, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/mission/factsheet.htm
140. Id.
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C. IllegalImmigration Reform and ImmigrationResponsibility Act of 1996
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
14
(IIRIRA) amended the INA by adding a provision for expedited removal. 1
Expedited removal only applies to aliens found at United States borders without
the proper documentation. 142 In order to avoid immediate deportation, an alien
must either articulate that he wishes to apply for asylum or express a fear of
persecution if returned to his home country. 43 In other words, even if an alien
does not specifically indicate a desire to apply for asylum, the immigration official
must treat an alien as an asylum seeker if the alien describes a situation that would
meet the definition of persecution. However, the IIRIRA also established a policy
of mandatory
detention for aliens awaiting removal, criminal aliens, and asylum
44
seekers. 1
The IIRIRA also requires all asylum applications to be submitted within a
year of arrival to the United States. 14 5 The only exception to this requirement is if
an alien can demonstrate a "material change in circumstances" since his or her
arrival in the United States that would now make him or her an asylum applicant or
if he or she can prove that "extraordinary circumstances" caused a delay in his or
her filing for asylum. 146 "Extraordinary circumstances" include legal disability, for
example status as an unaccompanied alien child. 147 As a general rule children are
unless they have specifically been classified as
not exempt from the one year limit
48
an unaccompanied alien child. 1
D. Overview of the United States'Asylum Process
Asylum is a mechanism that allows aliens who are in the United States to
remain and eventually adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident,
provided they meet the definition of a refugee and are not barred from either
applying for or being granted asylum. 149 As defined in the INA a refugee is:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality, or in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is.
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of

141. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 7; see also Immigration and
Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2005).
142. Id.
143. Id.
8 U.S.C.A.
§
144. Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 235 (b)(1)B)(iii)(IV),
1225(b)(1)B)(iii)(IV)(2005); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 236, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226
(2005).
145. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 6; see also Immigration and
Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(B)(2005).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
&
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
WHAT
IS
ASYLUM?,
at
149. U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/index.htm.
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persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Aliens 15may
apply for asylum in one of two ways: affirmatively or
1
defensively.
1. Affirmative Asylum
The affirmative process begins with an alien who is physically present in the
United States. 52 Regardless of how the alien entered the country they may submit
an asylum application to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.
The IIRIRA requires aliens to submit the asylum application within a year of their
arrival in the United States. 154 Affirmative applicants are usually not detained and
are free to live in the United States pending determination of their asylum case. 55
Before the alien is interviewed by an asylum officer, the applicant's identity must
be
be checked to ensure that there are no grounds for which the alien may
56
"inadmissible, deportable, or ineligible to apply for or be granted asylum."'
No later than 43 days after the submission of the application, the alien meets
with an asylum officer. 157 Only the asylum officer, the alien, and the alien's
attorney are present during this interview, making it non-adversarial. This meeting
normally takes place at one of the eight asylum offices in the United States. 58 The
purpose of this interview is for the alien to prove his case of persecution to the
asylum officer. If the asylum officer is not convinced that a well-founded fear of
persecution exists, the application will not be recommended for asylum. 5 9 If the
application is not recommended for asylum, the case is then referred to an
immigration judge under the Executive Office for Immigration Review.' 6° The
alien then has 30 days from the completion of removal proceedings to appeal the
immigration judge's decision.
According to law, the final administrative
adjudication of the asylum application, not including administrative62appeal, should
be completed within 180 days of the date the application was filed.

150. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2005).
151. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, OBTAINING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES:
Two PATHS TO ASYLUM, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm [hereinafter Two
PATHS TO ASYLUM].
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154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(d)(5)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(i) (2005).
157. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(d)(5)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) (2005);
see also Two PATHS TO ASYLUM, supra note 151.
158. Two PATHS TO ASYLUM, supra note 151.
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2. Defensive Asylum
Alternatively, an alien may apply for asylum defensively by way of appeal, as
a defense at removal proceedings, or as a means of preventing expedited
removal. 163 If the alien has applied affirmatively for asylum, the defensive process
begins when the asylum officer fails to recommend the case for asylum and the
applicant appeals to an immigration judge. 164 On the other hand, if an alien is
undocumented or in violation of [his or her] status when apprehended in the United
1 65
States, he or she will claim asylum as a defense at his or her removal hearing.
If an alien is caught trying to enter the United States without proper
documentation, he or she will be faced with expedited removal unless an
immigration officer finds that the alien has a "credible fear of persecution" if he or
she is returned to his or her home country. 166 The screening done by the
border/immigration officer is called "secondary inspection"; translators are usually
not available and consultation with an attorney has not taken place., 67 If the
border/immigration officer is convinced a credible fear of persecution exists, a
second screening takes place with an asylum officer. 168 This interview usually
takes place in an immigration detention center two to seven days after
apprehension, if not at the port of entry. 169 If the asylum officer is not convinced
that a credible fear of persecution exists, the alien continues to be detained while
awaiting an immigration judge's final determination. 170 The immigration judges
hear these cases in an adversarial proceeding, hearing claims from the applicant as
well as the government (the Department of Homeland Security). 17 1 If the
immigration judge does not find the applicant eligible for asylum, they will try to
determine if the172applicant is eligible for any other form of relief before removal
will be granted.
III.

PLIGHT OF THE CHILDREN: CONDITIONS OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN

IN THE UNITED STATES

Having reviewed the basics of international and United States refugee law,
this section focuses on those unaccompanied children who have been detained by
immigration officials and the problems they currently face.
United States asylum law considers "every person under the age of 18" to be a
child. 173 Despite their classification as children, United States immigration law
assumes that unaccompanied alien children are capable of convincing immigration
officials of their fears of persecution or even know to claim asylum. Currently,
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Two PATHS TO ASYLUM, supra note 151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Two PATHS TO ASYLUM, supra note 151.
Id.
INS Guidelines, supra note 69, at 1.
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unaccompanied child asylum seekers in the United States are74not guaranteed legal
representation and are held in prison-like detention facilities.
A. Legal Representation
At the age of 14 Isau fled Honduras and came to the United States to escape
severe abuse at the hands of his stepfather and persecution by government death
squads and youth gangs. 175 Upon his arrival in the United States, Isau was
apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and placed in a
children's shelter in Houston. 176 He was denied access to juvenile court which
would have determined whether he was abused, abandoned, or neglected, and
care, and appeared in immigration court
therefore eligible for long-term foster
77
without the assistance of counsel. 1
Legal representation is a major concern for unaccompanied alien children.
Unaccompanied alien children, like Isau, apprehended in the United States without
proper documentation face being returned to their home country either through
voluntary departure or face removal proceedings. 178 After the passage of the
IIRIRA, there was a lot of discussion concerning the expedited removal of
Issues arose concerning the children's ability to adequately
children. 79
Because
communicate a fear of persecution to immigration officials.' 80
immigrants do not have a right to counsel unless they attain it privately, there is no
one to help an unaccompanied alien child when they first arrive in the United
States. Taking into account the legal disability of unaccompanied alien children,
the INS advised its officers that unaccompanied alien children were to be placed in
regular removal proceedings, not expedited removal proceedings.' 8' This change
eliminates the need for unaccompanied children to prove persecution immediately
upon apprehension. However, without the assistance of legal counsel, there is no
guarantee that children like Isau will have their claims, their stories, properly heard
in removal proceedings.
Currently, there exists no system for appointing counsel or guardians ad litem
to unaccompanied alien children. As a result, of those children who do know to
claim asylum, less than half are represented by counsel in immigration
proceedings. 82 Children cannot afford counsel and must rely on available pro
bono attorneys.' 83 The United States provides aliens with the guarantees of the

174. See generally PRISON GUARD OR PARENT, supra note 5.
175. Id. at 1.
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United States Constitution and affords them equal protection of the law.' 84 The
Fifth Amendment provides for due process protection of life, liberty and
property. 85 As a consequence aliens have a right to due process in removal
proceedings.186 Adequate legal representation is a necessary aspect of due process.
In fact the187main reason asylum law exists is to protect the life, liberty and property
of aliens.
Because of the serious consequences of removal proceedings, it would be
reasonable for asylum seekers, especially unaccompanied alien children who are
indigent, to be provided legal counsel. Appointment of counsel is a guaranteed
right for child asylum seekers under international law and could even be construed
law has yet been passed
as a constitutional right under United States law, but no 188
that affords even unaccompanied alien children this right.
B. Detention
Detention is a second area of concern for unaccompanied alien children.
With the passage of the IIRIRA, detention became mandatory for asylum seekers
awaiting final decisions on their cases.' 89 Despite the fact that unaccompanied
alien children are placed in detention for non-criminal reasons, there have been
many accounts that these children are placed in facilities with the delinquent
population, subjected to handcuffing and shackling, forced to wear prison
uniforms, and locked in their cells.' 90
Human Rights Watch conducted an investigation in 1997 of the INS' Arizona
and California detention centers. 191 The organization discovered that many
children were held in jail-like conditions for long periods of time, not informed of
their legal rights, prevented from obtaining legal representation, and unable to
maintain contact with their families. 192 Again in 1998, Human Rights Watch
conducted a follow up investigation on Berks County Youth Center in Leesport,
Pennsylvania.' 93 During its visits in June and December of 1998, Human Rights
Watch spoke with Xiao Ling. 194 Pending determination of her asylum claim, Xiao
had been locked up in prison-like conditions with juveniles accused of murder,
rape, and drug trafficking. 195 She was kept under constant supervision, not allowed

184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §722 (1987).
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to speak her own
language, told not to laugh, and forced to ask permission to
196
nose.'
her
scratch
Not being allowed to speak one's language, laugh, or scratch one's nose are
not acceptable conditions for a child. Furthermore, it is unsafe for asylum seeking
children to be held with delinquents. The very conditions unaccompanied alien
children must endure in the United States are in direct contravention with
international law. 19 7 Children that are seeking asylum have already survived the
dangerous task of reaching the United States and escaping abuse in their home
country; they should not continue to be traumatized as they await the decision of
their asylum claims.
C. Office of Refugee Resettlement
As stated previously, the Refugee Act of 1980, created the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR). 198 The Director of the ORR advises the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (HHS), through the Assistant Secretary for Children and
Families, on matters relating to refugee resettlement, immigration, and
repatriation.199 The ORR is responsible for planning, developing, and directing
implementation for domestic refugee and entrant resettlement assistance
programs. 200
The ORR is also responsible for assisting refugee children.2 1 Under its
Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program (URM), the ORR assists
unaccompanied child refugees in developing appropriate skills to enter adulthood
(economic and social self-sufficiency).2 °2 The ORR assists refugee children
unaccompanied by a parent or other close adult relative until a month after their
eighteenth birthday.2 °3 This assistance includes foster care maintenance and health
care, as well as English language training, career planning, and socialization and
adjustment training. 2°4 Additionally, the ORR is responsible for arranging
placement for unaccompanied refugee children who have been accepted for
admission to the United States and is responsible for their immediate care until
their placement. 20 5 The program accepts children under the age of 18, who have
been granted refugee status overseas, were victims of trafficking, or were

196. Id.
197. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, supranote 63.
198. Immigration and Nationality Act § 411 (a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 152 1(a) (2005).
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200. Id.
201. Immigration and Nationality Act § 412(d), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1522(d) (2005).
202. ADMINISTRATION FOR FAMILIES & CHILDREN, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, THE
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http://www.acf hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/urm.htm [hereinafter THE UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE
MINORS PROGRAM].
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2 °6
The Lutheran
reclassified to refugee status upon arrival or granting of asylum.
Immigration Refugee Services and the United States Catholic Conference are the
two volunteer agencies that assist ORR in providing foster care placement and
helping plan URM program services.2 7

Though charged with the care of refugee children, the ORR is only able to
8
help those children that have been classified as refugees. 20 An unaccompanied
child seeking asylum will not be classified as a refugee until his or her claim of
persecution has been determined by an immigration judge. Further, the ORR relies
on non-profit organizations for assistance in carrying out its main obligations to
refugee children and is not available in all 50 states. 20 9 The Refugee Act of 1980
opened the door for unaccompanied child asylum seekers to be provided proper
care once they had been granted refugee status. 210 The shortfall of the act is that it
does not provide for the care or treatment of unaccompanied alien children pending
determination of their asylum claims.
D. INS Interim Regulations
Until 1985 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had not
established any policies governing the detention or release of unaccompanied alien
children. 211 Flores v. Reno was a class action suit, brought in 1985, which
challenged the INS' policies on the detention, processing, and release of
juveniles.212 The INS settled the case in 1997 and issued interim regulations and
guidelines in 1998, based on the settlement agreement.213 The interim regulations
proposed a framework for the processing, release, and detention of juveniles in
INS custody and were intended to revise 8 C.F.R. § 236.3.214 The proposed
changes provided for a general policy of placing detained juveniles in the least
to the juvenile's age and special needs, based on the
restrictive setting appropriate
215
Floresagreement.
According to the interim regulations, juveniles who were arrested and not
removed from the United States were to be provided adequate supervision to
protect the juvenile from others and permit contact with family members who were
arrested with the child.216 Furthermore, unaccompanied juveniles were to be
separated from unrelated adults.21 7 Those facilities that did not allow for
immediate separation from adults were supposed to provide separate facilities
within 24 hours.21 8 For temporary placement, juveniles could be placed in secure
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
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facilities if a licensed facility was not available.219 Within the secure facilities,
non-delinquent juveniles were to be separate from delinquent offenders. 220 For
those juveniles who were to stay in custody pending their immigration status, the
INS had between 3 and 5 days to place the child in a licensed facility. 22' A
licensed program was defined as "any program, agency, or organization licensed
by an appropriate state agency and contracted by the Service (INS) to provide
residential, group, or foster care services for dependent juveniles. 222 A secure
facility was defined as "a state or county juvenile detention facility or a Service or
Service-contract facility that has separate accommodations for juveniles., 223 Most
importantly, the interim regulations proposed providing every juvenile placed in
removal proceedings with a current list of pro bono counsel.224
The interim regulations also proposed new policies regarding notice and
request for disposition, as well as voluntary departure. For children who were
apprehended within the United States, as opposed to at a port of entry, and who
were unaccompanied by a natural or lawful parents, the INS proposed giving them
written notice of their rights. 225 If the child was under the age of fourteen, the
immigration officer was to read and explain the form to the child in a language he
could understand.226 With regard to voluntary departure, Mexican and Canadian
children unaccompanied by an adult and apprehended at an United States border
were to be informed of their right to call a parent, close relative, friend, or an
organization found on the list of pro bono counsel and then be presented with the
voluntary departure form. 7 All other unaccompanied alien children apprehended
at the border were to be provided access to a telephone and were required to
communicate with a parent, close relative, friend, or an organization found on the
list of pro bono counsel prior to being given the voluntary departure form.228
In its current form, 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 only retains a few of the proposed
regulations from the Flores agreement. Juveniles are defined as "aliens under the
age of 18 years., 229 The provisions regarding Refusal to Release, Notice to Parent
of Application for Relief, Voluntary Departure, and Notice and Request for
Disposition were adopted from the Flores agreement. 230 However, the provisions
regarding the detention of juveniles were not.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 236.3, juveniles who have been detained and posted bond
are to be released to the following persons: a parent, legal guardian or an adult
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relative.23' However, the juvenile will not be released to a guardian if it is
determined that detention of the juvenile is necessary to ensure his timely
appearance before the INS or the immigration court or to ensure the juvenile's
safety or that of others.232 Where it has been determined that detention of a
particular juvenile is necessary, the case will be referred to the juvenile coordinator
who is responsible for finding suitable placement in a "facility designated for the
occupancy of juveniles. 233 Placement may be made in a juvenile facility
contracted by the INS, by a state or local juvenile facility, or by other appropriate
agencies authorized to accommodate juveniles by the laws of the state or
locality.234 During the time the juvenile coordinator is looking for suitable
placement "the juvenile may be temporarily held by Service authorities or placed
in any Service detention facility having separate accommodations for juveniles. 235
The provisions regarding Refusal to Release, Notice to Parent of Application for
Relief, Voluntary Departure, and Notice and Request for Disposition were adopted
from the Flores agreement.236
The current 8 C.F.R § 236.3 provisions fail to state the special requirements
of separating non-delinquents from delinquents, as well as fail to distinguish
between secure facilities and foster care type facilities.237 The general policy of
placing "each detained juvenile in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the
juvenile's age and special needs" and "providing every juvenile placed in removal
proceedings with a current list of pro bono counsel" did not remain in the final
draft either.238 The interim regulations as codified in 8 C.F.R § 236.3 continue to
treat unaccompanied alien children as criminals, by placing them in jail-like
conditions and failing to guarantee unaccompanied alien children access to
counsel.
E. 1998 Guidelines
In addition to the interim regulations, the Flores v. Reno settlement produced
an INS policy and procedural memoranda titled "Guidelines for Children's Asylum
officers "with
Claims. 239 The guidelines were created to provide asylum
14°
background and guidance on adjudicating child asylum claims.
Children are reluctant to talk about past experiences because they are afraid to
relive the traumatic experiences, a task that is especially difficult when facing
foreign authority figures. 241 As a result, the INS created these guidelines to
prepare asylum officers for common issues that may arise during interviews and
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provide child-sensitive interview procedures. 242 The goal was to make children
more comfortable during interviews with the asylum officers, to ultimately ensure
that their claims were being properly heard.243 These guidelines apply to children
under the age of 18 who were applying for asylum on their own, separate from a
parent's asylum application (derivative application). 2 "
Key aspects of the guidelines include having a trusted adult present during
interviews, recognizing special interview considerations, promoting child-sensitive
questioning and active listening techniques tailored to child's age, and taking into
consideration special credibility issues. 245 Having a trusted adult with the child at
the asylum interview "may help the child psychologically. 246 The trusted adult is
not allowed to interfere with the interview process or coach the child during the
interview; however the mere presence of the trusted adult may comfort the child.247
Though the asylum interview is "non-adversarial," a child may still be
reluctant to talk to a stranger about embarrassing or emotional experiences and past
trauma.248 The asylum officers are encouraged to build a rapport with the child
before beginning the interview. 249 After establishing a level of confidence with the
child, the asylum officers are encouraged to tailor questioning during the interview
to the "child's age, stage of language development, background, and level of
sophistication., 250 When listening to the child's answers, the asylum officer is
encouraged to pay close attention to the "age-related or culturally related reasons
for a child's choice of words" in evaluating the child's story.251 Such questioning
and listening techniques should help the asylum officer evaluate the child's
credibility, but the officer should also take into account the child's psychiatric
condition at the time of the interview.252
As unaccompanied child asylum seekers do not receive special treatment and
are held to the adult standard of proving persecution, these guidelines are a step
toward ensuring that the claims of children are given fair consideration. However,
these guidelines only ensure that a minority of unaccompanied alien children, those
who know or have been told to claim asylum, are heard.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. LAW

Previous sections of this article have reviewed current international and
United States refugee law and the problems faced by unaccompanied children.
This last section will focus on recent developments in the United States that have
affected unaccompanied children seeking asylum.
242.
243.
244.
245.
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A. Homeland Security Act
In December of 2002 the Homeland Security Act was passed in response to
the attacks of September 1lth.253 One important aspect of the Homeland Security
Act was the dismantling of the INS (replaced by the Department of Homeland
Security) and the transfer of responsibility for unaccompanied alien children from
the INS to the Office of Refuge Resettlement (ORR).254 The Homeland Security
Act defines an unaccompanied alien child as one who "has no lawful immigration
status in the United States, has not attained 18 years of age, and with respect to
whom there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States or no parent or legal
guardian in the United States available to provide care and physical custody. 255
There were concerns that the INS, as a law enforcement agency, was incapable of
acting in the best interests of unaccompanied alien children and that a separate
office outside of the INS was necessary to meet these needs. 6
The ORR (previously discussed in this paper) is now organized into the
Office of the Director and four divisions: The Division of Community
Resettlement, The Division of Refugee Assistance, the Division of Budget, Policy
and Data Analysis, and the Division of Unaccompanied Children's Services.257
The Division of Unaccompanied Children's Services was created by the Homeland
Security Act to assume responsibility for the care and placement of
unaccompanied alien children.258 The Division of Unaccompanied Children's
Services consults with child welfare professionals, develops placement policies,
and makes decisions and recommendations to ensure that children are receiving
appropriate care. 259 The Division of Unaccompanied Children's Services also
oversees the Unaccompanied Alien Children Program.26° The goal of the
Unaccompanied Alien Children Program is "to provide a safe and appropriate
environment for children during the interim period between the child's transfer
into an Unaccompanied Alien Children's (UAC) program and the child's release
from custody by the ORR or removal from the United States by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). 26 1
The ORR is now responsible for coordinating and implementing the care and
placement of children in federal custody (for immigration reasons), developing a
plan on how to ensure independent counsel, overseeing the infrastructures and
personnel of facilities where children reside, and conducting investigations and
inspections of facilities where children reside.262 The ORR is also responsible for
253.
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making all placement determinations for all unaccompanied alien children who are
in federal custody by reason of their immigration status and ensuring that the
children appear at their hearings, are protected from harm, and are placed in a
setting in which they are not likely to pose a danger to themselves or others.263
The ORR created the Shelter Care Program because they were not allowed to
release any child on his or her own recognizance if there was no parent or guardian

available to take custody of the child. 264 The Shelter Care Program provides
temporary services for the interim period beginning when the child is placed in the
program and ending when ORR releases the child from custody, transfers him to
another facility, or the child is removed from the United States by the DHS.265
Some of the services the children receive are: shelter care, foster care or group
care, family reunification, routine and emergency medical/dental care, counseling,
case management, education, recreation, and visitation and contact with family
members.266 The program targets unaccompanied alien children up to the age of
17.267

With the transfer of responsibility for unaccompanied alien children to the
ORR, detention conditions should improve. Those children who will have to
remain in custody pending their immigration case, will now have the benefit of
foster care rather than jail. However, the Shelter Program only applies to children
under the age of 17, allowing children 17 and older to remain in jail-like detention
facilities. Furthermore, the Homeland Security Act fails to name any substantive
guidelines for the care of detained unaccompanied alien children. The ORR has
only been mandated to create guidelines and standards, but those standards have
yet to be defined. As the next story illustrates, guidelines regarding custody and
release of children to guardians, need to be clearly stated and not left to the
discretion of DHS.
B. Edgar Chocoy's Story
Thousands of Latin American teens fleeing gangs and poverty in their home
nations are being turned away from the United States each year. 268 Teens fleeing
to the United States trying to leave gang life, "face threats" if they are returned.269
This is the story of Edgar Chocoy.
Edgar never knew his father.27 ° When he was an infant Edgar's mother left
him in the care of his grandparents so that she could find work in Los Angeles to
support her family. 27 Edgar grew up in a rough part of Guatemala City. 272 He did
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not start attending school until the age of 10.273 By the time he was 12, Edgar had
been recruited into the Mara Salvatrucha gang in Guatemala City. 274 "After two
years of participating in beatings and robberies, Edgar grew to dislike gang life"
and wanted to leave the gang.275 He had made friends with children from stable
families with money and wanted a better life for himself.276 However, his Mara
Salvatrucha family members did not want to let him go- "they beat, robbed, and
threatened to kill Edgar and his family members if he left the gang. 277 Desperate,
in 2001 a 14 year old Edgar rode buses through Mexico and snuck into the United
States to find his mother.278
But there was no fairy tale ending to Edgar's story. He found his mother in
the Pico Union neighborhood of Los Angeles, but he also found the same gang
problems he had hoped to leave behind in Guatemala. 279 Edgar had tattoos from
his old gang, which marked him as an enemy of a local gang. 280 He sought
protection from older boys from a different gang, but was ultimately arrested for
possession of a firearm and cocaine. 281 The criminal courts were lenient with
Edgar because of his age.282 While on probation he started counseling; despite
being arrested Edgar wanted to turn his life around.283 However, his efforts were
cut short when a high school principal refused to enroll Edgar because of his
tattoos.284 Edgar became depressed, skipped his probation meetings, his mother
285
kicked him out, and he ultimately returned to the gang for a place to sleep.
Edgar was arrested for violating his probation and immigration authorities
transferred him to a detention center in Alamosa, Colorado.286 While at the youth
facility 8in7 Alamosa, Edgar studied math and began a program to remove his gang
2
tattoos.
Edgar was finally taking proactive steps to straighten out his life, yet his
hardest battle was yet to come. Edgar was now in the custody of the DHS and had
to plead for his life to remain in the United States. Edgar's lawyer filed an
application for asylum in an attempt to prevent Edgar from being deported to

272. Bruce Finley, Deportee's Slaying Spurs Reform Push, DENVER POST, April 8, 2004, at IA

/hereinafter Deportee'sSlaying.
273. Deadly Gang Life, supra note 270.
274. Deportee'sSlaying, supra note 272.
275. Deadly GangLife, supra note 270.
276. Id.
277. Deportee'sSlaying, supra note 272.
278. Deadly GangLife, supra note 270.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Nicole Colson, Socialist Worker Online, Victims of a witch-hunt (Nov. 12, 2004), at
http://www.socialistworker.org/2004-2/520/52005_Witchhunt.shtml [hereinafter Victims]; see also
Deadly Gang Life, supra note 270.
282. Victims, supra note 281.
283. Deadly GangLife, supra note 270.
284. Id.; see also Boundfor a Better Life, supranote 268.
285. Deadly Gang Life, supra note 270.
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287. Deportee'sSlaying, supra note 272.
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Guatemala. 288 Edgar's claim for asylum was based on the belief that he would be
killed by his former gang members if he was returned to Guatemala.289 In his
affidavit, Edgar wrote:
I am certain that if I had stayed in Guatemala, the members of the
gang... would have killed me. I have seen them beat people up with
baseball bats and rocks and shoot at them. I know they kill people. I
know they torture people with rocks and baseball bats. I know that if I
by them. I know that they
am returned to Guatemala, I will be tortured
290
will kill me if I am returned to Guatemala.

Edgar's aunt who lived in Virginia and was a legal U.S. resident wanted
custody of him.291 Prior to Edgar's 2004 merits hearing to decide his asylum
application, a teacher at the Alamosa detention center, a psychologist, and the
ORR had all vouched for recommendation of his asylum application.292 The ORR,
in charge of the welfare of unaccompanied alien children, had even approved his
release to his aunt.293 But it was the DHS that destroyed Edgar's chances of life in
the United States. The DHS "recommended" that Edgar not be allowed to stay in
the United

States.

294

The immigration judge that heard Edgar's asylum case found that "he told his
story honestly and directly. 295 But in the end that was not enough to grant him
asylum in the United States. The court found that though Edgar had taken steps to
do something with his life, "those steps came very late. 296 His past gang
relationships carried more weight than his recent attempts to straighten out his
life.297 The DHS emphasized Edgar's gang activity upon arriving in Los
Angeles.298 As a result, Edgar lost his asylum application on January 5, 2004.299
Edgar chose not to appeal his asylum case, telling his lawyer that he might commit
suicide if he remained in detention. 30 0 On March 10, 2004 he was deported to
Guatemala. 30 ' 3On
March 27, 2004, he was gunned down and killed by his former
02
gang members.

What is interesting about this case is that documentation shows that a January
2, 2004 letter from Health and Human Services (HHS) had cleared Edgar for
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release to the custody of his aunt in Virginia.3 °3 DHS officials refused to release
him and HHS ultimately reversed its decision to release Edgar into the custody of
his aunt. 30 4 The failure to release Edgar into the custody of his aunt prevented him
from appealing his asylum case. While in detention, Edgar had been traumatized
by gang members and as a result had tried to commit suicide by hanging himself
to appeal his case because "he just could
with his own shoe laces. 30 5 Edgar refused
30 6
not bear to be detained any longer.,
Edgar's Chocoy's story shows that though the Homeland Security Act took
steps to protect unaccompanied alien children, by placing them in juvenile
detention facilities, many problems still exist regarding the conditions of their
custody pending immigration hearings. The psychological effect detention has on
children alone, is enough to see that changes need to be made. It should also be
noted that the lack of strict guidelines regarding the release of unaccompanied
alien children to guardians also has a psychological effect on the children which
ultimately affects the outcome of their immigration case. If Edgar had been
released to his aunt, perhaps he would still be alive.
C. UnaccompaniedAlien ChildProtectionAct
On September 27, 2000, Senator Dianne Feinstein from California introduced
the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2000.307 The purpose of the bill
was to establish an Office of Children's Services within the Department of Justice
to coordinate and implement government actions involving unaccompanied alien
children. 30 8 The 2000 bill also proposed setting standards for the custody, release,
and detention of unaccompanied children, improving policies for their permanent
protection, and ensuring that their best interests were held paramount in
immigration proceedings. 30 9 The most important aspect of the bill was that the
Office of Children's Services310was not to be an office within the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS).
In January of 2001 Senator Feinstein reintroduced the Unaccompanied Alien
Child Protection Act. 31 1 The 2001 bill continued to push for the establishment of
an Office of Children's Services. 31 2 As the 2001 bill was unsuccessful, Senator
Feinstein renewed her fight in May of 2002.313 Title III of the Immigration Reform
accountability and Security Enhancement Act of 2002 proposed improving the
administration and enforcement of immigration laws, enhancing the security of the

303. Deportee'sSlaying, supra note 272.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2000, S. 3117, 106th Cong. (2000).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.at§ 101(a)(l).
311. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2001, S.121, 107th Cong. (2001)
312. Id.
313. Immigration Reform, Accountability and Security Enhancement Act of 2002, S. 2444, 107th
Cong. (2002)
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United States, and establishing the Office of Children's Services within the
Department of Justice.314 However, before any progress could be made regarding
the unaccompanied alien children, Congress was faced with the aftermath of
September 1Ith. As a result of that tragic day, Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act. 31 5 According to the provisions of the Homeland Security Act,
responsibility for unaccompanied alien children had been transferred from the INS
to the Office of Refuge Resettlement (ORR). 316 This was Senator Feinstein's first,
though small, victory.
In May of 2003, Senator Feinstein continued to fight for the rights of
unaccompanied alien children and introduced the Unaccompanied Alien Child
Protection Act of 2003.317 The purpose of this bill was simply to "provide for the
protection of unaccompanied alien children.,, 318 The bill did not pass the Senate
until October 11, 2004. The 2004 version of the bill was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary. 319 The goal of the 2004 bill continued to be "to
provide for the protection of unaccompanied alien children. 32 °
Still unsuccessful in passing the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act,
Senator Feinstein introduced another version on January 24, 2005.321 The 2005
bill retains the same definition of unaccompanied alien child as the Homeland
Security Act, "children under the age of 18 with no lawful immigration status and
no parent or legal guardian in the United States who is available to provide care
and physical custody., 3 22 Proponents of the bill would like to further the
protection of these children by creating procedures and guidelines for custody,
release, and detention, assuring access to guardians ad litem and counsel, as well as
strengthening policies and guidelines regarding the asylum claims of children.323
The 2005 bill requires that an unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the
ORR shall be promptly placed with one of the following individuals or entities in
the following order of preference: a parent; a legal guardian; an adult relative; an
individual or entity designated by the parent or legal guardian; a state-licensed
juvenile shelter, group home, or foster care program; or a qualified adult or entity
seeking custody when it appears that there is no other likely alternative to long
term detention and family reunification does not appear to be a reasonable
alternative. 324 No unaccompanied alien child shall be placed with a person or
entity unless a valid suitability assessment has found that the person or entity is
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315.
316.
317.
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319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
(2005).
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Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005, S.119, 109 thCong. (2005).
Id., at § 2(a)(6); see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
See Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005, S. 119, 109"h Cong. §§ 101-304
Id. at § 102(a)(1)(A-F).
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capable of providing for the child's physical and mental well-being.3 25 With
regard to the conditions for detention, the bill requires that the facility the child is
placed in provides educational services, medical services, mental health care,
access to telephones, access to legal services, access to interpreters, supervision by
professionals trained in the care of children, recreational programs and activities,
spiritual and religious needs, and dietary needs.326 The bill prohibits such facilities
to shackle, handcuff, or restrain the children, submit the children to solitary
confinement, or perform pat or strip searches.327
The guardian ad litem provision of the bill requires that only persons who are
child welfare professionals, have received training in child welfare matters, and
possess special training on the nature of problems encountered by unaccompanied
alien children will be appointed. 328 The role of the guardian ad litem is to conduct
interviews with the child, investigate the facts and circumstances relevant to the
child's presence in the United States, work with counsel to identify the child's
eligibility for relief from removal or voluntary departure, develop
recommendations on issues relative to the child's custody, detention, release, and
repatriation, take reasonable steps to ensure that the best interests of the child are
promoted and that the child understands the nature of the legal proceedings, and
report factual findings related to the care and placement of the child during the
pendency of the child's case. 329 The act also ensures that all unaccompanied alien
counsel who
competent
children in the custody of the ORR shall have access to 33
0
will represent them in immigration proceedings or matters.
The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005 attempts to fill in the
gaps left by the Homeland Security Act by ensuring that unaccompanied alien
children have legal representation, are not held in prison-like conditions, and do
not have to remain in custody pending their claims. However, the 2005 bill asks
the Executive Office for Immigration Review to adopt the INS' 1998 Guidelines
for Children's Asylum Claims. 331 This bill fails to establish new guidelines for
child asylum claims. From the first introduction of the Unaccompanied Alien
Child Protection Act, the bill has failed to establish a child standard of asylum,
leaving children to be treated as adults in proving their claims of persecution.
CONCLUSION

This article has followed the development of refugee law in its efforts to
protect children. Scared and alone, unaccompanied alien children face many
obstacles when they reach the United States. To ensure that unaccompanied alien

325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at § 102(a)(2).
Id. at § 103(a)(4)(A)(i-x).
Id. at § 103(b)(1-3).
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005, S. 119, 109 th Cong., § 201(a)(2)(A)(i-ii)

(2005).
329. Id. at § 201(a)(3)(A-F).
330. Id. at § 202(a)(1).
331. Id. at § 401(a).

2005

AN OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW AND CHILDREN

children receive due process in their asylum claims, special assistance and care
must be provided to them. The United States has fallen behind in addressing these
issues.
The goal of international law has been to ensure that the claims of
unaccompanied alien children are properly heard, that they get a fair trial. Without
proper legal representation no child's claim will ever be properly heard. Placing a
child in prison-like conditions is psychologically similar to not having legal
representation. A child that has not committed a crime will eventually give up if
placed in oppressive and cruel conditions. Furthermore, not allowing a child to be
released to a caring family member is also a form of psychological abuse. Such
conditions do not promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
International law has addressed these issues, setting a benchmark for the
United States to aspire to or surpass. As one of the founding members of the
United Nations, the United States should be held to a higher standard with regards
to promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The rest of the
international community regards children as especially vulnerable human beings
and affords them special treatment and assistance. The United States has failed to
afford unaccompanied child asylum seekers special treatment or assistance, by
continuing to hold children to the same standards as adults. The United States has
also failed to ratify one of the most important international treaties with regards to
protecting the rights of children. This failure is reflected in current U.S. policies
toward unaccompanied alien children.
Even the United States' northern neighbor, Canada, has embraced the
international ideals of affording children special care and assistance. Canada
recognized the failures in its own immigration system, holding child asylum
seekers to the same standards as adults, and instituted new policies and procedures
in order to rectify this problem. Canada employs the international principle of
"best interests of the child." A year after Canada published its newly revised
guidelines, the INS published its own, making the United States the second
government to publish such guidelines. However, the INS guidelines specifically
stated that the "best interests of the child" principle would not be used. Now that
the INS has been dismantled and the more child-friendly ORR is responsible for
the care of unaccompanied children, the United States needs to pass laws in
accordance with this change to ensure that all unaccompanied alien children under
the age of 18 receive proper legal representation, a chance at release from custody,
and proper care while in custody.
If the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005 is passed, a
majority of the current problems faced by unaccompanied alien children will be
greatly improved. The following provisions are absolutely necessary in order for
the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005 to be effective in
protecting the rights of unaccompanied children: providing every child with
competent legal representation; creating an effective process by which children are
released to family members pending determination of their claims; and preventing
children from being held in prison-like conditions if there is no family members to
take care of them.
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Though the ORR is currently responsible for the care of unaccompanied alien
children, the proposed legislation requires new government programs and policies
that would greatly stretch ORR's current resources. The ORR relies on non-profit
organizations to assist with its foster care programs. It may be necessary for
Congress to create a new department or office in order to meet the requirements of
the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005. For example, the number
of pro bono attorneys willing to help alien children is surely limited in every state.
A program will need to be established to provide an adequate number of attorneys
in every state and county where an unaccompanied alien child will be initially
detained. In addition to providing legal representation, the Unaccompanied Alien
Child Protection Act of 2005 provides for the appointment of guardians ad litem.
Such a person will assist counsel, but will also act as the child's representative
until a family member is found or legal counsel is appointed. The guardian ad
litem will most likely be the most important advocate for the unaccompanied alien
child. An office will have to be established in each state to facilitate the work of
guardians ad litem, as well as ensure that every child is appointed a representative.
A second area that will affect change to the ORR is the detention and release
of the unaccompanied alien children. The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection
Act of 2005 provides for the release of children to family members or other
approved guardians.
Prior to their release, an assessment test must be
completed. 332 Guidelines for the assessment test need to be created and trained
professionals will need to be employed to carry out the assessment tests. Again an
office will need to be established to ensure that the assessment tests are uniform
across the country and implemented properly. The Unaccompanied Alien Child
Protection Act of 2005 also sets out new standards for those children that will have
to be detained because they were not released to a guardian. These standards
require facilities and personnel capable of providing education, medicine, mental
health care, recreation, as well as meeting special spiritual and dietary needs. Such
standards require more services then are currently available in immigration
detention centers.
Lastly, the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005 refers to the
"best interests of the child" principle but only with regards to guardians ad litem.
In order for the United States to truly come up to speed with the rest of the
international community, the "best interests of the child" principle should be
applied in the determination of an unaccompanied child's asylum claim. In order
to effectively incorporate this principle, the United States needs to create a separate
system for hearing the asylum claims of children and would require the creation of
child-specific standards. However, in its current form the Unaccompanied Alien
Child Protection Act of 2005 asks that the INS' Guidelines for Children's Asylum
Claims be implemented by the Executive Office for Immigration Review. 3 33 As
stated previously, the INS guidelines specifically reject the "best interests of the
child" principle.
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Passing the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005 is only the
first step in adequately protecting the rights of unaccompanied alien children.
Congress will need to establish the appropriate offices and departments to make
the necessary changes possible. Congress will also need to consider new
legislation that creates a separate standard for unaccompanied child asylum
seekers.

THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS:
PERSUASIVE FORCE OR BINDING LAW?
SandraJ. Weiland'
I. INTRODUCTION

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention") sets
forth signatory nations' obligations to detained foreign nationals) The United
States adopted the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol in 1963 and ratified
in 1969.2 Article 36 requires that detained foreign nationals be informed--"without
delay"-of their right to confer, communicate, and seek representation by their
consulate throughout their detention.
Although the United States considers treaties as part of the "law of the land," 4
its record in enforcing and complying with obligations set forth in the Vienna
Convention is inconsistent. The United States demands enforcement of diplomatic
and consular rights abroad, yet the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently
found the United States in breach (for the third time) of the Vienna Convention. 5
Because of enhanced threats to U.S. citizens both abroad and at home, it is more
important than ever to have a consistent policy of enforcement and reciprocity
among nations.
6
After the ICJ's 2004 decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals,
President Bush ordered state courts to give "meaningfil review" to convicted
Mexican inmates who were not notified of their Vienna Convention rights.7 In a
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recent brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the U.S. Solicitor General stated,
"Compliance serves to protect the interests of United States citizens abroad,
promotes the effective conduct of foreign relations, and underscores the United
States' commitment in the international community to the rule of law."8 Shortly
afterward, however, President Bush withdrew from the Optional Protocol that
gives the ICJ
jurisdiction to hear cases, like Avena, arising under the Vienna
9
Convention.
The Vienna Convention expresses the international law rule of pacta sunt
servanda (once you enter an agreement in good faith you must aide by it), and the
United States' lack of enforcement of the rights and obligations under the Vienna
Convention has generated ill will in the international community.' 0 In this time of
increasing threats to United States citizens abroad and at home, the United States
should synthesize the Vienna Convention into its domestic law and demand
compliance from state and federal agencies. The United States' systematic Vienna
Convention violations undermine the integrity and accountability of the United
States internationally and demand redress within our court systems domestically.
Part II of this paper examines the issue of foreigners awaiting the death
penalty in the United States. Part III examines the rights and obligations created
under the Vienna Convention for foreigners. Part IV studies the evolution of the
legitimacy and enforcement of the Vienna Convention by examining the Breard"
and LaGrand 2 cases. Part V examines the Torres13 case and the ICJ's Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) decision. Part VI
examines the current status of conflicting jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit's recent
Medellin' 4 decision in which the United States Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari. Part VII concludes the paper.
II.

FOREIGN NATIONALS & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States reinstated capital punishment of foreign nationals in 1976.5
As of February 15, 2005, 119 foreign nationals await the death penalty.16 Most
foreign nationals on death row were not notified of their rights to confer with their
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10. See Lou Ann Bohn, Understanding the Imposition of Capital Punishment on Foreign
Nationals in the United States as a Human Rights Violation, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 435 (2003).
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http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?sdid=31 & did=582#executed.
16. Death Penalty Forum, Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the United States, (Feb. 15,
2005), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=l 98&scid=3 1.

2005

PERSUASIVE FORCE OR BINDING LAW?

long
consuls and did not learn of their rights
7 until after years of detainment and
after exhausting most of their appeals.'
Currently, 118 countries have abolished the death penalty and 15 more retain
it only for crimes against humanity and war-time crimes. 8 Four nations-the
19
United States, China, Iran, and Viet Nam-carry out 84 percent of all executions.
For purposes of the following list, dual- citizenship cases are not listed because,
according to the United States State Department, individuals who hold both United
States citizenship as well as another nationality are not entitled to rights under the
20
Vienna Convention.
Nationals under Sentence of Death in the United States: By Foreign
Foreign
2
Nationality '
Mexico: 54
Jamaica: 6
Cuba: 6
Germany: 2
Columbia: 4
El Salvador: 5
Thailand: 1
Estonia: 2
Cambodia: 3
Viet Nam: 3
Croatia: 1
Lebanon: 1
Peru: 1
Canada: 1
St. Kitts and Nevis: 1
Bahamas: 1
OTHER DEATH SENTENCES
(awaiting
1
Germany:
resentencing)
(awaiting
1
Argentina:
resentencing)
Viet Nam: 1 (awaiting retrial)
1
(awaiting
Thailand:
resentencing)
United Kingdom: (reversed on
appeal)

Spain: 1
Tonga: 1
Trinidad: 1
Philippines: 1
Nicaragua: 1
Laos: I
Honduras: 2
Egypt: 1
Bangladesh: 1
Haiti: 1
Jordan: 1
Iran: 1
Unknown nationality: 7
Guatemala: 1
France: 1
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Penalty,
The
Death
International,
18. Amnesty
http://web.amnestyusa.org/abolish/foreign-nationals.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
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21. Id.
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Further, foreign nationals face capital punishment in the following states
(number of nationals in each state in parenthesis): California (43), Texas (27),
Florida (21), Arizona (5), Ohio (4), Oklahoma (1), Nevada (4), Pennsylvania (2),
Louisiana (3), Virginia (1), Oregon (1), Montana (1), Georgia (1), Mississippi (1),
Alabama (1), Nebraska (1), and Federal (2).22
III.

THE VIENNA CONVENTION: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

The United States must notify detained foreign nationals "without delay" of
their rights to confer with their consular officials.23 Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention is two-fold: (1)to notify "without. delay" the detained foreigner of his
right to confer with his consulate; and (2) to allow communication between the
detained foreign national and his consulate. 24 This requirement gives people
traveling and living abroad the right to contact their consulates and seek assistance
when accused of a crime.
The Vienna Convention codified international customary law on consular
"relations, privileges and immunities., 25 The United States ratified the Vienna
Convention treaty without reservations in 1969 and agreed to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ, which hears disputes between nations.26 In March 2005, however, President
Bush withdrew the United States from the Optional Protocol that gives the ICJ
jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the Vienna Convention.2 7
Ironically, the United States has been a leader in advancing the legitimacy and
binding effect of ICJ judgments.28 In 1979, when Iran held American hostages at
the United States Embassy in Iran, the United States immediately went to the ICJ
and demanded a judgment that Iran had violated international law.29
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the Vienna
Convention binds all states.30 Scholars debate whether the United States has
obligated itself to international treaties as binding on state's judicial and criminal
procedures. 3I And, even officials aware of the Vienna Convention do not always
adhere to it. Gene Acuna, spokesmen for Texas Governor Rick Perry, stated:
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28. Mark Weisburd, InternationalCourts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 270-72
(2000) (noting requests by the United States to allow consular access to Americans detained in
Germany, Syria, and Iran).
29. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treatise made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
3 1. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the InternationalistConception,
51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 553 (1999).
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"According to our reading of the law and the treaty, there is no authority for the
federal government or this World Court to prohibit Texas from exercising the laws
passed by our legislature. 32
IV.

CASE STUDIES
33

A. Breard v. Greene

In 1992, the Commonwealth of Virginia arrested Angel Francisco Breard, a
dual citizen of Paraguay and Argentina, for rape and murder.34 At trial, the State
presented "overwhelming evidence of guilt, including semen found on the victim's
body matching Breard's DNA profile and hairs on the victim's body identical in all
microscopic characteristics to hair samples taken from Breard. ' '35 Breard refused
counsel and confessed to killing the victim, but explained that he did so only
because his father-in-law placed a satanic curse on him.36 A jury convicted Breard
and then sentenced him to death.37 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.3 8 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari .
Only after Breard exhausted all of his state court proceedings did he learn that
Virginia officials violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, and he then
brought a habeas corpus petition in federal district court.40 The court denied his
petition, however, because of the "procedural default" rule: Breard had not raised
the issue in previous state court proceedings. 41 The court also found that Breard did
not show he suffered prejudice as a result of this procedural default. 42 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed.43 Notably, in a concurring opinion, a Fourth Circuit judge stated:
"United States citizens are scattered about the world.... Their freedom and safety
are seriously endangered if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and
other nations follow their example.""
After Breard's conviction became final, Paraguay sued in the ICJ, stating that
the United States had violated the Vienna Convention.45 Because of Breard's
pending execution date, the ICJ issued an order before its judgment.46 The court

32. Reuters, Texas Snubs World Court on Execution Stays, (Feb. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.rense.com/general34/exce.htm.
33. Breard,523 U.S. 371 (U.S. 1998).
34. Id. at 373.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 682 (Va. 1994)).
39. Id. (citing Breard v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 971 (1994)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citingBreard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 621 (1998)).
44. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th. Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring).
45. Breard,523 U.S. at 374.
46. Id.
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demanded that the United States "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these
Angel Francisco
' 47
proceedings.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Vienna Convention "arguably
confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest,' A' the
Court voted (6-3) on the eve of Breard's execution and decided that under state
procedural rules "claims not so raised are considered defaulted., 49 The Court stated
that rights created under the Vienna Convention "shall be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." 50 Thus, Breard could not then
raise a claim of violation of his rights under the Vienna Convention on federal
habeas corpus review. 5' Further, the Court held that Breard did not present any
evidence that he was prejudiced by this procedural bar.52 Even if Breard had
properly raised his Vienna Convention claims, the Court noted that it would be
the Court "did not
unlikely that violations would reverse his conviction. 53 Notably,
54
see itself as constrained by the [ICJ's provisional] order.",
The Breard case illustrates the turmoil in the U.S. justice system. Three
justices dissented, stating that they would grant a stay of execution. 55 Justice
Breyer wanted more time to weigh the "potential relevance of proceedings in an
intemational forum." '56 While the Justice Department argued the Court should deny
Breard's stay of execution, Secretary of State Madeline Albright sent a letter to the
Governor of Virginia pleading Virginia to comply with the ICJ's order and grant
the stay. The letter stated her concern for "the possible negative consequences for
the many U.S. citizens who live and travel abroad. 57 Within an hour after the
release of the Supreme Court's opinion, Angel Breard was executed.58

47. Id.
48. Breard,523 U.S. at 376-77 (stating further that "neither the text nor the history of the Vienna
Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United State's courts to set
aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions").
49. Id. at 375.
50. Patrick Dervishi, Comment, No Remedies for Violation of the Foreign Nationals' Right to
ConsularNotification, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 645, 649 (2003) (quoting Breard, 523 U.S. at 375).
51. Breard,523 U.S. at 376.
52. Id. at 377.
53. Jonathan 1.Chamey & W. Michael Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 673
(1988) (citing Breard, 523 U.S. at 377).
54. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 882

(2000).
55. Breard,523 U.S. at 379.
56. Id. at 381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the InternationalistConception, 51
STAN. L. REV.

529, 553 (1999).

58. See Sarah M. Ray, DomesticatingInternationalObligations:How to Ensure U.S. Compliance
with the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1744 (2003).
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B. Karl and Walter LaGrand59
Arizona accused the LaGrand brothers, who were German citizens, of
murdering a bank employee in a robbery attempt.60 After 17 years of confinement
and only weeks before their scheduled executions, Arizona officials notified the
brothers of their Vienna Convention rights.61 Shortly after becoming aware of their
citizens' plight, Germany sued the United States in the ICJ asserting that the
Convention rights by failing to
United States had violated the brothers' Vienna
62
notify them of their rights to consular access.
The ICJ unanimously ordered a stay of execution because the brothers were
not informed of their rights to confer with the German consulate under the Vienna
Convention.63 The ICJ stated that the United States should take "all measures in its
disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision
in these proceedings, and should inform64the Court of all the measures which it has
taken in implementation of that Order."
However, time was running out for the LaGrand brothers. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that it was too late to raise the issue of their Vienna Convention rights
due to the "tardiness of the pleas. ' '65 Despite the ICJ's injunction, the Court
66
permitted the execution to proceed and dismissed Germany's appeal. Arizona
executed Walter LaGrand.67

Although both LaGrand brothers had been executed, Germany continued to
pursue its ICJ suit.68 The United States admitted to violating the Vienna
Convention and formally apologized to Germany. 69 The United States argued,
however, that the Vienna Convention had no authority to meddle within domestic
criminal procedural rules. 70 Germany argued that the Vienna Convention does
confer individual rights on states and that the U.S. "procedural default" rule
violated the Vienna Convention.7 '

59. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
60. Id. at 1257.
61. Amnesty International, United States of America: A Time for action-Protectingthe Consular
at
2001),
22,
of Foreign Nationals Facing the Death Penalty, (Aug.
Rights
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511062001.
62. Sarah M. Ray, DomesticatingInternationalObligations:How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1744 (2003); Michael Fleishman,
Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in Defense of Its Foreign Nationals in
UnitedStates Penalty Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 359, 389-90 (2003).
63. Sarah M. Ray, DomesticatingInternationalObligations:How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with
the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1729, 1742-45 (2003).

64. La Grand Case (Germany v. United States of America), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
65. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
66. Id.
67. See La Grand Case, supranote 64.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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On June 27, 2001 the ICJ held for the first time that the provisional measures
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations are legally binding.7 2 The ICJ
found that the United States had breached its obligations to the LaGrand brothers
and to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention and failed to
provide a remedy for these violations.73 The ICJ held that pursuant to the Vienna
Convention: (1) an individual has the right to be notified of the right to
communicate with consul; (2) domestic "procedural default" rules cannot bar
judicial review of violations; and (3) violations demand judicial "review and
reconsideration. '74 The ICJ stated:
"[A]n apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned
have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent
upon the United States to allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction
and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention. 75
Although the ICJ ordered the remedy of "review and reconsideration," U.S.
courts hold that defendants must prove they were prejudiced by not being informed
of their right to consular access to get a remedy.76
V. THE

FACE OF LITIGATION TODAY: TORRES AND THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT

In a case similar to LaGrand,Oklahoma convicted Osbaldo Torres for killing
a couple during a burglary in Oklahoma City and sentenced him to death without
notifying him about his rights under the Vienna Convention. 77 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence and denied other
claims for post-conviction relief.78 Torres subsequently filed a writ for habeas
corpus which was denied by the federal district court and affirmed in the Tenth
Circuit. 79 Torres then sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging
(among other things) conflicts between the Tenth Circuit's ruling and the ICJ's
holding in LaGrand.80
A. The U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court declined certiorari.8' This denial of certiorariagain
stalled judicial determination of what an appropriate "remedy" may be for
72. International Court of Justice Press Release, La Grand Case, (Germany v. United States of
at
http://www.icj
2001),
(June
27,
104
2001
I.C.J.
America),
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
73. Ashley Wright Baker, ForcibleTransborder Abduction: Defensive Versus Offensive Remedies
for Alvarez-Machain, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1373, 1392 (2004).
74. Lou Ann Bohn, Understandingthe Imposition of CapitalPunishment of Foreign Nationals in
the United States as a Human Rights Violation, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 435, 453 (2003).
75. See La Grand Case, supranote 64.
76. See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. See Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
78. Id.
79. Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2003).
80. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (denying certiorari).
81. Id.
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Oklahoma's failure to notify Torres of his Vienna Convention rights. Notably, in a
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens raised concerns that:
Applying the procedural default rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct
violation of the Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly unfair. The ICJ's
decision in LaGrand underscores that a foreign national who is presumptively
ignorant of his right to notification should not be deemed to have waived the
Article 36 protections simply because he failed to assert that right in a state
criminal proceeding.82
Justice Stevens concluded by saying that the procedural default doctrine,
which provides that States do not have to provide a remedy for violating a detained
foreign national's rights, is not in accord with the law of nations and thus the law
of the United States: "The Court is equally unfaithful to that command when it
permits state courts to disregard the Nation's treaty obligations. 83 Similarly, in
Justice Breyer wrote that Torres' and Mexico's arguments seemed
dissent,
"substantial. ' '84
B. InternationalCourt ofJustice
In an unprecedented action, Mexico sued the United States alleging numerous
violations of the Vienna Convention in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America).8 5 Avena concerns 52 Mexican nationals
awaiting capital punishment in the United States, 86 and Torres is one of the 52
Mexican nationals in the suit. 87 Mexico alleged that the United States consistently
ignored its obligations under the Vienna Convention and that detainees generally
learn of their rights years later, after their appeals have been exhausted.88 Although
Torres was arrested and convicted in 1993, the Mexican government was unaware
of his detainment until 1996 when members of Torres' family notified it. 89 By this
been through one mistrial and a second trial which placed
time, Torres had already
90
him on death row.
The United States contended that it followed the ICJ's orders handed down in
LaGrand, which requires "review and reconsideration" of Article 36 violations
cases through the clemency hearing process. Further, the United States insisted that
it is beyond the91 scope and authority of the ICJ to further interfere with its criminal
justice system.

82. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1036 (Stevens, J., concurring)
83. Id. at 1037.
84. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1041 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
86. Id.
87. International Herald Tribune, Lifeline for Death-Row Inmates, (Jan. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/125430.htnl.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Associated Press, U.S., Mexico in Death Penalty Feud, (Dec. 16, 2003), available at
http://www/cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/24/world/ffain585236.shtnl.
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Mexico argued that these 52 cases offer clear evidence of the United States
denial of Article 36 rights. The Mexican government asked the ICJ to: (1) define
the United States' obligations under the Vienna Convention; (2) define the scope
of "review and reconsideration;" (3) provide a remedy for its violations; and (4)
declare that the clemency process used by the United States9 2 to satisfy the "review
and reconsideration" requirement for violations inadequate.
Mexico, which strongly opposes the death penalty, asked the ICJ to order a
provisional measure to ensure that the named Mexican nationals in the suit were
not executed prior to the judgment being passed down.93 The ICJ unanimously
ordered the United States to take all measures necessary to avoid the execution of
the named Mexicans.94 The United States complied with this order.
C. JudgmentHanded Down
On March 31, 2004, the ICJ handed down the judgment in Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals and ordered the United States to "review and [reconsider]" the
52 Mexican nationals' death sentences.95 The ICJ based its order on the numerous
violations of the United States' obligations to these detained foreign nationals
96
under the Vienna Convention. The ICJ held that the requisite advisement of
consular rights "without delay" is a "duty upon the arresting authorities to give the
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), information to the individual.., once it is realized that
the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person
is probably a foreign national." 97 Unfortunately, the decision said little about what
"review and reconsideration" necessarily entails or demands.
The ICJ held the following points ina vote of fourteen-to-one:
(1)The United States breached its obligations to 51 of the Mexican nationals
by not informing them "without delay" of their rights under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention;
(2)The United States breached its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, by not notifying the Mexican consulate "without delay" of the
detention of 49 of the Mexican nationals;
(3)The United States breached its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, to 49 Mexican nationals by depriving them of their right to have
communication with, and access to, the Mexican consulate;

92. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. International Court of Justice Press Release, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, (Mar. 31,
2004),
available
at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2004/ipresscom200416_mus_20040331.htm.
97. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128.

2005

PERSUASIVE FORCE OR BINDING LAW?

(4)The United States its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, to 34 Mexican nationals by not allowing their consulate to arrange for
their legal representation in previous hearings;
(5)The United States breached its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, to three of the Mexican nationals, including Torres, by not permitting
the review and reconsideration of their cases; and
(6)Reparation for the above violations is "review and reconsideration" by the
United States.98
Further, the court unanimously held the following:
(1)The United States has evidenced a commitment to ensuring performance
of Vienna Convention rights, which satisfies Mexico's request for assurance
of future compliance; and
(2)"[R]eview and reconsideration" must be left up to the United States to
determine the "means of its own choosing." 99
The court failed to state what the scope of "review and reconsideration"
entails, but it did specify that the current executive clemency process alone was
insufficient.100 Thus, the ICJ flatly held that the United States had violated the
Vienna Convention and "did not shy away from what the United States had
characterized as interference in the U.S. judicial process." 10 1 Although treaties
ratified by the United States are supposed to be the "law of the land," not all states
honor these treaties. Texas and Oklahoma, where many Mexican nationals are on
death row, have already indicated an "unwillingness to comply" with the ICJ's
judgment.1 0 2 This result indicates that federalism tensions arise when balancing the
United States' compliance and commitment to international law with the autonomy
of the state's separate criminal justice systems. 10 3 Texas Governor Rick Perry
stated that the International Court of Justice "does not have jurisdiction in
Texas."' 4 However, Governor Perry commuted Torres' death sentence shortly
after the ICJ's decision. 10 5 Subsequently, President Bush ordered state courts to

98. International Court of Justice Press Release, supra note 96.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: InternationalReview of National Courts,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2149 (2004).
102. Death Penalty Forum, California Considers Impact of InternationalCourt Ruling Regarding
Mexican Foreign Nationals, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did--950 &scid=64 (last
visited March 13, 2005).
103. See Jehanne E. Henry, Overcoming Federalism in InternationalizedDeath Penalty Cases, 25
TEX. INT'L L.J. 459,461 (2000).
104. Death Penalty Forum, No Justice in Rights Denied, (Apr. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scidz3 I&did--955.
105. Boston Herald, Governor Commutes Mexican National's Death Sentence, (May 14, 2004),
availableat http://news.bostonherald.con/national/view.bg?articleid=27877&format >.
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who were not notified of their Vienna Convention
give Mexican foreign nationals
10 6
rights "meaningful review.,
VI. Medellin v. Dretke'1 7
Medellin, a Mexican citizen, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death.10 8 Medellin subsequently filed a writ for habeas corpus, which was
denied by the federal district court and affirmed in the Fifth Circuit.10 9 The Fifth
Circuit applied Breard's procedural default rule and held that the "[p]etitioner's
claim fails for two reasons: (1) it is procedurally defaulted, and (2) even if it were
not procedurally defaulted, the Vienna Convention, as interpreted by this Court in
the past, does not confer an individually enforceable right." 110 Mexican consular
officials were first notified of Medellin's incarceration when he wrote them from
death row. "'
The Fifth Circuit noted Medellin's claims that the ICJ's recent decisions in
LaGrand and Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, which held that a procedural
default cannot bar review. 1 2 Nonetheless, the court stated that under the Supreme
Court's Breard decision, claims can be procedurally defaulted in death penalty3
cases and "only the Supreme Court may overrule a Supreme Court decision.""
Absent being "taught otherwise," the Fifth Circuit is bound to follow the Breard
precedent. 1 4 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held that without indication from the
Supreme Court, it was bound by precedent that the Vienna Convention does not
create an individually enforceable right despite the ICJ's decisions in LaGrand and
Avena. 115
The Court granted certiorari in December 2004 and may resolve these
lingering issues.116
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court in Paquette Habanastated: "International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination." ' 1 7 Although the Supreme Court refers to
customary international law as "part of our law" and part of the "law of the land,"
it has so far resisted enforcement of the Vienna Convention." 8
106. See Death Penalty Forum, supra note 7.
107. 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004).
108. Id. at 273-74.
109. Id. at 274.
110. Id. at 279.
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
Forum,
News
from
the
111. Death
Penalty
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.phpdid=248&scid=38 (last visited March 14, 2005).
112. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 279-80.
113. Id. at 280.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
117. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
118. Id.
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Additionally, President Bush recently ordered state courts to give "meaningful
review" to Mexican nationals who were not informed of their Vienna Convention
rights but then ordered the withdrawal of the United States from the Optional
Protocol. This double-standard fails to encourage reciprocity among nations: "This
backward step cannot be reconciled with the United States' own declaration that
compliance with the ICJ serves to protect American interests abroad and promotes
the global rule of law."'1 19
U.S. federal and state governments should work cohesively to illustrate their
commitment to international law. We must reciprocate and uphold the rights and
obligations under the Vienna Convention to other nations. The Supreme Court's
voice must be heard regarding these lingering issues: (1) whether a petitioner's
failure to raise Vienna Convention violations in previous appeals results in a
procedural default; (2) whether an individually enforceable right is created by such
violations; and (3) what is the scope "review and reconsideration" for such
violations.

119. See Amnesty International, US Withdraws from VCCR Protocol is Step Backwards, (Mar. 10,
2005), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/new/document.do?id=C8544612FF018A4685256FC0006301.

